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ABSTRACT 
Linking the theoretical conceptualization of public and organizational accountability, 
defined as a culture of high-trust, with the Government Performance and Results 
Modernization Act (GPRA-MA) of 2010, may revolutionize the way Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) leaders and performance practitioners, partners and 
stakeholders consider and apply strategic performance management practices and 
processes within the department.  
This thesis contains twelve (12) recommendations based on the concept of meta-
governance, which incorporates “relational webs” and “network power” involving the 
general public, into departmental performance management and improvement processes. 
Our next generation solution to creatively implement the GPRA-MA, innovative 
(democratic) networked governance, integrates social complexity theory epistemologies 
and best practice principles in an attempt to ameliorate the five (5) cultural conditions 
identified as contributing to deficiencies within the five (5) major focus areas of the 
GPRA-MA.  
Placing organizational management, strategic planning, program evaluation, 
performance measurement, governance, accountability and decision making within the 
larger context of fiscal, ethical and democratic responsibility and responsiveness, would 
be an inestimable force multiplier to both DHS politically appointed and career officials, 
having the potential to revolutionize the way the United States of America secures and 
protects its homeland.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Mindset regarding the role of the average citizen in government affairs is rapidly 
changing, impacting relational dynamics between public institutions and the American 
people at the federal, state and local levels. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
should begin to position itself now to find ways to translate improved mission 
effectiveness and efficiency into greater public and organizational understanding, 
cooperation and collaboration. Linking the theoretical conceptualization of public and 
organizational accountability, defined as a culture of high-trust, with the Government 
Performance and Results Modernization Act (GPRA-MA) of 2010, may revolutionize the 
way DHS leaders and performance practitioners, partners and stakeholders consider and 
apply strategic performance management practices and processes within the department.  
Establishing public accountability, or creating and maintaining a culture of high-
trust, as the main driver behind DHS mission focus and strategy achievement would 
represent a major paradigm shift, emboldening DHS leaders to break free from the 
Weberian model of civil service, currently being fed by mechanistic, rules-based, 
reductionist approaches to public administration. The strategic planning and decision-
making practices of the past, involving complex multi-year strategic plans, detailed 
annual budgets, and quarterly performance reports, as well as the resulting prescriptive, 
one-directional way of interfacing with the public, should be enhanced with more 
interdependent and interactive dialogue within organizations, as well as greater 
collaborative and sustained working relationship(s) with average citizens, increasingly 
asking for the opportunity to weigh in on problems and solutions that affect their daily 
lives. Incorporating “relational webs” and “network power” or innovative (democratic) 
networked governance into departmental performance management and improvement 
processes would encompass a much broader base of both public and private partners and 
stakeholders, obligating DHS strategic planners and decision-makers to look for solutions 
that are more complementary to the task, as diverse and complex as the extended 
environment in which they operate.  
 xx 
This thesis contains twelve (12) recommendations based on this concept of meta-
governance, the “next new thing” in federal government strategic performance 
management. They represent our next generation solution to creatively implement the 
GPRA-MA, considering social complexity theory epistemologies and best practice 
principles in an attempt to ameliorate the five (5) cultural conditions identified as 
contributing to deficiencies within the five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA-MA.  
Placing organizational management, strategic planning, program evaluation, 
performance measurement, governance, accountability and decision making within this 
larger context of fiscal, ethical and democratic responsibility and responsiveness, would 
be an inestimable force multiplier to both DHS politically appointed and career officials, 
having the potential to revolutionize the way the United States of America secures and 
protects its homeland.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been said that the definition of insanity is doing the same things over and 
over again, yet expecting different results. This is not the definition of insanity. It is the 
definition of bureaucracy.  
The saying, attributed to Einstein, rings no truer than when it comes to federal 
government Strategic Performance Management (SPM),1 succinctly defined here as the 
formulation, execution and assessment of strategy, where officials continually opt for 
simple solutions to tackle complex problems, always with the same expectation of 
success, and almost always with the same disappointing, lackluster, and transitory results.  
In Congress’ latest efforts to help agencies gain relevant insights into and improve 
mission performance, it recently passed the Government Performance and Results 
Modernization Act (GPRA-MA) of 2010.  
We will review this Act in order to obtain a clearer understanding not only of the 
written requirements of the law but also of its underlying precepts and function.  
The main purpose of this thesis, however, is not to provide a simple policy 
analysis of the legislation or an assessment of the progress and success of its 
implementation. The goal is to get government decision makers to see the world of 
performance management differently, to think and act in ways other than they have up to 
now, and entertain more innovative performance improvement solutions that lead to 
better, longer-lasting results. To accomplish this, we have placed the law within the 
overarching concept of public accountability, immediately defined here as a culture of 
high-trust.  
Linking the theoretical conceptualization of public and organizational 
accountability with the GPRA-MA may revolutionize the way DHS leaders and 
                                                 
1 Federal government strategic performance management encompasses strategic frameworks (strategic 
goals, objectives, strategies, priorities etc.), performance indicators (milestones, metrics, measures, targets, 
results), and methodologies and processes (governance and decision model analysis) to help organizations 
formulate, execute and assess strategy, gain relevant insights into progress, and make better-informed 
decisions to improve results.  
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performance management practitioners, partners and stakeholders consider and apply 
strategic performance management practices and processes within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). Redefining the performance improvement discipline in such a 
way, incorporating democratic governance which encompasses a much broader base of 
both public and private partners and stakeholders in departmental strategic performance 
management functions, will obligate DHS strategic planners and decision-makers to look 
for solutions that are more complementary to the task, as diverse and complex as the 
extended environment in which they operate. In turn, these more robust responses, 
leveraging social complexity theory epistemologies and focused on evolving strategy and 
collaborative decision making, will embolden leaders to break free from the bureaucratic 
insanity often associated with the Weberian model of civil service, currently being fed by 
today’s mechanistic, rules-based, reductionist approaches to public administration.  
A. GPRA-MA OVERVIEW 
The GPRA-MA is the culmination of prior legislative, regulatory and 
administrative requirements.2 It is meant to institutionalize the SPM within the federal 
government by codifying the development, use and reporting of performance information 
to clarify, assess, implement and continuously improve organizational strategy and its 
execution by identifying, measuring and then managing what matters in order to improve 
the effectiveness, efficiency and overall performance of operations. It offers a framework, 
with guiding principles and a strategy, for achieving greater transparency and 
understanding of the internal workings of government, hopefully resulting in improved 
congressional oversight of the use of taxpayer dollars and a better informed and more 
engaged American public. Its intent is to build strategic frameworks that describe end 
states rather than activities, performance indicators that speak of outcomes instead of 
outputs, analytical methodologies and review processes that replace imprecision and/or 
data overload with informed decision making, and finally, increased accountability  
 
 
                                                 
2 See Appendix A for an evolution of federal government performance management legislative, 
regulatory and administrative requirements. 
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through governance structures harnessing the commitment and engagement of leaders 
who do not thrive on status quo or indecision, but rather seek to drive innovation and 
improvement. 
This new statute, enacted on January 4, 2011, builds upon the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) performance planning, measurement development 
and reporting framework of 1993 (Public Law 103-62). It encourages greater use of 
performance information in program decision making by requiring that the 24 federal 
agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officer’s (CFO) Act of 1990 concentrate their 
efforts on the following five (5) major focus areas:  
• Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and 
Improvement: demonstrating leadership commitment to creating a positive 
learning and performance improvement culture;  
• Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment: aligning individual, 
program, and agency priorities through annual planning and goal-setting; 
• Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation: improving the 
quality of performance measures, by building analytic capacity to produce 
and analyze timely, actionable performance information for decision 
making; 
• Performance Reviews: conducting frequent, data-driven reviews to reduce 
costs (i.e., efficiency) and improve performance outcomes (i.e., 
effectiveness); and 
• Transparency and Accountability: communicating and reporting 
transparent performance information frequently and effectively to increase 
accountability and results.3  
The first four (4) focus areas contribute to accountability within government 
agencies, or inter- and intra-organizational trust, whereas the fifth area is geared more 
toward increasing trust in government through strategic communications with the general 
public.  
                                                 
3 (1) Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRA-MA), Public Law 111–
352; (2) GPRA Modernization Act, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs United States Senate to Accompany H.R. 2142 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, December 16, 2010; (3) Office of Management and Budget (OMB), OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 
6: Preparation and Submission of Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Performance 
Reports (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Pre-
decisional DRAFT, May 2012). 
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So What? Why spend such an inordinate amount of time reading about and 
discussing something that, for the majority of us, is no more than an obscure regulation?  
The importance of the GPRA-MA is beholden to the fact that it is currently the 
only “act” in town. It is the official context within which existing government 
performance management policy and strategy exists. Policy advisors, strategic planners, 
performance managers and decision-makers will not feel empowered to venture beyond 
their current familiar top-down, command-and-control approaches to SPM unless 
Congressional and OMB intent and requirements have first been considered and included. 
If one is to encourage government officials to apply principles and solutions from general 
industry best practices, to seek out and apply unfamiliar, more creative and/or innovative 
strategies to improve performance, they must first be associated and linked with what is 
already familiar to them. The officially recognized framework of the GPRA-MA will 
help DHS leaders and decision makers translate the boundary-less discipline of social 
complexity theory and related best practices into strategic performance management 
solutions that are perceived and accepted as rational, legitimate and informed by 
government decision-makers. 
B. PROBLEM SPACE: EVIDENCE AND CAUSES OF GPRA-MA 
DEFICIENCIES  
It will be demonstrated, through both empirical evidence and subsequent peer-
reviewed literature, that the GPRA-MA, similar to most traditional strategic performance 
management frameworks, is failing to impact DHS performance and results, due to 
deficiencies manifested in all five (5) of the legislation’s major focus areas.  
We will demonstrate that there is a direct correlation, or causal relationship, 
between these “symptoms,” or deficiencies in government performance management 
practices, and the “disease,” or the overarching performance improvement culture. The 
five (5) primary cultural conditions contributing to the prevailing climate, are (1) the lack 
of the creation and sustainment of a high-trust culture (i.e., accountability), and (2) the 
particular challenges/difficulties involved with resolving performance management issues 
(i.e., “wicked” problems).  
  5 
Also having a negative impact on success, is (3) the administrative/bureaucratic 
tendency to direct and control.  
The remaining two conditions, (4) political considerations, and (5) insufficient 
oversight, do not seem to be having the same, direct (i.e., causal), influence on the 
“symptoms.” This is an important finding, since both political and administrative 
oversight are major elements of the GPRA-MA, representing the legislation’s current 
interpretation and primary focus. This may explain why the current approach is having 
such a limited impact in improving performance and results to date.  
An analysis of these five (5) cultural conditions will indicate that DHS’ past 
failures and current limited successes are primarily due to an inability to relinquish even 
the slightest control over one’s respective area of influence. This inability to “let go” and 
entertain more non-traditional solutions, is primarily due to the lack of trust caused by, 
and further exacerbating, the absence of true public and organizational accountability.  
Recommendations will be made in an effort to remedy these conditions, thus 
alleviating the deficiencies identified in the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas, resulting in a 
positive impact on the effectiveness of the legislation overall.  
C. GPRA-MA BACKGROUND AND PRIMARY THESIS ASSERTIONS 
Systematic measurement of performance has been evolving within the federal 
government since the early 1990s, beginning with the Chief Financial Officers Act of 
1990, meant to improve overall financial and management processes, and culminating 
with the 2010 update of the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), the 
first to underline the importance of clearly defining an end state to promote greater 
efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in federal spending. According to most of the 
literature, the basic tenant of both laws is that successful government performance entails 
managing for results.  
For over two decades now, both elected and appointed government officials have 
expressed the importance of impacting and communicating government performance.  
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However, in spite of the sustained focus and attention and accompanying optimism 
associated with the passage of these two major pieces of legislation, results continue to 
fall short of expectations.  
Even though GPRA-MA enhances SPM at the federal level, modernizing and 
refining the requirements established by the original Act of 1993, it has failed to ensure 
true accountability, or increased public trust, necessary for ultimate success.  
The literature will demonstrate that most public performance management 
frameworks only associate accountability with improved organizational outcomes, or 
performance results. These types of systems may satisfy the needs of public 
administrators responsible for implementing government programs, but they continue to 
fall short when it comes to ensuring true public and organizational accountability, which 
Melvin Dubnick and H. George Fredrickson equate with the creation and sustainment of a 
“High-Trust Culture.” They further state that today’s current governmental 
accountability mechanisms, much in line with the expectations and requirements of the 
GPRA-MA, are not sufficient to establish and maintain such a culture.  
Increasing this type of accountability requires much more than simply 
“operationalizing” performance management, much more than applying the same 
traditional, reductionist approaches to strategic planning and resource allocation used in 
the past, which tend to focus on the achievement of short-term, individual goals and 
objectives. Strategic performance management models, such as the GPRA of 1993, and 
its 2010 update, could be improved by applying much more descriptive, rather than 
prescriptive, solutions based on continual innovation and improvement through learning, 
communication and relational capabilities. Creating such a management philosophy and 
performance culture based on transparency, interaction and collaboration will require and 
result in a change in both attitude and behavior. 
Strategic performance management is a complex problem requiring complex 
solutions. Yet it has often been treated as a simple problem with simple solutions. It is a 
field that has been understated and undervalued by political and administrative officials, 
who often prefer to dismissively dither with and/or dabble in it. Where subject matter 
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expertise is lacking, “face value assumptions, group-think, inherited beliefs, bias, sloppy 
[or totally absent] logic, and all the other enemies of critical and independent thought,”4 
including cavalier or casual, offhand and uniformed opinions on the subject, continue to 
prevent any real and/or lasting progress in this arena.  
Challenging federal government officials to believe, think, and behave differently 
requires sound research, based on best practices in the fields of organizational 
management, strategic planning, program evaluation, performance measurement, 
governance, accountability and decision making. In order to compel these same officials 
to apply tried and true principles from these best practices, they must first be translated 
into specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and timely (SMART) recommendations in 
the context of current government policy and strategy.  
Conducting basic, applied, and action research into the GPRA-MA and strategic 
performance management best practices, informed by social complexity theory, and 
applying lessons learned to the various performance management and improvement 
strategies and solutions currently being applied within and across the department, would 
contribute to the creation of a cultural and organizational environment more conducive to 
the successful implementation of the Act. 
Furthermore, associating the GPRA-MA with improved organizational and public 
accountability (i.e., trust), requiring much more complex adaptive systems and solutions, 
would change the way the DHS thinks about these types of federal government strategic 
performance management frameworks, and how they might better be leveraged to impact 
and communicate results.  
Ultimately, the reason why the GPRA-MA is failing to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of DHS programs is not due to a flaw in the legislation or in its guiding 
principles. Deficiencies exist because there are missteps in its implementation, a 
misunderstanding or misinterpretation of its purpose and focus, a disregard of the  
 
                                                 
4 Lauren Wollman, “NS2013: What is Inquiry?,” (Online lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Center 
for Homeland Defense and Security, Monterey, CA), (n.d.), 
https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/research/lectures/research_inquiry/player.html. 
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necessity to create and sustain a “High-Trust Culture,” where government officials are 
giving and getting the benefit of the doubt, both intra- and inter-agency and vis-à-vis the 
American public. 
Lasting change and results will only be produced within a culture of public and 
organizational accountability. The GPRA-MA can contribute to the creation and 
sustainment of such a culture.  
D. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
The vision of the GPRA-MA is not complicated. It is quite simple. The 
government should be able to clearly, consistently and correctly demonstrate its success 
to internal and external stakeholders, particularly the general public.  
As the focus of a research topic, the GPRA-MA can describe how the federal 
government is working to ensure that today’s government programs are helping us 
achieve long-term results in the greater public interest. The GPRA-MA, in fact, proposes 
a way to do this through the development and implementation of a five-prong approach 
or strategy. 
The purpose of this thesis is not to evaluate how well the DHS is achieving its 
long-term mission. The intent is not to directly impact program outcomes through 
specific program analysis or evaluation findings and recommendations. Nor is the 
research agenda meant to conduct a comprehensive, in-depth assessment of DHS 
performance management and improvement policies and practices, or make detailed 
process or procedural recommendations to improve the department’s current GPRA-MA 
solutions. 
The primary purpose of this thesis project is to link the theoretical and practical 
conceptualization of public and organizational accountability with the GPRA-MA, and 
make recommendations to instill such a culture at the DHS. If DHS leaders and 
performance management and improvement practitioners, partners and stakeholders 
come to realize the current limitations of the legislation due to its primary association 
with the political and bureaucratic intent of elected and appointed officials, as opposed to 
  9 
the greater good of the American public, they might possibly begin to view the Act 
differently. By providing these same officials with solid empirical evidence that the 
GPRA-MA and associated best practices can be valuable tools5 in better fulfilling their 
public trust roles, they might experience a paradigm shift in the way they consider and 
apply strategic performance management within the DHS: 
You could say paradigms are harder to change than anything else about a 
system […]. But there’s nothing physical or expensive or even slow in the 
process of paradigm change. In a single individual it can happen in a 
millisecond. All it takes is a click in the mind, a falling of scales from the 
eyes, a new way of seeing. Whole societies are another matter—they resist 
challenges to their paradigms harder than they resist anything else. So how 
do you change paradigms? […] You keep pointing at the anomalies and 
failures in the old paradigm. You keep speaking and acting, loudly and 
with assurance, from the new one. You insert people with the new 
paradigm in places of public visibility and power. You don’t waste time 
with reactionaries; rather, you work with active change agents and with 
the vast middle ground of people who are open-minded. Systems modelers 
say that we change paradigms by building a model of the system, which 
takes us outside the system and forces us to see it whole.6 
Placing the GPRA-MA with its agenda to improve mission and program 
outcomes, or performance results, within an overarching model of accountability or 
public and organizational trust, will allow us to move beyond the status quo, go beyond 
the current practice of adopting simple solutions to tackle complex problems, and instead 
assist us in identifying alternative approaches more meaningful to end users at all levels 
of the performance improvement continuum.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ROADMAP 
Even though the GPRA-MA contributes to better framing the discussion 
pertaining to performance results, defining and achieving true accountability is still 
largely unchartered territory within the field of federal government strategic performance 
management. There is no clearly defined vision. There are conflicting, often 
                                                 
5 Some of these methodological tools or disciplines include complexity theory, public accountability, 
public administration, organizational accountability, strategic performance management, and governance. 
6 Donella Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (Chelsea Green Publishing, 2013), 3078–3088, 
Kindle edition. 
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contradictory values. There is no real urgency. And regarding results, few have 
recommended what actions to take to get us there, or how to know when we arrive. 
Up to now, many government institutions have preferred public administration, 
expressed in terms of government performance and results, to public accountability, or 
the creation and sustainment of a “High-Trust Culture.” This lack of public and 
organizational accountability has been the primary cause of the failure of traditional 
strategic performance management frameworks, such as the GPRA-MA, which tend to 
associate accountability immediately, simply (and uniquely), with improved 
organizational outcomes through the execution of a political and/or management agenda 
meant to improve individual program impact. Costs of this preference are measured in 
terms of the inability to improve and adequately communicate outcome performance and 
results, as well as to achieve overarching mission effectiveness and efficiency.  
Closing the gap between these two non-mutually exclusive and parallel worlds of 
public accountability and public administration will involve: 
• Defining the problem, in terms of how deficiencies in all five (5) major 
focus areas of the GPRA legislation are primarily attributable to five (5) 
cultural conditions; 
• Reviewing official government policy and external best practices 
pertaining to the GPRA-MA, SPM, and social complexity theory to define 
and/or identify current policy requirements and goals and generate a clear 
set of non-mutually exclusive policy alternatives and solutions; and 
• Making specific recommendations, leveraging the Act, to modify current 
approaches to GPRA-MA implementation, predicting and evaluating the 
impact such modifications might have on increasing accountability and 
improving public and organizational trust.  
By asking and answering the following research questions, we will be able to (1) 
understand why and how the lack of public and organizational accountability has rendered 
the GPRA-MA ineffective, and how this ineffectiveness is impeding organizational trust, 
greater awareness, participation, cooperation and collaboration (i.e., condition); (2) 
understand how this situation hinders the improvement and communication of program 
performance and results (i.e., cost); (3) understand how this lack of successful 
performance management and improvement practices negatively impacts DHS mission 
effectiveness and efficiency (i.e., consequence); and finally (4) make practical 
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suggestions on how to apply (i.e., application) SPM best practices, informed by social 
complexity theory, within all five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA to increase public and 
organizational accountability and improve the overall impact of the legislation. 
Overarching/Fundamental Research Question(s): How has the lack of true 
public and organizational accountability rendered the GPRA-MA ineffective and what 
can the DHS do to instill a culture of greater accountability, or increased trust, by 
leveraging the Act? 
• Condition (Pure Research): The lack of accountability has rendered the 
GPRA-MA of 2010 ineffective, which in turn impedes organizational 
trust, participation, cooperation and collaboration, perpetuating a vicious 
circle. Why? How?  
• Cost (Pure Research): This situation prevents the improvement and 
communication of performance and results. How?  
• Consequence (Pure Research): How are these inadequate performance 
management practices negatively impacting DHS mission effectiveness 
and efficiency?  
• Application (Practical Research): How can DHS leverage the GPRA-
MA to create, then cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e., a high-trust 
culture) within the department, and vis-à-vis the general public? 
F. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
Our novel approach to studying federal government strategic performance 
management in the context of the GPRA-MA and the overarching concept of public and 
organizational accountability will allow the following to be integrated into current policy 
and practices as intrinsic elements of the field, resulting in a significant shift in the scope 
of management resources and (potential) solutions: 
• Redefinition of public performance accountability as enduring public and 
organizational trust, cooperation and collaboration; 
• Immediate association of the GPRA-MA with this revised definition along 
with a more comprehensive understanding of performance-based 
accountability; 
• Acknowledging the utility of social complexity theory and applying it to 
enhance strategic performance management; 
• Diminution of the political-administrative dichotomy between the 
executive and legislative branches of government, and between public 
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service and public trust, reconciling direct political influence (i.e., 
legislation) with administrative discretion and decision making (i.e., 
policy) and the political/bureaucratic definition/understanding of 
accountability with the expectations of the general public; 
• Greater awareness of the dramatically changing cultural landscape and 
evolving dynamics involving United States (U.S.) government-citizen 
interaction;  
• Potential for unelected government officials to remain responsive and 
accountable to the people, and not only to other appointed, and/or elected 
officials; and  
• Concept of innovative (democratic), networked, meta-governance as the 
“next new thing” in government performance and overarching solution 
(i.e., holistic, comprehensive, and sustainable framework) for public and 
organizational accountability. 
G. ASSUMPTIONS 
There are at least two assumptions on which the research and its conclusions rest: 
• An acceptance of the five (5) designated GPRA-MA focus areas as the 
main purpose and intent of the legislation;7 
• A correlation and/or causal relationship between the GPRA-MA and 
strategic performance management;  
Throughout this thesis, particular effort will be made to demonstrate how opaque 
political considerations have placed undue stress on the implementation of the GPRA-
MA within and across federal agencies. Eliciting greater commitment from the highest 
echelons of national leadership within the legislative and executive branches of 
government to continually place public awareness, transparency, communication, 
participation, cooperation and collaboration at the forefront of government performance 
improvement efforts, will strengthen both the public and organizational accountability 
agendas of elected and appointed administrators. 
Absence such commitment, it will be more difficult to implement the new (i.e., 
innovative) strategies and recommendations proposed within this thesis to mitigate and/or 
overcome challenges.  
                                                 
7 The five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA-MA of 2010 are: (1) leadership engagement, 
collaboration, learning; (2) strategic planning, clarity, organizational alignment; (3) program evaluation, 
performance measurement; (4) performance review, improvement; (5) transparency, accountability, 
decision making. 
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H. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Linking the theoretical conceptualization of public and organizational 
accountability with the GPRA-MA, will propel DHS leaders onto a much broader 
operating stage, that of the public arena, one that is much more complex, diverse and 
interdependent than the controlled environment within which public administrators have 
been used to operating. Successfully navigating through such an expanded and dynamic 
landscape will require much more nuanced/flexible, organic and emergent ways of 
conducting government business than have been employed in the past.  
It will require moving beyond the status quo and the current practice of adopting 
simple solutions to tackle complex problems. It will require the identification of 
alternative strategic planning and decision-making approaches more relevant to end users 
at all levels of the performance improvement continuum, based on public and 
organizational trust, cooperation and collaboration, and not solely on performance-related 
issues. 
Because of the evolution of the existing cultural climate relative to public 
accountability, namely, the call for greater government-citizen interaction, we have 
settled on a single overarching approach to affect change, adopting the emerging 
philosophy of innovative (democratic) networked governance. Meta-governance 
leverages the resilient dynamics of (small) group interaction to achieve success, such as 
diversity, interdependence, collaborative dialogue and boundary-less network learning, 
involving a multiplicity of stakeholders. 
Adopting such a strategy along with relevant solutions will allow us to replace our 
current simplistic definition of public accountability, as improved government 
effectiveness and efficiency, with its much broader and more meaningful definition of 
public trust, or giving and getting the benefit of the doubt, both intra- and inter-
organizationally, and vis-à-vis the American public.  
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Closing the gap between public administration (i.e., organizational performance 
accountability) and public trust, means mitigating and/or remedying the deficiencies 
identified within all five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA, as well as the underlying 
cultural conditions contributing to them, by: 
• Overcoming resistance to change and stagnation through greater 
leadership and management engagement, committed to transforming 
standard working groups into performance-focused action learning forums 
creating momentum for continuous improvement;  
• Eliminating confusion and doubt with regards to leadership motive and 
intent, by seeing complexity and unpredictability, not as overwhelming 
challenges, but as opportunities to discover more participative ways of 
achieving strategic clarity and organizational alignment, of reaching 
consensus, and gaining external stakeholder confidence in the homeland 
security enterprise; 
• Transforming the inconsistency and indecision which currently 
characterize agency performance measurement and evaluation functions 
into analytical products that enjoy greater credibility and legitimacy, 
leading to improved intra- and inter-agency collaboration; 
• Replacing the current indifference and passivity toward performance 
reviews with motivation for and initiative toward more innovative 
management dialogue and cross-organizational interaction; and 
• Reconciling organizational performance accountability with public trust 
by applying transparent and democratic meta-governance structures, 
systems and processes, turning current public criticism and conflict into 
greater optimism and contribution to the homeland security mission.  
Moving from our current state of government strategic performance management 
to our desired end state will entail adopting best practices, informed by social complexity 
theory. It is in this way that we can reconcile performance results with public trust, 
combining both character and competence to find the correct balance between 
organizational COLLABORATION and COMPETITION, and individual CREATION 
and CONTROL.  
The following twelve (12) recommendations based on the concept of innovative 
(democratic) networked governance within the greater context of public accountability, 
represent our “next generation” solution to creatively implement the GPRA-MA. They 
have incorporated social complexity theory epistemologies and principles in practical  
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ways to ameliorate all five (5) of the cultural conditions affecting performance 
management and improvement, alleviating deficiencies in all five (5) GPRA-MA focus 
areas. 
Our first set of recommendations focus on COLLABORATION, or doing things 
together, as a means to diffuse and redistribute power, leveraging the almost limitless 
capabilities of an almost equally limitless pool of talent: 
• Collaborate #1: Require an Innovative (Democratic) Networked 
Governance Factor and Indicator of Success in Senior Executive 
Service (SES) Performance Plans—With the intent of cultivating public 
service motivation among employees, the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) can further link performance management and 
strategy achievement with overall public good by adding an additional 
(public) engagement factor to one of the five (5) critical elements of 
federal SES performance plans.  
• Collaborate #2: Encourage Internal Agency Communication, 
Collaboration, Outreach between Performance Improvement Officers 
(PIOs), and Congressional and Public Affairs Liaisons—The federal 
Performance Improvement Officer (PIO) and staff should establish, long-
term, collaborative working relationships with the agency’s internal 
Legislative and Public Affairs Offices in order to better embrace the 
power of politics and public messaging as positive rather than negative 
forces impacting the performance management discipline. 
• Collaborate #3: Apply the Innovative (Democratic) Networked 
Governance Principle of Crowd-Sourcing at the State and 
Local/Tribal Levels to Advance the DHS Mission—In partnership and 
close collaboration with national Congressional representatives and state 
and local/tribal leaders, PIO, Congressional and public affairs staff should 
establish DHS information campaigns, “DHS 101 Seminars,” meant to 
educate and mentor local communities, both individuals and groups (i.e., 
businesses and non-profits), regarding the DHS mission set, its current 
programs, projects and activities.  
Next, we should concentrate on redefining COMPETITION, or doing things fast, 
to ensure that inclusive dialogue and teamwork are continually being seen as force 
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• Compete #1: Select the PIO/Deputy PIO Based on Factors of Trust—
Because of the importance the GPRA-MA places on the contributions of 
the federal PIO to create a positive learning and performance improvement 
culture, and oversee all agency performance-related activities, the 
selection of the PIO and/or Deputy PIO should be based on factors of 
trust, then placed in a position within the agency that is sufficiently 
hierarchically influential to affect real change. 
• Compete #2: Develop Innovative Networked (Meta-)Governance 
Leadership Training for Federal PIOs and Staff—OPM and OMB 
should work with agencies to develop and deliver strategic and innovative 
leadership training for federal PIOs and their staffs, emphasizing the true 
face of leadership, increasingly showing a preference for meta-
governance, abandoning the traditional top-down, closed loop, governance 
structures prevalent in today’s public sector. 
• Compete #3: Develop and Communicate Government Performance 
Information Tailored to the People—If knowledge management means 
producing, analyzing and communicating information in ways that create 
true value to end users and consumers, then public-facing performance 
data should provide context and meaning to average citizens and/or their 
representatives. To ensure that the federal government’s performance 
measure development and reporting processes are serving and satisfying 
the needs of the taxpayer, transparently communicating public policy and 
its effects as a means to gain and maintain public trust, publically 
accessible performance information should be improved through the 
application of six (6) key attributes of performance reporting.  
Next, unleashing true CREATIVITY, or doing things first, freeing (human) 
resources from the limits of Weberian and Newtonian paradigms, can be facilitated in the 
following ways: 
• Create #1: Apply the Innovative (Democratic) Networked Governance 
Principle of Co-Creation at the State and Local/Tribal Levels to 
Advance the DHS Mission—Building on the information and momentum 
gained through the “DHS 101 Seminars” public outreach and crowd-
sourcing campaigns, develop a co-creative approach to further tap into the 
valuable perspective that a more limited and targeted number of average 
citizens, business and non-profit leaders, and state and local homeland 
security officials can bring to defining and refining the DHS mission, its 
continually evolving strategy and program solutions.  
• Create #2: Create an Innovative (Web-Enabled) Networked 
Community of Practice (CoP) to Inform DHS Strategy and 
Performance Measure Development—DHS organizational performance 
management can be reconciled with the various definitions of 
transparency and public accountability through interactive, web-enabled 
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Communities of Practice (CoPs), and their supporting Information 
Communication Technologies (ICTs), capable of interfacing with a 
multiplicity of partners and stakeholders, particularly the general public. 
• Create #3: Leverage Web 2.0 Technologies in Policy Development and 
Decision-Making—In ongoing efforts to institutionalize processes that 
establish safe spaces for government officials to create and innovate, 
agencies should work with their internal public affairs and information 
technology shops, to identify any current ongoing efforts to leverage 
advanced internet technologies and applications including blogs, wikis, 
RSS, and social bookmarking to better engage constituencies and improve 
the presentation and implementation of specific agency programs.  
The final three (3) recommendations shatter the myth that machine-like 
CONTROL, or simply doing things right, automatically culminates in achieving strategic 
success:  
• Control #1: Consider A Multiplicity of Program Theory Models to 
Develop Strategy and Measure Performance—Whether an agency opts 
to use the logic model, balanced scorecard, strategy mapping, or a 
different, uniquely tailored alignment methodology to create a clear line of 
sight between high-level strategic goals and individual program and 
personal contributions, preference should be toward the development of 
counterintuitive governance frameworks that mobilize a diversity of 
players and remove obstacles to greater collaboration.  
• Control #2: Develop Innovative (Collaborative) Networked 
Performance Measurement and Evaluation Methodologies—In order 
to minimize distrust in executive branch analytical products, and ensure 
that they are making credible, unbiased representations about how well 
agencies and programs are performing, include a cross-representation of 
analysts in working groups (i.e., performance-based action learning 
forums) dedicated to developing acceptable methodologies and tools that 
improve the overall analytical capability and capacity of the department 
and appropriately and accurately define, measure, achieve and 
communicate what truly constitutes success.  
• Control #3: Reform the Congressional Authorization and 
Appropriations Processes and Budget-Performance Frameworks—As 
the legislative and executive branches work to reconcile their competing 
and often contradictory agendas and priorities, Congress should consider 
consolidating the DHS authorization and appropriations structure in order 
to facilitate departmental comparisons of impact based on like costs across 
components and offices. This would increase the department’s cross-
organizational analytic capability and capacity and help DHS leadership 
better understand the implications of its strategic planning and resource 
allocation decisions.  
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The OMB’s underlying philosophy in interpreting the GPRA-MA was to 
institutionalize strategic performance management through the development and 
implementation of a government-wide infrastructure and associated processes that would 
reunite/assemble holistic long-range planning with short-term prioritization. In order to 
encourage commonality at all levels of the performance improvement continuum, while 
avoiding the linear, prescriptive approach advanced by the former Program Assessment 
Rating Tool (PART), OMB preferred a wider mission-based view of performance, as 
opposed to the narrower programmatic approach; one that required the establishment of 
cross-cutting goals and objectives and intra- and inter-agency collaboration to be 
successful. As a result, the updated A-11 Circular (Part 6), interpreting the GPRA-MA, is 
more of a high-level doctrinal policy on strategic planning concepts and principles, meant 
to create “safe” environments for creative performance improvement practices, rather 
than strict step-by-step guidance to ensure compliance.  
At the time OMB set about developing/revising its Performance Management 
Framework (PMF), there was no reliable management process within the federal 
government informing the Circular A-11 to consistently interpret the Modernization Act. 
Previous performance-based strategic management frameworks had been advanced, only 
to be torn down by subsequent administrations. There simply was not any government-
wide performance management, or executive branch decision-making framework, that 
enjoyed the same stability and legitimacy as the federal budgeting process. 
Recognizing that performance improvement is a “wicked” problem requiring 
multiple approaches and processes, OMB’s revised PMF establishes a prerogative for 
leadership to promote the setting of clear, ambitious goals with supporting empirical data, 
and the tracking of progress toward those goals through frequent evidence-based reviews. 
It was meant to be linked with other management models, in an effort to institutionalize a 
government-wide performance improvement process, mirroring the annual budget cycle, 
with the primary purpose of getting a somewhat skeptical leadership more frequently 
engaged in driving and monitoring progress against high-level goals, objectives and 
priorities.  
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OMB’s current governance approach was influenced by discussions on the Hill 
and various strands of learning coming from academia and private industry, but most 
importantly, the PMF was inspired by the United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister’s 
Delivery Unit Report that created one of the most innovative performance management 
processes to come out over the past few years: the Performance Stat Review, whose 
primary purpose was to get everyone, particularly leadership, proactively engaged in 
developing and measuring progress against national strategy and broad, long-term 
strategic objectives. Short-term capacity was concurrently built through current and 
projected baselines of government-wide capabilities and requirements, focused on near-
term success, needed to achieve priority goals.  
The translation of the UK’s Stat methodology into U.S. federal government 
performance management policy reflects this bi-furcated approach. OMB’s Strategic 
Objectives Annual Review (SOAR) process serves as a “mechanism to reinforce long-
term strategic thinking, [by asking] tough questions about progress on high-level goals, 
strategic trade-offs, the most effective allocation of resources, and legislative needs that 
will enable agencies to achieve higher performance.”8 At the same time, extensive 
resources are being dedicated to short-term priority setting associated with these goals. 
Agency Priority and Cross-Agency Priority Goals (APGs/CAPs) recognize that 
“improving government performance is hard and demanding work, [requiring] systematic 
attention to tracking high-quality data closely over a sustained period, identifying patterns 
and casual factors, and coming up with solutions. It means corralling and managing what 
is likely to be a diverse network of stakeholders.”9 
The OMB PMF is like seed, dispersed to get people thinking about results-based 
management, inspiring, rather than mandating, agencies and sub-agencies to incorporate 
sound performance management principles into their internal processes as standard 
operating procedure. Describing success, rather than prescribing solutions, it has laid the 
groundwork for greater fluidity and flexibility in strategic performance management 
                                                 
8 Donald Moynihan, The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA Modernization 
Act (Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2013), 13. 
9 Ibid., 12. 
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systems and practices, providing “top cover” for government officials and performance 
practitioners who wish to innovate in this arena, if they choose to do so. 
Guns don’t kill, people do. Likewise, neither the GPRA-MA mandate, nor the 
OMB Circular A-11 and resulting strategic performance management framework(s) will 
automatically, on their own, instill a culture of true public accountability. People can, 
however, by working together and adeptly wielding its various drivers to produce the 
kind of success we have always talked about, desired and anticipated, but never truly 
achieved.  
For those of you among us who have no intention of instilling a culture of 
accountability, or a genuine results-based management culture within the DHS as a 
standard paradigm for its professionals, then you need read no further. We offer you only 
one recommendation: dismantle the entire resource-consuming cottage industry, which 
has built up around the GPRA and GPRA-MA over the past two decades. Instead of 
paying lip service to a performance infrastructure that is being maintained simply to 
“protect” the agency from Congressional and/or other external stakeholder “prying,” you 
should end the hypocrisy and waste now by intentionally limiting your “performance” 
infrastructure to a bare minimum, in minimal compliance with the strict requirements of 
the mandate. 
As for the others, for those of you who want more, we hope that you will find 
reassurance in the following chapters that you have been given permission to dream big. 
Our discussion will culminate with further details pertaining to the twelve (12) above-
mentioned recommendations having the potential for far-reaching and long-lasing 
consequences. They have been written with daring and bold confidence, for bold and 
daring leaders.  
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II. DEFINITION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Before discussing ways the GPRA-MA is advancing federal government SPM, 
how it is being used to hold agencies accountable to achieve measurable results, and how 
it might be leveraged to establish and maintain a culture of high-trust within the DHS, it 
would be beneficial to first obtain a basic understanding of the principles and concepts 
surrounding public administration and accountability, particularly as they relate to 
organizational performance. 
The Act, as is the case with most public performance management frameworks, 
would lead us to immediately (and simply) equate accountability with improved 
organizational outcomes, or performance results.  
True accountability, however, is much more.  
A. WHAT IS ACCOUNTABILITY? 
The founding fathers, in their search of a “government of the people, for the 
people, and by the people,” established a federal constitutional republic consisting of 
three branches of government, the executive, the legislative and the judicial, each 
recognizing their limitations on the exercise of power. Respective roles and 
responsibilities were written into the text of the U.S. Constitution.  
A nation’s Constitution describes its very nature. The nature of the American 
experience and collective social order is one of distributed, balanced and limited power. 
Implicit in the design of the American Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and 
subsequent Bill of Rights is the separation of powers (i.e., checks and balances), the 
federal-state division of sovereignty (i.e., federalism), and the recognition that the 
ultimate arbiter of all disputes would be the law (i.e., the Constitution). In the United 
States, both (1) limited government, and (2) citizen participation (i.e., republican liberty) 
are necessary to maintain public trust. American thought pertaining to national unity and 
freedom are inseparable from these two pillars and their underlying principles of 
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federalism, the separation of powers, self-governance, and the rule of law.10 In the 
American mind, there are no exclusions, or exceptions to these fundamental 
requirements.  
Such concepts also extend to the realm of public administration, where the 
separation of powers clause has created a political-administrative dichotomy between the 
executive and legislative branches of government separating direct political influence 
(i.e., legislation) from administrative discretion and decision making (i.e., policy).  
Beginning in the early 20th century, Woodrow Wilson, in his attempt to reign in 
the influence of special interests in the affairs of state, defined public accountability as 
the exercise of administrative power under the control and supervision of non-elected 
officials (i.e., civil servants). He believed that protection against tyranny would only 
come through separating political decision making, beholden to special interests, from 
administrative policy execution.11 Indeed, Wilsonian thought purported that many areas 
of public administration should be based upon expertise and neutral principles alone, in 
order to free the executive branch of government from the more negative influences of 
partisan politics.12  
However, in the minds of many Americans, the only legitimate government is the 
one that remains directly responsible to the people. Therefore, adequate frameworks, 
based on transparency, open discussion and participative decision making, should be 
(re)established to ensure true accountability in public administration, where government 
policy making and implementation remain responsive and accountable to the people, and 
not only to appointed, or even, elected officials. 
What would such a culture of public accountability look like? How can it be 
observed and measured? What does the lack of accountability look like? Where does 
DHS fall along this spectrum?  
                                                 
10 Herman Belz, Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in America (Washington, DC: The Heritage 
Foundation, 2009), 77. 
11 Donald F. Kettle, The Politics of the Administrative Process (Los Angeles: Sage, 2012), 12. 
12 Ronald J. Pestritto, PhD, The Birth of the Administrative State: Where It Came From and What It 
Means for Limited Government (The Heritage Foundation: First Principles Series, no. 16, 2002).  
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B. PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
Donald F. Kettle proposes three pillars of public accountability:13 
• The legal/political responsibility to establish and uphold the law (i.e., 
Constitution); 
• The bureaucratic/administrative ethical responsibility to be obedient to 
the law, to hierarchy, and to standards of efficiency and effectiveness; and  
• Adherence to moral standards and values. 
Legality can be expressed in two ways: (1) legislation based on the Constitution, 
and in conformity with existing law; and (2) public policy influenced by political 
considerations. 
Ethics pertains to the rules and regulations governing public administrators and 
officials in the implementation of legislation and public policy.  
Morality is an individual’s internal compass (i.e., what is right and wrong for 
him/her).  
Fortunately, for government administrators these three elements often overlap, but 
not always. Sometimes there is divergence due to particular circumstances and 
individuals. 
The challenge then becomes how to reconcile freedom and flexibility, or 
discretion, to act when necessary in order to obtain results in the implementation of 
public policy, while still remaining accountable to the law, ethics and morals. This 
involves successfully subjecting administrative/bureaucratic power (i.e., ethics) to legal 
accountability (i.e., both the law and politics), and ultimately, to a nation’s guiding 
compass (i.e., values and morals). When unaligned, any legal boundaries codified into 
law will simply result in increasingly complex and difficult to solve political challenges 
created by poor administrative decisions made in an ad-hoc fashion by individuals on the 
front lines liberally interpreting ethics-based policy according to their own morals. 
It is not only professional training (i.e., bureaucratic/administrative responsibility) 
nor external controls (i.e., political/legal responsibility) that ultimately hold executors 
                                                 
13 Kettle, The Politics of the Administrative Process, 10. 
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accountable, but, also their own internal compasses (i.e., ethical/moral behavior), which 
take into account situational considerations, systemic forces and the deterrence offered by 
various mechanisms of reward and punishment. True public accountability must include 
all three elements, if it is to ensure political legitimacy in nation-states of consent, where 
government is based on laws established by the governed and not simply on the mere 
whims, or morals, of individuals.  
This is a tall order, but can be accomplished by establishing sound public 
administration, which ensures legal, ethical, and moral accountability within public 
service.  
C. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
There are, in fact, at least four distinct categories of accountability expectations in 
public administration today: ethical, democratic, fiscal and performance.14 Because these 
perspectives are each based on a common understanding or general concept of public 
accountability, we begin our discussion with a simple, yet broad definition offered by 
Melvin Dubnick and H. George Frederickson: 
Accountability can be approached as having two major definable 
characteristics: (1) it is a social relationship between at least two parties; 
(2) in which at least one party to the relationship perceives a demand or 
expectation for account giving between the two. This definition highlights 
the fact that accountability is social in nature—it must involve two or 
more individuals to come into play in any relationship.15 
The authors equate Accountability with the creation and sustainment of a “High-
Trust Culture,” further stating that today’s current governmental performance 
                                                 
14 Ethical Accountability: Government agencies operate honestly, without conflict of interest, self-
dealing, other forms of fraud, or abuse of the power of governmental authority. Democratic: Government 
agencies do what their citizens want and need, engaging citizens and their elected representatives in 
understanding trade-offs and making well-informed choices among competing priorities. Government 
agencies treat people civilly and courteously, unless there are strong justifications not to, so people do not 
resent or resist government because it has acted in a rude, slow, or inappropriate manner. Fiscal: 
Government spends its money as authorized, with as little waste as possible. Performance: Government 
agencies and their employees work intelligently and diligently to deliver effective and cost-efficient 
government programs. Shelley H. Metzenbaum, Performance Accountability: The Five Building Blocks 
and Six Essential Practices (Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2006), 7. 
15 Melvin Dubnick and H. George Frederickson, Public Accountability: Performance Measurements, 
the Extended State, and the Search for Trust (The Kettering Foundation, 2011), 6. 
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accountability mechanisms are not sufficient to get us to such a desired end state because 
they lack the necessary characteristics. Their basic argument is that the current problems 
associated with accountability are “rooted in a widely held but unsubstantiated belief in 
the capacity of [performance-based] accountability mechanisms alone to bring about the 
three things we require of our government today—efficient control, democratic 
legitimacy, and effective performance.”16 Because of the limitations of these current 
‘mechanical’ approaches, disassociated as they are from public expectations, the authors 
believe that they should be relabeled ‘promises of accountability’ frameworks.  
Dubnick and Frederickson continue by saying that, ultimately, most government 
accountability-based reform models, are about risk-avoidance, or ensuring adequate 
performance based on pre-defined and properly communicated expectations between 
public administrators in order to avoid being held accountable for mishaps or missteps 
down the line. They call these pre-factum (or before the fact) accountability to prevent or 
preclude post-factum (or after the fact damage control) accountability.17 Performance-
based accountability systems may increase precision and objectivity, resulting in 
knowing how well a program is performing, and what to do when it is not, but they will 
not automatically translate into true accountability, or increased public trust.  
A report from the Kettering Foundation, Don’t Count Us Out: How an 
Overreliance on Accountability Could Undermine The Public’s Confidence in Schools, 
Business, Government, and More,18 equates the disconnect between the way public 
institutions understand accountability, and the way the general public does, by drawing 
attention to the difference between Public Administration, or policy/program 
accountability, which falls to non-elected government officials, and Public 
Accountability, the main responsibility of elected political representatives. They purport 
that institutions think of accountability in terms of information sharing to increase 
                                                 
16 Dubnick and H. George Frederickson, Public Accountability: Performance Measurements, the 
Extended State, and the Search for Trust, 5. 
17 Ibid., 8. 
18 Jean Johnson, Jonathan Rochkind, and Samantha DuPont, Don’t Count Us Out: How an 
Overreliance on Accountability Could Undermine the Public’s Confidence in Schools, Business, 
Government, and More (Washington, DC: The Kettering Foundation and Public Agenda, 2011). 
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effectiveness and efficiency (i.e., organizational performance), while citizens tend to think 
of it in terms of relationship building, based on trust (i.e., public service). The general 
public is less concerned that a government institution is managed appropriately or 
properly executed, which is more the focus of the typical public servant and his or her 
bureaucratic leadership. The average American citizen’s concern relates to other 
considerations, less administrative- or management-centric, such as, improved service, 
responsiveness, trustworthiness, even reprimanding or rewarding individuals based on 
conduct. 
Elia Armstrong proposes an international ethics framework or integrity system for 
public administrations, defining public service accountability in equally simple terms:19 
• Integrity: honesty or trustworthiness in the discharge of official duties, 
serving as an antithesis to corruption or the abuse of office; 
• Transparency: unfettered access by the public to timely and reliable 
information on decisions and performance in the public sector; and 
• Performance: the obligation on the part of public officials to report on the 
usage of public resources and answerability for failing to meet stated 
performance objectives. 
It is only when public service accountability is placed within the greater context 
of ethics and democratic governance that public officials will be obligated to continually 
place community interest above their own, thus bridging the gap between policy and 
practice, rhetoric and results. 
D. PUBLIC SERVICE ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK 
Having thus established, for the purposes of this discussion, a final working 
definition of accountability in public administration as involving integrity, ethics, 
transparency, and fiscal and performance responsibility, let us focus our attention of the 
details of such a framework.  
                                                 
19 Elia Armstrong, Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in Public Administration: Recent 
Trends, Regional and International Developments and Emerging Issues (The United Nations: Economic 
and Social Affairs, August 2005), 1. 
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1. Integrity, Ethics and Accountability 
Even though there is disagreement regarding whether ethics can be taught, as 
researchers into child development assert that the values of most children are formed by 
the age of three,20 an attempt will be made here to point out the major expectations and 
trends relative to the integrity of government officials in the United States. 
As previously stated, individual integrity and ethics speak of a person’s internal 
compass, his or her sense of what’s right and wrong. Such concepts, on a public or 
community level, pertain more to the rules and regulations governing public 
administrators and officials in the implementation of legislation, public policy and 
government agency programs. Public ethics result when governments are operating 
“honestly, without conflict of interest, self-dealing, or other forms of fraud, or abuse of 
the undue influence of governmental authority.”21  
a. Individual Integrity 
We indicated earlier that American ethical values revolve around 
individualism and republican liberty, and, like a weathervane, are used by the average 
U.S. citizen to assess fairness and justice within the public arena. Public officials, both 
elected and non-, exercise legitimate power in the exercise of their functions, only in so 
far as they are (1) chosen by the people and (2) remain beholden to them, continuing in 
their representation and advocacy of each individual constituent’s unique, even 
idiosyncratic values, and personal needs. Such a (dis)position is captured well in one of 
the more famous American sayings, “No taxation, without representation.”  
b. Public Ethics 
With regards to public ethics, and in a world increasingly dominated by 
globalization, most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries, wealthy and mainly located in western Europe and North America, seem to be 
displacing emphasis on standard anti-corruption safeguards (i.e., conflict-of-interest, 
                                                 
20 Kettle, The Politics of the Administrative Process, 509. 
21 Metzenbaum, Performance Accountability: The Five Building Blocks and Six Essential Practices, 7. 
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bribery, fraud, etc.), and public access to information (i.e., freedom of information), in 
order to stress the importance of evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of 
government programs (i.e., performance). This is because efforts in the first two areas 
have been largely successful, due in large part to the robust transparency mechanisms that 
have been built into these countries’ accountability frameworks.22  
These OECD countries, which include the United States, identified and 
adopted 12 Principles to strengthen their national ethics infrastructures “incorporating an 
ethical dimension into management frameworks, and reviewing the impact of various 
reforms on the integrity of public sector employees,” by focusing on four (4) areas: (1) 
general core values of integrity, (2) specific standards of conduct, (3) actions for 
implementing and promoting integrity values, and (4) standards and methods and 
procedures to report integrity-related offences.23  
Public websites, such as The Global Integrity Report, transparently display 
the results of such efforts, using both qualitative analysis and quantitative indicators of 
success articulated around major concepts of accountability, such as the transparency of 
political and public administrative processes, media freedom, and conflicts of interest 
regulations.24  
Tables displaying the assessment results of the United States, highlighting 
the differences and gaps between the official policies, or legal frameworks, and the actual 
results, or impact of these frameworks, can be accessed on The Global Integrity Report 
website at the following link: http://report.globalintegrity.org.  
                                                 
22 Armstrong, Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in Public Administration: Recent Trends, 
Regional and International Developments and Emerging Issues, 8–9.  
23 Ibid., 4. 
24 Global Integrity Indicators: anti-corruption non-governmental organizations; media’s ability to 
report on corruption; public requests for government information; voting and party formation; election 
integrity; political financing transparency; conflicts of interest safeguards and checks and balances 
(executive, legislative, judicial branches and civil service); budget process oversight and transparency; 
whistle-blowing protections; government procurement transparency, fairness and conflicts of interest 
safeguards; privatization of public administrative functions transparency, fairness and conflicts of interest 
safeguards; national ombudsman; supreme audit institution; taxes and customs fairness and capacity; 
oversight of state-owned enterprises; business licensing and regulation; anti-corruption law, agency or 
equivalent mechanisms; judicial independence, fairness, and citizen access to justice; law enforcement 
conflicts of interest safeguards and professionalism. 
  29 
Results in 2009 found the United States, in comparison with thirty-three 
(33) other countries, with a “strong” rating, or overall score of 85 out of 100. Similar high 
scores were received with regards to freedom of the press, public access to information, 
political participation, election integrity, and civil society organizations serving as 
effective anti-corruption watchdogs, while high-level lobbying and the corrupting 
influence of money in politics, official secrecy, campaign finance regulations and lack of 
true independence and objectivity in American oversight agencies topping the list of 
challenges plaguing accountability frameworks within the United States.  
A possible solution to these challenges, still yet to be fully considered, 
would involve a solid plan to educate the private sector, both individuals and 
organizations, on their oversight responsibilities (i.e., “watchdog” roles), getting them, as 
partakers of civil society, more involved in the actual development and evaluation of 
public policy, goals and objectives. This would involve the establishment of collaborative 
venues involving the general public, such as “visioning workshops, discussion forums, 
and stakeholder-based advisory committees.”25 
Americans value individual values and can easily make them as binding as 
law, with their propensity to legislate morality, both at the local and national levels. In 
America, lack of representation translates into illegitimacy. As a government of consent, 
the United States has special concerns and expectations regarding the professional (if not 
personal) integrity and behavior of its elected and appointed officials. As such, it has 
established institutional stopgaps in its public service frameworks to ensure financial, 
human resource and information management probity, in the hopes that public trust will 
be upheld.  
2. Transparency, Democratic Governance and Accountability  
The second aspect of public accountability is democratic governance, defined as 
government agencies doing what their citizens want and need, and is dependent upon 
government’s responsibility to conduct its business transparently. Transparency is 
                                                 
25 David E. Booher and Judith E. Innes, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative 
Rationality for Public Policy (Taylor & Francis, 2010), 5, Kindle edition. 
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defined as unfettered access by the public to timely and reliable information on public 
sector decisions. Indeed, without transparency, or openness in government, citizens 
would remain detached and unengaged from the efforts of their elected representatives 
and appointed officials, not knowing whether they were doing what they were expected 
to do.  
The ultimate goal of democratic governance, undergird by government 
transparency, is to ensure that the common citizen has had a chance to understand and 
weigh in on what their government is doing, and evaluate how well it is doing it, in time 
to prevent and/or possibly correct ineffective or inappropriate actions. The logic is 
simple: the more people are informed, the more involved they will become. The more 
involved they become, the more they will buy in. The more they buy in, the less they will 
come to resent or resist their government.  
Professor P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, former European Union (EU) Ombudsman, 
states that democratic governance can only exist where there is government legitimacy, 
ensured through free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association, and public 
access to information.26  
He continues by saying that there are primarily two types of democratic 
government in existence today: pluralistic and egalitarian.  
Many European nations have adopted the egalitarian or “leveling” 
conceptualization of democracy, with their centralized form of government and 
preoccupation with equality, or homogeneity, as a major organizational principle. The 
major drawback of egalitarianism is the diminution of local representation and individual 
rights.  
The Americans prefer pluralistic democracy, rooted in their federalist principles 
and concept of shared power through checks and balances, excluding, by definition, the 
notion that electoral victory confers a plenary right to exercise power. Because the United 
                                                 
26 European Ombudsman, “Transparency, Accountability, and Democracy in the EU,” Lecture by 
Professor P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns 
Hopkins University, Bologna, Italy, October 17, 2006, 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/en/2006–10–17b.htm. 
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States has more robust institutional and societal checks and balances on power than many 
countries, it tends to demand greater account of its leaders than its European counterparts, 
and this, more often and throughout the political/administrative process. 
Indeed, most Americans would like to see government decision making as open 
and as close to the citizenry as possible. Without some devolution of power to the lower 
levels of government, bringing citizens closer to their governmental decision-making 
structures, public administration has the potential to descend into technocracy and 
elitism, or worse, corruption. Government that is unconnected and estranged from the 
governed automatically becomes less legitimate in peoples’ eyes, particularly Americans. 
In most Western democracies, citizens are free to elect the person they want to 
represent them, and if he or she does not deliver, the people will hold this individual 
“accountable” by not reelecting him/her to office. This is referred to as accountability at 
elections. In governments of consent, such accountability is no longer problematic. 
However, unless the electorate is continually being provided with enough information to 
make well-informed evaluations regarding the priorities and decisions of their 
representatives, what Professor Diamnadourous calls accountability between elections, 
accountability at elections becomes problematic. Indeed, an uninformed and disinterested 
electorate makes it easier for public administrators, operating under opaque conditions 
and with little notion of the will of the people, to become arbitrary and self-serving.  
True government legitimacy entails good democratic governance, or ensuring 
accountability both at and between elections, guaranteed through robust checks and 
balances, at both the institutional and societal levels. In other words, representative 
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The basic idea of transparency is that citizens should easily be able to 
obtain the information they need in order to call public authorities to 
account, whether at elections, or between elections. At least until recently, 
many modern democracies have tended to assume that sufficient 
information would [simply] emerge as a by-product of the exercise of 
traditional political freedoms, in particular the freedom of expression. 
However, freedom of expression does not require public authorities to 
impart information to citizens [voluntarily].27 
In order for this type of (official) information to flow freely from the government 
to the general public, some type of forcing mechanism is necessary.  
In the United States, laws designed to ensure public access to information include 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), passed in 1966, and the Ethics in Government 
Act, passed in 1978.  
a. Freedom of Information 
Freedom of information is an area of public administration where there 
seems to be the least amount of divergence, in both principle and practice. The United 
States expounds on the democratic principles of free nations, where rulers govern with 
the consent of the governed, on the right of citizenry to know and influence what their 
government is doing, and where leaders regularly update citizens on their action and 
progress through inspirational, motivating speeches and public awareness/outreach 
campaigns.  
Unfortunately, such closeness in expression is too often offset by an 
equally dramatic gap in practice, and much work remains to be done to ensure that 
freedom of information is being made relevant within the greater concept of democratic 
governance. 
b. Democratic Governance 
Democratic governance not only entails freedom and access to 
information, or transparency, it also requires policies and practices that allow citizens to 
influence what their government is doing and how they are doing it based on that 
                                                 
27 Ombudsman, “Transparency, Accountability, and Democracy in the EU.” 
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information. While adequate mechanisms exist to obtain information from government 
officials on their activities, there are few viable (i.e., effective) options for citizens to 
meaningfully act upon it once they have obtained it.  
Americans, understanding that they currently have no direct control over, 
and often very little knowledge of, the unaccountable numbers of individual decisions 
that administrators make every day to make public administration work, seek other 
avenues to voice their concerns and impact change.  
There are several options currently available to the American taxpayer to 
“petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” a right enshrined in the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
To begin with, there are two-way, interactive means of communicating 
with both elected and unelected government officials at the local level, such as attending 
town hall or neighborhood council meetings, participating in public surveys and focus 
groups, serving on boards, commissions, and oversight committees, sponsoring 
initiatives, volunteering, even running for office, all of which encourages greater public 
participation.28  
At the national level, as well, citizens can influence accountability 
between elections, by directly soliciting their elected officials (in Congress). 
We will focus our attention on the latter, more particularly on how the 
U.S. Congress sees its role and responsibility to be responsive to American citizens in 
fulfillment of its obligation to conduct oversight of the executive branch’s administrative 
programs and activities.  
The U.S. Congress accomplishes its oversight responsibilities through a 
variety of legislative review mechanisms: 
 
 
                                                 
28 Sandra Emerson, Royce Menkus, and Kathy Van Ness, The Public Administrator’s Companion: A 
Practical Guide (CQ Press, 2010), 66–69. 
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• Authorizing Committees: the regular legislative committees that prepare 
the laws that authorize government programs; 
• Appropriations Committees: standing committees that manage the annual 
appropriations process, or legislation that commits money to be spent on 
government programs; and  
• Committees on Government Operations: fulfilling the primary purposes of 
oversight, such as ensuring that administrators follow legislative intent, 
investigating instances of fraud, waste, and abuse, collecting information, 
evaluating program effectiveness, protecting legislative prerogatives, 
personal advocacy, and the reversal of unpopular actions.29  
Unfortunately, the task is daunting for Congressional representatives to 
execute adequate oversight of all government agencies and programs throughout the 
lifecycle of an authorized and appropriated investment (i.e., pre-, and post-legislation).  
Absence the smooth transition between legislation and the corresponding 
development, implementation, and evaluation of executive branch policy interpreting that 
mandate, divergence will exist between the law and its enforcement, with deficiencies 
plaguing the implementation of government programs distanced from the intent of 
lawmakers and the American values and expectations they represent. As long as there are 
such dverging interpretations and disagreements regarding the law, Americans will 
continue to write their Congressional representatives who will dutifully consider their 
constituents’ letters of complaint before forwarding them to the same exact agency where 
the complaint arose in the first place. Admittedly, such a self-policing approach for the 
“redress of grievances” is not ideal.  
Congressional oversight is not enough to ensure accountability, because 
today, elected officials are not making the rules, appointed officials are. Therefore, every 
effort should be made to continually and proactively seek to strengthen and sustain a 
more open, transparent, and participative relationship between public administrators and 
the citizens they serve. 
At present, there is no system in place where everyone knows what the 
accountability expectations are for unelected officials, where these expectations apply to 
                                                 
29 Kettle, The Politics of the Administrative Process, 488–489. 
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everyone. It is therefore extremely important to better inform the average citizen, through 
increased transparency, “making the inner workings of organizations visible,”30 through 
one-way communications from government agencies to the public, such as posting 
periodic strategic plans and performance reports on public websites, direct media 
relations, community education campaigns and e-government.31  
Getting average citizens, and other impartial/independent stakeholders, 
more involved in government affairs and operations would create an environment 
conducive to greater political and administrative accountability, for both policy makers 
and executors.  
This would require the establishment of a context and framework to 
ensure greater and broader citizenry participation in public policy and program 
development, implementation and assessment, sustained over time, where the general 
public is afforded opportunities to offer their perspectives on what they feel constitutes 
success.32 This would depart from the current practice of one-way marketing types of 
communication where the government simply informs its constituents on public 
programs, hoping to convince them of their ultimate utility and benefit. A way to do this 
would be through an ongoing two-way dialogue with a diverse set of both government 
and non-government stakeholders established at the local level.  
Many public agencies see their role as finding out what the public’s goals 
are so they can use them to prepare plans in the classic rational planning 
style. Citizens, especially the marginalized, are not apt to think in terms of 
goals but rather of daily life. Technical planners are so embedded in their 
own discourses that they typically do not recognize what citizens have to 
offer. One of the few ways planning and policy making can tap into the 
[real] life world, rather than relying solely on the world constructed by 





                                                 
30 Emerson, Menkus, and Van Ness, The Public Administrator’s Companion: A Practical Guide, 66. 
31 Ibid., 66–69. 
32 Ibid., 65. 
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method with its closed ended questions), and by powerful state and private 
interests, is to hear these citizen voices [directly] and respect their 
knowledge and experience.33 
In democratic nations of consent, power always considers and responds to 
the concerns of those governed, whether proactively or reactively, positively or 
negatively, collaboratively or prescriptively, peacefully or contentiously. Government 
actions must therefore acknowledge the current dynamics and expectations of the public, 
products of a nation’s laws and by-laws, themselves a reflection of its people, culture and 
history.  
Because the United States spends one-third of its Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) on national, state and local government combined,34 Americans tend to expect a 
lot from their government in terms of products, services, and verified results. These 
expectations are reflected in our governance systems and underlying philosophy of 
transparency. Current efforts in this arena include better informing the average citizen, 
through increased awareness of the inner workings of government.  
In order to translate these information sharing mechanisms into true 
democratic governance, however, where government officials are able to elicit and 
respond to the needs and expectations of citizens, such transparency needs to be coupled 
with the establishment of a context and framework for the broader incorporation of 
citizens in public policy and program development, implementation, and assessment. 
These types of “outside-the-box” solutions, challenging the current status quo of one-way 
communication, are required to ensure that public institutions remain accountable to the 
people, and not simply to their elected and appointed officials. Until this occurs, true 
accountability, both at and between elections, is neither attainable nor sustainable.  
 
 
                                                 
33 Booher and Innes, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for 
Public Policy, 173. 
34 Emerson, Menkus, and Van Ness, The Public Administrator’s Companion: A Practical Guide, 65. 
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In summary, the highest levels of political leadership should understand 
public administration as contributing to enduring public trust, communication and 
cooperation, enabled through our final and primary accountability expectation and the 
focus of the remainder of our discussions: improved performance, or the enhanced 
efficiency and effectiveness of government operations.  
3. Fiscal and Performance Responsibility and Accountability 
We conclude our discussion with the third and final definition(s) of public 
accountability, performance, defined as: (1) fiscal responsibility, primarily understood as 
government spending its money as authorized, with as little waste as possible, and (2) 
performance results, where government agencies and their employees deliver effective 
and cost-efficient government programs.35  
This third category of public accountability involves the evaluation of program 
results, or enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations and 
programs, one of the primary purposes of oversight. 
E. PERFORMANCE-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY 
There is a global trend toward performance- (or results-) based management, 
focusing on establishing and achieving strategic outcomes, not only in line with the rules 
and process requirements of public administrators, responsible for implementing 
government programs, but also in response to the demands and expectations of the 
general public; more concerned with ultimate outcomes, or what benefits they are 
actually receiving from public sector expenditures and activities.  
In the increasingly constrained fiscal environment in which we are operating, 
there is external pressure to do better with less, not only coming from civil society, 
working to ensure that government efforts remain linked to the needs and desires of the 
citizenry (i.e., democratic governance), but also from the various management and 
oversight bodies themselves, tasked with ensuring government accountability and results 
with ever dwindling resources. Not surprisingly, therefore, there are as many different 
                                                 
35 Metzenbaum, Performance Accountability: The Five Building Blocks and Six Essential Practices, 7. 
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definitions, interpretations, and understandings of government performance 
accountability as there are mission sets, due to the simple fact that being held accountable 
in such a universe entails that an agreed upon goal or target was set and met or missed.  
As such, the GPRA-MA accomplishes this first task in establishing a 
performance-based accountability system for public organizations, by clarifying 
accountability expectations, both with those being held accountable and with those 
holding them to account. It offers a public performance accountability framework that 
contributes to a common understanding of and commitment to the political and 
bureaucratic intent (i.e., goals and priorities) of elected and appointed officials.  
Success in the GPRA-MA environment, as it is currently being interpreted, 
therefore, is not being stated in terms of public accountability, or how we’re increasing 
public trust and achieving a better society, but in terms of government performance and 
results, or how well we are implementing a presidential and/or congressional agenda.  
The remainder of this thesis will attempt to bridge the gap between this rather 
limited concept of organizational performance accountability, and the overarching theory 
of public accountability, much more comprehensive in its scope and purpose. Our goal 
will be to find ways to translate improved GPRA-MA efficiency and effectiveness into 
improved public trust, cooperation and collaboration and vice versa.  
In particular, we will make recommendations on how to better leverage the 
legislation to instill a high-trust culture, first within the DHS, then vis-à-vis the general 
public at large. The following literature review delves more in depth into the Act, 
reviewing the five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA, as well as best practices 
contributions to the field of strategic performance management.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review addresses the five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA 
framework in the context of instilling a culture of accountability within the DHS, and vis-
à-vis the American public. An inspectional research of legislative36 and executive37 
branch requirements, outlined in official government policy related to the mandate, has 
been conducted in answer to the question: What does DHS have to do? This summary of 
official government policy and recommendations, directly pertaining to the legislation 
itself, its timeliness, anticipated benefits and immediate and long-term implications, as 
well as actual and potential opportunities and challenges regarding implementation, has 
been followed by a point-by-point commentary addressing each focus area. This analysis 
also incorporates a syntopical reading of a selection of published material on best 
practices in the evolving field of strategic performance management.  
By understanding both the limitations and contributions of existing schools of 
thought in the fields of organizational management, strategic planning, program 
evaluation, performance measurement, governance, accountability and decision-making, 
organizations will be in a better position to select and apply principles and configurations 
that are best adapted to their individual requirements and unique context (i.e., internal and 
external environments). The DHS, as a complex organization, would benefit from 
incorporating some of these more creative and innovative best practices into its major 
performance management strategies and functions.  
1. Advance Organizer 
The first section of the literature review addresses best practices related to 
leadership and collaborative networks and partnerships, leveraging a multiplicity of 
stakeholders. Organizational learning techniques, involving adaptability and the 
utilization of new (i.e., innovative) knowledge, have been emphasized.  
                                                 
36 GPRA-MA of 2010, Congressional Research Service, General Accountability Office (GAO), etc. 
37 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DHS, etc. 
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The second section focuses on research studies pertaining to the development of 
strategy, and how best to translate vision, mission and mandate into specific actions at 
both the tactical and operational levels. Next, there is a section on program evaluation 
and performance measurement. The fourth section focuses on performance monitoring, 
reviews and reporting, all still within the context of increasing accountability. Finally, the 
fifth and final section further ties these two sections together by discussing research 
related to improving transparency and decision making through sound governance 
processes. 
By more fully understanding the field of strategic performance management, the 
GPRA-MA can be leveraged to bridge the gap between public organizational 
performance and public accountability, hopefully resulting in translating improved 
government effectiveness and efficiency into greater public trust, cooperation and 
collaboration. 
What does this new and improved version of the original Act of 1993 contribute 
to today’s world of federal government performance measurement and improvement 
practices? What are its underlying concepts, and immediate and long-term implications? 
And most importantly, what should the DHS be doing to usher in a new era of 
transparency and public accountability within its own ranks, in line with the precepts of 
the GPRA-MA and related government performance management policy and private 
industry best practices?  
2. Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010 
Overview 
The original 1993 GPRA purported that agencies could improve the efficiency, 
effectiveness and accountability of federal programs by establishing a system to set goals, 
measure results and communicate success. For the first time, it required that agencies 
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measurable performance indicators to address the policy, budgeting and (managerial) 
oversight needs of both Congress and agency leaders, partners/stakeholders, and program 
managers.38  
Even though the GPRA laid the foundation for outcome-oriented government, 
still lacking were the elements necessary for achieving real improvements in program 
management and progress toward strategic outcomes. In 1997, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), assessing the effects of the 1993 legislation, noted that 
federal managers surveyed by GAO reported having significantly more of the types of 
performance measures called for by GPRA, but also that there had been no significant 
gains in the use of performance information for decision making.39 Official perception 
was that the GPRA of 1993 had five (5) primary performance management deficiencies: 
(1) insufficient leadership engagement and cross-organizational collaboration; (2) 
disjointed goal setting and misaligned performance measures; (3) inadequate application 
of performance management/measurement analytics; (4) absence of periodic progress 
reviews; and (5) lack of transparency in communicating and/or reporting performance 
results. These missing elements, according to the mandate’s two primary policy experts, 
Congress and the OMB, are addressed in the GPRA-MA.  
The Report of the (Senate) Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs accompanying the GPRA-MA captures the purpose of the new legislation in 
succinct terms:  
H.R. 2142 will modernize and refine the requirements established by 
GPRA in order to produce more frequent, relevant data, which can then 
inform decision-makers and agency operations.40  
This is to be accomplished through the development and application of a 
practical, data-driven performance management framework that is inquisitive rather than 
punitive, moving away from the stove-piped strategic performance planning and 
                                                 
38 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), Public Law 103–62. 
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Lessons Learned for the Next Administration on Using 
Performance Information to Improve Results (GAO-08–1026T), Washington, DC: GAO, 2008. 
40 GPRA Modernization Act, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs United States Senate to Accompany H.R. 2142, 2. 
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reporting, characteristic of the original GPRA of 1993. Achieving more effective and 
efficient government operations requires a more holistic and comprehensive framework, 
that goes beyond the simple progress monitoring and compliance reporting of the past.41  
a. OMB Performance Management Framework  
(1) Official Policy. Pursuing the three tenets of the Open 
Government Directive,42 transparency, participation and collaboration, the OMB 
government-wide PMF, inspired by the GPRA-MA, purports that progress can only be 
made in an environment where senior leaders are personally engaged in the performance 
improvement strategies of their agencies, continually ensuring cross-organizational 
collaboration and buy-in, rapid decision making and persistent follow-up. To avoid 
political hubris and organizational group think, subjective judgments made by internal 
subject matter experts are now to be complemented by consultations with external and 
more independent stakeholders, particularly Congress. In order to ensure a 
comprehensive and accurate depiction of program progress and challenges, evaluations 
are to be grounded in sound performance management and measurement methodologies 
that incorporate best practices and feature fact-based empirical data. Finally, further 
communicating these assessments in publically accessible website forums will not only 
increase public understanding of how government works, but will also limit the potential 
for unintentional gaps and duplicative, or redundant efforts that would have been 
overlooked under the previous GPRA’s decentralized, stove-piped approach to program 
planning, execution and assessment. 
Hoping to successfully steer the new Act through its infancy and 
realize the promises of increased accountability and improved government performance, 
the OMB is building a revised PMF, communicating responsibilities through its official 
                                                 
41 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Changes to the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New Framework of Products and Processes by 
Clinton T. Brass, CRS Report R42379 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, February 29, 2012). 
42 Peter R. Orszag, OMB M-10–06: Open Government Directive (Washington, DC: Executive Office 
of the President, Office of Management and Budget, December 8, 2009). 
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policy document, the A-11 Circular, Part 6.43 Additional supplemental direction and 
guidance will also continue to be provided in the form of diverse memoranda, such as the 
OMB M-11-17,44 M-11-31,45 which emphasized near-term, outcome-focused priority 
goal-setting and performance reviews conducted by a committed and engaged leadership, 
and the latest OMB M-13-01, focused on strategic planning and performance reporting, 
building upon the update to Circular A-11, Part 6, finalized by the OMB on August 3, 
2012.46  
The various objectives and strategies for this overarching federal 
government performance management framework, reflected in both law and guidance, 
have been illustrated in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1.  OMB’s New Performance Management Framework47 
                                                 
43 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 6: Preparation and 
Submission of Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Performance Reports.  
44 OMB Memorandum M-11–17, dated April 14, 2011, “Delivering on the Accountable Government 
Initiative and Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010”  
45 OMB Memorandum M-11–31, dated August 14, 2011, “Delivering an Efficient, Effective, and 
Accountable Government.” 
46 OMB Memorandum M-13–01, dated May 1, 2013, “Updated Strategic Planning and 
Performance.gov Guidance.” 
47 Moynihan, The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act, 14. 
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See Appendix B for an in-depth schematic overview of the Act, its 
major focus areas, principle requirements, and underlying performance management 
strategies, displaying the intent of both Congress and the OMB to shift the focus of 
government performance and accountability away from a preoccupation with monitoring 
and reporting on activities to one of achieving better results through the development and 
use of performance information. 
(2) Best Practices. Diverse Congressional oversight and 
research bodies (e.g., Congressional Research Service, Government Accountability 
Office, etc.), the Office of Management and Budget, private industry, and the media have 
begun to holistically review and study the GPRA-MA processes and products in order to 
determine its potential impact on government operations and how it might be leveraged 
to achieve better results from government programs.  
Reactions have varied. The most important contributions from 
subject matter experts in the field consist primarily of recommendations to help guide 
effective implementation of the legislation, allowing Congress and OMB to weigh in on 
its design and application.  
Most recently, a 2013 report produced by Donald Moynihan, 
Professor of Public Affairs, at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, went beyond the 
standard historical and/or chronological overviews most commentators have produced for 
these types of federal performance management systems, beginning with the passage of 
the original GPRA of 1993.48  
In addition to detailing the legislation’s new requirements, roles, 
and processes, as well as observing the initial success agencies have had in applying it to 
improve their program and mission performance, Professor Moynihan comments on the 
anticipated changes we can expect to see in the field of government strategic performance 
management, in the coming months and years, as a result of the passage of GPRA-MA.  
                                                 
48 The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act, The IBM 
Center for the Business of Government, 2013. 
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He presages major cultural changes, even a seismic shift in 
mindset pertaining to government performance and results that will be much more far-
reaching than has been seen in the past, affecting relational dynamics between the 
executive and legislative branches, between the branches of federal, state and local 
governments, and between the government and the American people. 
He makes six (6) recommendations to prepare and transition 
government leaders and performance management practitioners in anticipation of these 
coming evolutions. These recommendations represent a bridge between the compliance 
focus of the past, and the still evolving future landscape of performance management 
improvement, one that incorporates innovative, collaborative, and networked solutions to 
produce much more holistic, comprehensive and sustainable frameworks.  
 
 
Table 1.   The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA 
Modernization Act Six (6) Key Recommendations 
The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act 
Six (6) Key Recommendations 
 
Recommendation One: Connect the Performance System to Public Service Motivation  
Action 1.1: Select goals that motivate  
Action 1.2: Make goals the glue to hold networks together  
Action 1.3: Connect to beneficiaries  
Action 1.4: Create a clear line of sight between actions and goals  
Action 1.5: Celebrate achievement  
Action 1.6: Align employee recognition systems  
Recommendation Two: Build a Learning Culture  
Action 2.1: Use quarterly and strategy reviews as learning forums  
Recommendation Three: Balance Top-Down Targets with Bottom-Up Innovations  
Action 3.1: Learn from network members  
Action 3.2: Use benchmarking  
Action 3.3: Disseminate lessons, not just data  
Recommendation Four: Integrate Program Evaluation into the Performance Management System  
Action 4.1: Create an understanding of program evaluation  
Action 4.2: Redefine performance information to include program evaluation  
Action 4.3: Incorporate evaluation expertise into performance discussions  
Action 4.4: Use delegation of rules as opportunities to evaluate  
Action 4.5: Link performance goals to evaluation outcome variables  
Action 4.6: Link evaluations to funding  
Action 4.7: Make use of administrative data to assess the effects of programs.  
Recommendation Five: Ensure Leaders are Committed to Performance Management  
Action 5.1: Take advantage of the performance leadership team created by the Modernization Act  
Action 5.2: Select leaders based on performance management skills  
Recommendation Six: Connect with Congress and Stakeholders  
Action 6.1: Agencies and OMB should proactively consult with Congress early in the goal-setting process  
Action 6.2: Speak the language of Congress  
Action 6.3: Congress has a responsibility to engage 
Action 6.4: Involve external stakeholders 
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B. BODY OF THE REVIEW 
Our review of each of the five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA will consist of (1) 
inspectional research of official government policy, and (2) syntopical research of 
external best practices related to strategic performance management and how they can 
inform and impact federal government strategic planning and decision making, in answer 
to the two questions: what does DHS have to do? And what are others doing? Each 
section will conclude with a short summary, abridging the key points within the 
literature, connecting-the-dots between each section, and discussing how the current 
research topic contributes to the literature, by filling a gap, answering a question and/or 
providing a solution.  
The literature review will attempt to ask and answer the following questions:  
• How have the selected authors defined and framed the issues? 
• What are the major principles contained in the best practices? 
• What are some of the initial conclusions that can be drawn about these 
concepts in the context of the GPRA-MA mandate and federal government 
SPM? 
Particular emphasis will be placed on discussing the less tangible, more human-
related factors necessary for performance improvement. Namely, the first and last focus 
areas of the GPRA-MA, leadership engagement, collaboration, learning and public 
accountability, or how each research document contributes to increasing accountability 
through improved public and organizational trust, cooperation and collaboration. 
Most of the books reviewed covering best practices were written by one, two or 
three authors, while some were edited collections of relevant topics drafted by a variety 
of experts in the field. Individual case studies, involving both the public and private 
sectors, were prevalent. In addition to literature providing the historical context, 
chronological evolution, and/or foundation of theory pertaining to the various 
performance management/improvement disciplines, a fair amount of the literature 
attempted to translate descriptive principle into prescriptive practice. Much more 
succinct, these documents often resembled practical how-to guides offering specific 
solutions especially tailored for public institutions. Indeed, if the analyses of Weberian 
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bureaucracies and criticism of government strategic planning processes are any 
indication, government organizations usually prefer these easy-to-follow guidebooks, 
developed by public think tanks, research centers of excellence, government management 
and oversight bodies, and/or external consultants, to the more fluid and complex 
theoretical approaches often promoted by academia and considered by private industry, 
which recommend and offer a much more holistic understanding of disciplines prior to 
the development and adoption of solutions.  
Since the Weberian model of bureaucracy, involving administration in large 
organizations, tends to build structured environments based on a strict adherence to 
impersonal hierarchy and rules-based methodologies, it is possible to argue that 
government administration thrives in simple, stable (i.e., predictable), and controllable 
environments. Ostensibly, in such a structured, procedurally acquiescent environment, 
with centralized, formalized, stove-piped functions and functionaries operating under 
strict (time) constraints, these types of easy-to-follow desk reference guides, with their 
formal, decomposed, deliberate (i.e., prescriptive) instructions, are particularly well-
suited. 
1. GPRA-MA Focus Area #1: Leadership Engagement and 
Collaboration and Learning and Improvement  
a. Official Government Policy 
One of the main requirements of the GPRA-MA involves the 
establishment of (a) leadership-driven governance structure(s) to oversee performance 
improvement activities within organizations.  
Sections of the legislation supporting ownership and cross-organizational 
coordination and collaboration mandate the establishment of a governance structure in 
each agency led by a Chief Operating Officer (COO), and supported by a PIO. The 
federal PIO, either a career or non-career member of the SES, works under the direction 
of the agency head and the OMB. Agency PIOs staff a government-wide Performance 
Improvement Council (PIC) chaired by OMB’s Deputy Director for Management 
(DDM).  
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Creating a performance culture that inspires continual learning and 
improvement requires the commitment and engagement of agency leadership. The 
GPRA-MA says, in effect, that leadership matters by requiring COOs, in collaboration 
with PIOs and Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCOs), to apply performance 
management best practices in translating policy into strategy, and strategy into action. In 
particular, the Act makes individual officials responsible for setting and achieving cross-
cutting federal and agency priority goals,49 distinguishing those that are the highest 
priority, driving progress on those priorities through inter- and intra-agency collaboration, 
and holding managers accountable for achieving mission results.50  
Clearly illustrating the federal government’s desire to develop and instill a 
performance culture that emphasizes learning and results, Mr. Jeffrey Zients, the former 
OMB DDM and Chief Performance Officer (CPO) stated, “[We’re] going to move from 
OMB sets priorities to the agency sets priorities; from oversight to partnership; from 
shipping reams of guidance to a two-way dialogue about how we achieve the desired 
outcome; from transparency not just for accountability, but for idea flow to find and share 
best practices; from ad-hoc engagement from stakeholders such as Congress, to regular 
communication. […] I’m positive we’ll make mistakes, we’ll slip into some old bad 
habits, but I commit to you that we will serve you differently than we have in the past.”51 
Leadership has a new and unique role to play under the revised law, 
ensuring accountability and elevating the importance of the performance management 
and improvement discipline.52 Federal government performance leaders are being 
encouraged to advance the agenda of the GPRA-MA, by adopting the simple change 
                                                 
49 Jacob Lew and Jeffrey Zients, OMB M-11–17: Delivering on the Accountable Government Initiative 
and Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the 
President, Office of Management and Budget, April 14, 2011). 
50 Jacob Lew and Jeffrey Zients, OMB M-11–31: Delivering an Efficient, Effective, and Accountable 
Government (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 
August 17, 2011). 
51 Jason Miller, “OMB Wants to Change the Tone of Management,” Federalnewsradio.com, October 
17, 2011, http://www.federalnewsradio.com/?nid=&sid=1791266; Elizabeth Newell, “Performance Chief 
Promises to Help Managers Overcome Challenges,” GovExec.com, October 5, 2009, 
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/100509e2.htm. 
52 Robert Shea, Principle Grant Thornton LLP. Statement before the Committee on the Budget United 
States Senate, March 16, 2011, 6. 
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management strategies of increased performance-related communication, coordination 
and collaboration, in efforts to eliminate the inadequacies of the original legislation.53 
b. Best Practices Literature 
Fortunately, best practices literature can assist in this transformational 
process by providing useful specifics relating to the general theme of strategic leadership, 
or how to create collaborative networks to advance organizational learning, 
transformation, and manage change.  
The topic of discussion is introduced quite well by authors Julia Balogun 
and Steven W. Floyd, in their work Research in Organizational Change and 
Development. They propose a model demonstrating the extensive interconnectedness 
between the “hard” (i.e., formal structure and hierarchy, governance structures, control 
systems, processes, etc.) and “soft” (i.e., culture, beliefs, relationships, etc.) components 
of strategic leadership and management, stating that any hope for lasting organizational 
change will require a holistic and seismic shift within both of these arenas.54 Their model 
nicely summarizes the bi-furcated philosophical approach to leadership and decision 
making accepted and adopted by the majority of subject matter experts in the field.  
Similar frameworks to better understand such dualism were also found in 
other works, and followed a typical pattern: first reviewing the existing literature on 
executive-level leadership styles (i.e., conceptual and behavioral complexity, strategic 
management, visionary/inspirational leadership, etc.), then discussing how leadership 
requirements can change as a function of organizational perspective and/or level (i.e., 
strategic, tactical, operational), and finally focusing on the unique nature of strategic 
vision and decision making.  
 
                                                 
53 Partnership for Public Service and Grant Thornton, A Critical Role at a Critical Time: A Survey of 
Performance Improvement Officers (Washington, DC: Partnership for Public Service and Grant Thornton, 
April 2011); Shelley Metzenbaum, Survey: PIOs Slowly Creating a Performance Culture, Radio Interview 
by Jason Miller, Federal News Radio, 1500 AM, February 1, 2012.  
54 Research in Organizational Change and Development, vol. 18 (Bradford, GBR: Emerald Group 
Publishing Ltd., 2010). 
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Strategic decision-making is the ability to think insightfully about 
consequential events over time, to understand what causes long-range 
effects in and on complex and dynamic systems, and to bring partisan, 
competing interests together under shared goals.55 
This main principle, often repeated, purports that strategic leaders are 
those who are capable of understanding complex situations and making decisions in the 
context of long-term, system-wide, vision or desired end-state, rather than simply in 
consideration of more short-term, stove-piped operations, associated with day-to-day 
operations and obligations. 
Reiterated, as well, and along these same lines, was the requirement of 
strategic leaders to master various skill sets, such as strategic understanding and vision, 
team building, organizational analysis, power and politics, negotiations, and consensual 
decision making. Heuristic frameworks, along with templates and tools were often 
provided in order to assist in translating these epistemologies into practice.56 We will be 
discussing many of these leadership skill sets throughout our literature review, 
particularly the importance of decision making in focus area three (3).  
Most commentaries were acutely aware of the unique challenges power 
and politics posed in inhibiting leaders from managing logically, objectively and to the 
benefit of the overall organization.57 The majority of authors underlined the existential 
requirement for leaders to be adept “politicians,” experienced in dealing with “diversity 
of thought” caused by ideological biases, special interests and/or competing tensions 
between and among organizations and their sub-cultures. Accepting this dynamic as a fait 
accompli, even (un)necessary evil, most of the authors, nevertheless, remained 
refreshingly optimistic, offering suggestions on how to navigate these treacherous waters 
                                                 
55 Thomas Fernandes, Strategic Leadership and Decision Making 1 (Delhi, IND: Global Media, 
2009). 
56 Charles Lusthaus, Marie-Hélène Adrien, Gary Anderson, Fred Carden, and George Plinio 
Montalván, Organizational Assessment: A Framework for Improving Performance (Ottawa, ON, CAN: 
IDRC Books, 2002); Estrella et al., Learning from Change: Issues and Experiences in Participatory 
Monitoring and Evaluation (Ottawa, ON, CAN: IDRC Books, 2000); John Denton, Organisational 
Learning and Effectiveness (London, GBR: Routledge, 1998); Donald Kirkpatrick and James Kirkpatrick, 
Transferring Learning to Behavior: Using the Four Levels to Improve Performance (Williston, VT: 
Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2005).  
57 Thomas Fernandes, Strategic Leadership and Decision Making 2 (Delhi, IND: Global Media, 2009). 
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in ways that would still allow leaders to meaningfully contribute and obtain results for 
their organizations. Realistic, while avoiding cynicism, these recommendations for 
appropriately collaborating and managing networks to advance transformation, and 
manage change, included: marrying both the “will and skill” needed to embrace power 
politics as a positive rather than a negative force; understanding where the various 
clusters of interest, in terms of both people and functions, were located; leveraging these 
multiple power bases to ensure that existing status quo would not be threatened by 
innovative ideas and/or organizational change; and understanding the difference between 
formal authority and process, used mostly at the tactical/operational levels, and influence, 
method and negotiation, employed more often and successfully at the strategic levels. 
The term innovative leadership was specifically applied to describe the 
above-mentioned qualities, particularly in the context of forming collaborative 
partnerships and networks to advance organizational learning and creative change 
management, both also major themes within the literature. 
In one work, organizational learning was defined in simple terms as “the 
process of improving actions through better knowledge and understanding,” and learning 
organizations as places where “people continually expand their capacity to create the 
results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, 
where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to 
learn together.”58  
Even though there were many different definitions and approaches to 
organizational learning, emphasis was placed, almost universally, on the importance of 
affecting behavior through participatory pedagogy, or learning through doing things 
together. The various works often detailed case studies demonstrating how to 
operationalize such evolutionary, descriptive learning by transferring various skill sets 
                                                 
58 Denton, Organisational Learning and Effectiveness, 16. 
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into specific behavior(s), and then measuring how successful those achieved behaviors 
were in actually impacting overall mission effectiveness and efficiency.59  
Perhaps the most compelling work on innovative leadership described 
understanding the changing role of leadership in the face of an increasingly complex, and 
decentralized cultural and professional landscape. Authors Ori Branfman and Rod A. 
Beckstrom in their book, The Starfish and the Spider, speak of the unstoppable power of 
leaderless organizations, which are supplanting more traditional hierarchical 
configurations, through their ability to decentralize power, organize themselves in 
concentric circles, and capitalize on preexisting networks by leveraging already well-
established platforms to initiate grass-roots change. 
Branfman and Beckstrom see true leaders as passionate, ideological 
catalysts, even champions, willing to let go of their leadership role when necessary, 
trusting others to take ownership of and responsibility for results. The opposite of “glory 
hounds,” these altruistic leaders recognize the importance of initiating change, then 
getting out of the way and letting creative innovation do the rest.  
The future lies, they believe, in recognizing the limitations of the typical 
manager, and beginning to see and embrace the almost limitless horizons that sharing 







                                                 
59 Estrella et al., Learning from Change: Issues and Experiences in Participatory Monitoring and 
Evaluation; Organisational Learning and Effectiveness; Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, Transferring 
Learning to Behavior: Using the Four Levels to Improve Performance. 
60 Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider (New York: Portfolio, Penguin 
Group USA, 2006), 130. 
  53 
Typical Managers Innovative Leaders 
The Boss A Peer 
Command-and-Control Trust 
Rational Emotionally Intelligent 
Powerful Inspirational 
Directive Collaborative 
In the Spotlight Behind the Scenes 
Order Ambiguity 
Organizing Connecting 
Table 2.   Managers Versus Leaders 
In summary, the role of leadership in advancing strategic performance 
management at the federal level, through frameworks, such as the GPRA-MA, was 
heavily emphasized and cannot be overstated here. Current literature offers various 
tactics, techniques and tools to understand and leverage specific leadership approaches 
and skill sets. Some of the more articulate approaches recommended conducting 
organizational assessments, ensuring situational awareness at the strategic, tactical and 
operational levels, and leveraging performance monitoring and reporting systems that 
integrate large amounts of relevant quantitative and qualitative data from diverse sources 
in order to produce a common operating picture of progress and/or success. Providing 
leaders with a better understanding of the present state of their organization allows for a 
more accurate communication of status and, by extension, more informed decision 
making at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels. 
Equally stressed was the important role interpersonal relationships and 
collaborative networks can play in managing transformation and affecting lasting cultural 
change. Once again, organizational learning, involving all stakeholders and emphasizing 
adaptability and the utilization of new (i.e., innovative) knowledge was recommended as 
the best way to detect and close the gap between current leadership theory and practical 
management practices applicable in the “real world.”  
The GPRA-MA recognizes the importance of creating such a leadership-
driven performance culture that inspires continuous learning and improvement through 
shared understanding. The Act can be used as a driver to ensure that viable best practices 
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relative to leadership engagement and collaboration and learning and improvement are 
continually being refreshed and integrated into government organizational performance 
management and improvement strategies. 
2. GPRA-MA Focus Area #2: Strategic Clarity and Organizational 
Alignment 
a. Official Government Policy 
In order to improve strategic clarity and organizational alignment, the 
strategic and performance planning and reporting portions of the Act require better 
connectivity among agency plans, programs and performance results. The GPRA-MA 
requires that the federal government set long-term Federal Government Priority Goals 
(FGPGs), in the form of (1) Cross-cutting Agency Priority (CAPs) goals that are 
outcome-oriented and cover a limited number of important policy areas; and (2) 
Management Priority Goals (MPGs) covering mission support areas, such as information 
technology, financial management, procurement and acquisition management, real 
property management, and human capital management. In addition, the legislation 
requires individual agencies to set near-term Agency Priority Goals (APGs), achievable 
within a 12–24 month timeframe.  
Increased consultation with Congress to address these high-priority policy, 
management and performance issues is also a major stipulation of the legislation. Both 
the majorities and minorities of Congressional authorizing, appropriations, and oversight 
committees, are now afforded opportunities under the law to weigh in on agency goal 
setting, measure development, program evaluation and results assessment in executing 
their policymaking, budgeting, and oversight responsibilities. 
A very important requirement of the Act, and one that should be valued by 
both the executive and legislative governing branches, is making sure that Congressional 
views are being heard when setting government program goals. Mutual agreement and 
collaboration between the two, however, are becoming increasingly problematic due to 
partisanship, and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) anticipates that requirements 
for congressional consultations to establish long-term FGPGs, and short-term APGs will 
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create additional tension in congressional and executive branch working relationships. 
This is a bi-partisan problem due to the demonstrated diversity of thought among existing 
political parties.  
Congress may indeed provide suggestions to the Obama Administration 
on “high-risk” areas they should be focusing their performance improvement efforts on, 
yet these priorities can often be very different from the President’s management agenda. 
For example, the OMB admits to studying GAO recommendations in selecting its CAP 
goals, but they also state that they can choose to place emphasis on selecting goals that 
reflect current Presidential priorities, as well.  
This observation highlights a potential hindrance to effective GPRA-MA 
implementation. How can Congress and the President collaborate toward a common end 
if they are unable to find common ground? It is difficult to make progress in a world of 
competing and often contradictory priorities. The goal-setting performance improvement 
dynamic of the GPRA-MA framework may be sound in principle, but political realities 
have the potential to dampen the benefits of this key stipulation. The legislation and its 
official policy guidance currently lack adequate mechanisms to ensure objective and 
independent adjudication of the competing and often contradictory agendas and priorities 
of these two power entities. One authoritative document revealed continuing skepticism 
about “whether the congressional consultations [mandated by the Act] would [actually] 
be enough to mitigate some of these challenges, [or] create enhanced opportunities for 
Congress to influence the direction of agencies, [and, therefore] foster the congressional-
executive collaboration and compromise demanded by the legislation.”61 
Real solutions are required to overcome some of these partisan challenges, 
which, due to the unique nature of our current form of representative government, might 
not be resolved anytime soon. According to recent studies, the level of political 
polarization is actually at an all-time high, the highest it has been since the end of 
                                                 
61 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Changes to the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New Framework of Products and Processes, 19. 
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Reconstruction between the two major parties within the House and Senate, increasingly 
moving to the extremes along the liberal-moderate-conservative spectrum.62  
Part of the solution to overcoming these challenges and minimize the 
political-administrative dichotomy created by the diminishing role of moderates in 
political decision making, may be to singly focus these disparate legislative and 
administrative efforts on ensuring better strategic planning, clarity and organizational 
alignment, through the incorporation of best practices. 
b. Best Practices Literature 
Going beyond the slightly mechanical and rather limited goal of 
reconciling Congressional legislative and executive branch perspectives, however, the 
best practices literature recommended, quite radically, a complete departure from any and 
all types of traditional strategic performance management practices involving complex 
multi-year strategic plans, detailed annual budgets, and quarterly forecasting and 
performance reports. In light of the rapidly expanding and seemingly infinite landscape 
that is today’s increasingly competitive, dynamic, and volatile operating environment, 
most traditional planning and management reporting processes, were believed to be too 
lethargic, detail-oriented, inward-focused and disconnected from partner/stakeholder 
expectations to offer any satisfying, long-term solutions. It was thought that they were 
simply being outpaced by other, more fluid, forms of communication, forcing 
organizations to radically rethink some of their traditional performance management 
processes.63  
Although business performance management encompasses all the 
processes, information, and systems used by managers to translate strategy into action 
through the development of sound strategic, tactical and operational planning and 
supporting financial processes, special emphasis will be placed, here, on capturing only 
those ideas, tools and techniques that are related to ensuring strategic clarity and 
                                                 
62 See link: Voteview.com, “The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, Updated January 18, 2013, 
http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp. 
63 David A. J. Axson, Best Practices in Planning and Performance Management: Radically 
Rethinking Management for a Volatile World, 3rd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010), 5. 
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organizational alignment as a means to establish and achieve common goals. Comments, 
therefore, will be articulated around the following two (2) themes: organizational 
strategic planning and performance management, and budget-performance integration 
methodologies.  
(1) Organizational Strategic Planning and Performance 
Management. Prevalent within the literature is a multiplicity of strategic performance 
management frameworks comprised of integrated processes and tools to manage, develop 
and translate strategy into operational actions, and monitor and improve the effectiveness 
of both.  
A common challenge and major hindrance to ensuring strategic 
clarity and alignment identified in the best practices literature, was the lack of sufficient 
collaboration and agreement once a framework was selected and the actual development 
of strategy began. These can be important obstacles that can potentially derail efforts, as 
impactful results are most often the product of collective, as opposed to individual, 
contributions.  
Such discord can take many forms, both intra- and inter-
organizationally. Authors Robert Kaplan and David Norton summarize the latter dynamic 
(i.e., non-alignment within organizations), capturing the majority opinion, by stating 
“strategy is almost [always] completely disconnected from execution.” Their solution to 
bridge the gap between intent and results and correct such organizational misalignment is 
the Balanced Scorecard (BSC).64  
Other similar alignment models, which create a clear line of sight 




                                                 
64 The Balanced Scorecard, by applying clear logic model principles without limiting input to “fixed” 
cause-and-effect relationships, can take into account additional factors influencing process and outcomes. It 
provides the increased flexibility required to define and implement the cross-cutting goals of an extended 
homeland security enterprise scorecard and measure the contribution and performance of its multiple 
components, stakeholders and partners, and this, according to four (4) distinct perspectives: (1) the 
customer; (2) financial measurement; (3) internal business processes; and (4) knowledge, education and 
growth. 
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include logic models and strategy maps which display the various relationships and 
processes that exist among diverse elements contributing to goal and measure 
achievement.65 
Some of the most common processes reviewed to facilitate 
strategic clarity and organizational alignment included strategic planning, tactical 
planning, financial planning, management reporting, forecasting, and risk management, 
as well as additional sub-processes and tasks associated with internal management 
control systems. The latter included conducting comprehensive environmental 
assessments, or SWOT/C analyses (i.e., strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
threats/challenges), goal selection, priority identification, implementation planning, 
strategy alignment, performance measurement methodologies, facilitated learning 
through consistent feedback and benchmarking, and flexible governance and 
accountability structures.  
Almost all of these are alluded to in some form or another in either 
the GPRA-MA itself or the resulting OMB policy guidance, the Circular A-11, along 
with prescribed actions to improve results in these areas. Reflective of the best practices 
literature, they include: 
• Engaging the political environment more in actual goal setting and 
decision making, such as eliciting input from Congress;  
• Obtaining White House advocacy and its management and 
oversight body (i.e., OMB); 
• Engaging additional external constituencies (i.e., interest groups 
and the media); and, finally,  
• Cultivating public service motivation among employees.66  
In addition to engaging external environments, there are also 
internal keys to success, such as:67 
 
                                                 
65 Chris Wye, Performance Management for Career Executives: A Start Where You Are, Use What 
You Have Guide (The IBM Center for the Business of Government, October 2004), 33. 
66 Steven Kelman and Jeff Myers, Successfully Executing Ambitious Strategies in Government (John 
F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, April 2009), 11–12, 27–30. 
67 Gary L. Neilson, Karla L. Martin, and Elizabeth Powers, “The Secrets to Successful Strategy 
Execution,” Harvard Business Review, June 2008, 1. 
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• Centralizing strategy-related functions; 
• Breaking down partitions, avoiding work in isolation;  
• Ensuring and properly communicating strategic alignment between 
high-level enterprise-wide strategic/tactical/operational 
implementation and small group/individual motivations, 
contributions and reward/incentives;  
• Integrating management functions and processes linking strategy 
to resource allocation; 
• Delineating clear responsibilities or “ownership” for execution and 
decision making; and 
• Ensuring both vertical and horizontal review and communication 
of strategy execution and performance results.  
The IBM Center for the Business of Government produced an 
influential work in 2007 addressed to the current Obama Administration, “Performance 
Management Recommendations for the New Administration.” Written by Dr. Shelley H. 
Metzenbaum, the report details several guiding principles and recommendations to 
improve government performance offered at all levels from the President, to the OMB 
and the PIC, to Cabinet Secretaries and Agency Heads. Unsurprisingly, since Dr. 
Metzenbaum was the former OMB Associate Director for Performance and Personnel 
Management, many of her concepts have been captured in OMB’s Circular A-11, or 
policy guidance for the GPRA-MA implementation. Those specifically relating to focus 
area #2, or ensuring a clear line of sight between program development, execution and 
impact, recommended increased collaboration, communication and consistency in 
performance goal setting, monitoring and reporting by:  
• Clearly identifying Presidential priority targets; 
• Establishing performance management/improvement leadership 
and teams at all levels of government; 
• Identifying management cross-agency targets and measures; and 
• Redesigning web-enabled federal performance portals. 
Presenting information in a way that meets the needs of specific 
audiences, the third of four guiding principles to improve federal performance 
management, is perhaps the one that contributes the most to ensuring strategic clarity and 
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alignment.68 People should be met when and where they are, at whatever capability level, 
in their disparate approaches to managing for results. If practitioners are not able to 
package information in meaningful ways to satisfy the needs of end users, becoming true 
value added, then it becomes more difficult for them to recognize where they stand in 
relationship to the overall strategy and what the significance of their individual 
contributions might be. Without such clarity, alignment becomes opaque and chimerical.  
One recent work expounded on the development of performance 
measures and targets as a means to develop strategy and align implementation efforts, 
rather than as a consequence of it.69 As a remedy to misaligned strategy, the author quite 
radically recommended establishing the following 3-prong approach to ensure that 
measurement was driving strategy, rather than the other way around:  
• Define Outcomes: What are the specific outcomes that we aim to 
achieve? 
• Create the Action Plan: What actions do we need to take in order 
to get there? 
• Add Clarity through Metrics: How will we measure our progress?  
With regards to intra-organizational alignment, or alignment 
between organizations, Chris Wye attempts to reconcile diverging interests among 
various independent stakeholders by linking performance management and strategy 
achievement with the overall public good, or, as previously stated, cultivating public 
service motivation among employees: 
To talk about improving government performance alone, without 
connecting it to a higher vision of public service, is more often than not, to 
focus on all the things that need to be fixed—to see the glass as half 
empty.70 
                                                 
68 Principle One: Communicate Performance Trends and Targets, not Target Attainment and Ratings; 
Principle Two: Encourage Performance Improvement with Increased Diagnostic Analysis, Data-Driven 
Discussion, Practical Experiments, and Knowledge Sharing; Principle Three: Present Information to Meet 
the Needs of Specific Audiences; and Principle Four: Structure Accountability Mechanisms to Encourage 
and Inspire, not Embarrass, Reprimand or Punish. 
69 Cheryl Davenport, Measurement Drives Strategy, Not the Other Way Around: A Guide to 
Outcomes-based Strategic Planning and Program Design, Mission Measurement, 2011. 
70 Wye, Performance Management For Career Executives: A Start Where You Are, Use What You 
Have Guide, 4. 
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Wye places the onus squarely on the shoulders of leaders 
demonstrating how career executives can overcome common problems in the design, 
alignment, use, and communication of performance information by developing effective 
responses to common obstacles frequently encountered within public institutions when 
attempting to implement performance management/measurement systems. 
Providing and responding to a common set of pessimistic and/or 
cynical comments often made by federal government leaders and managers, Wye offers 
up several antidotes to various forms of passive and active resistance toward the 
performance management discipline. Rather than respond to each individual objection 
contributing to the stagnation of performance improvement efforts within and across 
agencies, he attempts to change the overall thought dynamic, collectively raising the bar 
for everyone, by equating true public service with a results-based mind-set that 
continually seeks to improve performance. 
There is a great need to develop a management culture that cultivates new 
ideas and better practices. If we simply monitor [and reproduce] the 
practices of others, we can be no better than good imitators. But if we 
create a climate in which new and better ways of doing things is valued 
and encouraged, we can generate a culture of improvement where the 
pursuit of quality become[s] an overriding mission.71  
In order to create such an innovative climate/culture more 
conducive to performance improvement, he encourages public service (i.e., servant) 
leaders, as a normal “no frills” part of their duties, responsibilities, and the high-trust 
environment inherent with their professions, to apply several best practices approaches in 
response to the most common “knuckle dragger” objections. These counter responses 
relate to specific performance-related functions, such as designing performance 
indicators, aligning performance processes, and using and communicating performance 
information, and are intended to be useful in overcoming resistance within each of those 
specific areas.  
                                                 
71 Wye, Performance Management For Career Executives: A Start Where You Are, Use What You 
Have Guide, 12. 
  62 
We see here, once again, an emphasis on leadership, a recurring 
theme throughout all five (5) focus areas, to anchor, then drive, performance management 
frameworks that facilitate strategic clarity and organizational alignment.  
Kaplan and Norton recommended the establishment of a 
centralized office of strategy management reporting directly to the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) or his/her equivalent. They underlined the importance of interactive 
leadership, properly wielding influence and staying informed through collaborative, 
participatory management styles, as keys to success in overcoming barriers, obstacles and 
objections to change:  
While many people believe that the chief executives wield direct and easy 
influence, the reality is that any [CEO] has a difficult time influencing his 
or her organization. A [CEO’s] attempts to command and control 
undermine the authority of senior executives. I want to exert my influence 
indirectly and in a way that empowers my executive and creates an 
environment in which they can lead and manage their parts of the 
organization. I set the tone, and I define the strategic agenda, communicate 
it, and ensure that it gets undertaken, but I don’t command any parts of the 
organization.72 
Finally, and once again, the influence of politics, or more 
particularly, of political appointees, to ensure overall performance and democratic 
responsiveness was highlighted. One study found that understanding and communicating 
political considerations could actually contribute to the likelihood of change toward 
mission integration, by ensuring greater flexibility when faced with it. On the other hand, 
the same study also determined that most of the current traditional public and non-profit 
change or transformational management strategies proposed by political leadership (i.e., 
reorganization, “burning platform,” quick wins and pilots) really don’t significantly 
impact change, because such strategies tend to focus on individual short-term pet 
projects, as opposed to emphasizing the general improvement of overall management 
processes or long-term organizational performance.73  
                                                 
72 Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, “The Office of Strategy Management,” Harvard Business 
Review, October 2005, 6. 
73 Kelman and Myers, Successfully Executing Ambitious Strategies in Government, 41–44. 
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(2) Budget-Performance Integration (BPI) Methodologies. In 
studying our second strategy to ensure greater strategic clarity and alignment, we revisit 
here one of our previously defined categories of performance accountability, fiscal 
responsibility, or government spending its money as authorized as efficiently and 
effectively as possible.  
The GPRA-MA is, in fact, first a tool for both Congress and the 
President to better inform the executive budget process, which consists of three main 
phases: development of the President’s budget proposal, submission and justification of 
the President’s budget proposal, and execution of enacted appropriations and other 
budgetary legislation.74 When executive agencies submit their requests and justification 
materials to OMB for examination and review before final Congressional submission, 
they are required to provide statements of the President’s policy priorities along with a 
unified plan for the allocation of federal budgetary resources toward those goals, all 
supported by reliable (i.e., verified and validated) performance information displaying 
past, current and projected results.  
In compliance with OMB Circular A-11, Part 6, agencies submit 
this integrated budget-performance information in what is called a “Performance Budget 
Strategic Context.” The purpose of the Strategic Context (SC) is to describe how the 
resources and performance of DHS components contribute to the mission of the 
department, in answer to question: How does the component help the department 
accomplish its mission set? Within each departmental mission, the SC highlights the 
ways and means components achieve strategic objectives through individual programs, 
known as the Future Year Homeland Security Program (FYHSP). The SC also 
communicates specific resource requests, their associated performance impact, and how 
program resources and planned performance results contribute to the accomplishment of 
the department’s overarching strategic goals and objectives. 
                                                 
74 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Executive Budget Process: An 
Overview by Michelle D. Christensen, CRS Report R42633 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, July 27, 2012), 1. 
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Because of this, budget preparation is a time and data intensive 
process for agencies, involving detailed analysis and estimation of past and future 
budgetary resources, aligned to strategic and performance plans and reports, in the hope 
that these analyses will attest to the overall effectiveness and cost-efficiency of funded 
government programs either seeking to maintain current or obtain future taxpayer dollars.  
Understandably, multiple resources have been developed over the 
years to assist OMB and federal agencies in completing this important task. 
Unfortunately, many of these resources also prefer to maintain the philosophy of formal 
rules-based compliance reporting in developing their guidance, missing important 
opportunities to provide advice on how to use performance information more liberally at 
other important stages of the budget process. One resource, in particular, breaks away 
from this standard approach of staying within the strict Congressional and OMB confines 
for budget-performance integration in the context of the preparation, approval, execution, 
audit, and evaluation of the budget.  
Philip G. Joyce, in his report, “Linking Performance and 
Budgeting: Opportunities in the Federal Budget Process,” proposes a workable 
framework that allows public performance practitioners to better link performance 
information to funding decisions, at different junctures in the process and in a way that 
might actually impact policy and resource allocation decisions. His systematic and 
integrated framework shifts the focus of the debate from inputs to outcomes and results, 
in order to ensure that performance information is applied in ways other than to simply 
justify current funding levels. Achieving a more results-oriented and accountable 
government means increasing the capacity of the federal government to link resources to 
actual results, also reiterating what Professor Behn of Harvard University’s John F. 
Kennedy School of Government says about the use of performance measures in the 
federal budgeting process: 
Performance measurement can help public officials to make budget 
allocations. At the macro level, however, the apportionment of tax monies 
is a political decision made by political officials. […] Thus, political 
priorities, not agency performance, drive macro budgetary choices. […] 
Nevertheless, line managers can use performance data to inform their 
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resource allocation decisions. Once elected officials have established 
macro political priorities, those responsible for more micro decisions may 
seek to invest their limited allocation of resources in the most cost–
effective units and activities. And when making such micro budgetary 
choices, public managers may find performance measures useful.75 
Moving beyond the former and current logic-model based federal 
budgeting systems, such as the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) and 
zero-based budgeting (ZBB) leading to the original GPRA in 1993, and the subsequent 
Bush Administration’s PART supporting the BPI component of the President’s 
Management Agenda (PMA), the Joyce model has advocated for a more systematic use 
of performance information in the budget process, further reconciling macro- and micro-
views of success and the various strategic, tactical and operational actions contributing to 
that success. His basic premise is elementary, yet essential: if information is not used to 
make decisions, then it is neither important, nor necessary. He proposes making 
performance-informed budget data available and useful by: 
• Further integrating planning and budgeting processes, supporting 
them with better performance and cost information; 
• Identifying ways/approaches to use performance information at 
every stage of the budget development, execution and audit and 
evaluation process; and 
• Reforming the Congressional authorization process to better 
communicate legislative performance expectations and free 
agencies of the current constraints placed upon them by ineffective 
and inefficient authorization and appropriations frameworks.76  
Making performance measures useful, not only to ensure strategic 
and organizational alignment but also for more informed decision making, is one of the 
main purposes of the GPRA-MA and the subject of our next focus area.  
                                                 
75 Robert Behn, “Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures,” Public 
Administration Review 63, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 586–606. 
76 Philip G. Joyce, “Linking Performance and Budgeting: Opportunities in the Federal Budget 
Process,” in Managing for Results, ed. John M. Kamensky and Albert Morales (Washington, DC: IBM 
Center for the Business of Government, 2005). 
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3. GPRA-MA Focus Area #3: Performance Measurement and Program 
Evaluation  
a. Official Government Policy 
To address shortfalls in the use of performance information in program 
decision making, the legislation calls for strengthened measure development 
methodologies, undergird by more rigorous data verification and validation processes to 
ensure the quality, accuracy, and timeliness of data. Accompanying OMB policy places 
an emphasis on improving analytical capability to accurately measure the achievement of 
both near- and long-term goals. Program evaluations, incorporating qualitative and 
quantitative performance data and other evidence, are encouraged to help better 
understand what is working and what isn’t and to take measures to improve results and 
achieve success.  
The usefulness of improving analytical capability, through performance 
measurement and program evaluation, cannot be overstated. However, special attention is 
called for in order to avoid flawed executive branch measurements and evaluations due to 
politicized bias and selectivity. Examples of this have already been highlighted and 
pertain primarily to deficiencies in the methodologies selected or preferred by 
presidential administrations in their eagerness to display success, as opposed to 
measuring actual program progress.77 Since GPRA-MA requires many products to be 
developed by the executive branch and submitted to Congress to inform its legislative 
policy and resource allocation deliberations, issues involving credibility are primarily 
attributed to the perceived bias or the lack of objectivity, as a result of the often 
competing Congressional oversight and executive branch policy-making roles.  
Congress’ role makes it naturally wary of accepting evaluations from the 
executive branch at face value. Recognizing that the establishment of mission and 
associated goals is often a political adventure, defining and measuring success against 
these standards can be politically motivated as well, lacking the independence and 
                                                 
77 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Obama Administration Agenda for 
Government Performance: Evolution and Related Issues for Congress by Clinton T. Brass, CRS 
memorandum (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, January 19, 2011), 
21.  
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objectivity required. Congress may hold the purse strings, but the President as the chief 
manager of federal funds has competing and sometimes contradictory priorities. Data the 
executive branch collects and evaluates does not always meet Congress’ requirements or 
comply with the criteria set by the legislative branch.  
Once again, collaboration and trust comes into play when attempting to 
identify acceptable methodologies and tools to appropriately define and achieve 
“success,” ensuring that analytical products are making credible, unbiased representations 
about how well agencies and programs are performing, without totally divorcing metrics 
from politics, which would be to produce another form of tyranny, that of the technocrats. 
Hoping to mitigate some of these challenges, a few institutions have 
already begun providing helpful suggestions in the form of hands-on practical and tested 
performance measurement aids and techniques.78 These supplement OMB’s guiding 
philosophy contained in their official policy and are meant to enhance existing evaluation 
tools and methodologies.79  
b. Best Practices Literature 
The urgency pertaining to this one major focus area of the GPRA-MA, 
performance measurement and program evaluation, seems to have dramatically 
increased.  
“Efficiency and effectiveness” has become the new mantra of many 
federal agencies, including the DHS. In the increasingly constrained fiscal environment 
in which we are now operating, it is becoming more and more problematic to “spend 
whatever is necessary to secure the homeland.”80 Because we are now required to do 
more, do better, and, especially, [do] with less, the original GPRA’s initial focus on long-
range planning, priority setting, and establishing “clear performance-based measures of 
                                                 
78 U.S. Government and Accountability Office, Managing for Results: A Guide for Using the GPRA-
MA to Help Inform Congressional Decision-Making (GAO-12–621SP), Washington, DC: GPO, June 2012. 
79 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Obama Administration Agenda for 
Government Performance: Evolution and Related Issues for Congress. 
80 President George W. Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 
Washington, DC, July 2002), 63. 
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effectiveness,”81 is no longer enough to achieve success in today’s world of diminishing 
budgets. The performance measurement and assessment requirements of the GPRA-MA 
are an indication that GPRA’s initial efforts are increasingly being undergirded by the 
development of more robust program analysis and evaluation capabilities.82 Since “future 
resource constraints are seemingly unavoidable, at least for the foreseeable future,”83 and 
“years of rising fiscal and trade deficits will…necessitate hard choices in the years 
ahead,”84 emphasis is being placed on ensuring that not only risk-based performance 
plans, but also actual program results are informing decision making. 
The quasi-totality of ready-made best practices for the public sector are 
expressing this philosophical shift using similar terms as well, such as “data-driven 
decision making,” “real-time data transparency,” or “business/predictive analytics” which 
combine a wide variety of technological tools, techniques and tactics. The intent is for 
performance measurement practitioners and data analysts to (1) collect better 
information, (2) conduct better data analysis, and (3) make better decisions, hopefully 
resulting in real solutions to “big,” seemingly intractable, problems. 
Often the final package resulting from this three-prong effort is what is 
referred to as the “performance-stat” approach, based on systems and models developed 
in city and state governments, but increasingly being adopted and adapted by federal 
agencies. This so-called “Stat” approach is based on frequent goal-focused, data-driven 
meetings that support decision makers in reaching priority goals, and is the focus of our 
next section. 
                                                 
81 President George W. Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 69. 
82 Chapter 8 of the Analytical Perspectives of the Budget “Program Evaluation and Data Analytics” 
states that “Evaluations do what performance measurement, alone, cannot. Evaluations determine whether 
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Budget of the U.S. Government,” Office of Management and Budget, 2013, 
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83 David J. Kaufman, “Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2030: Forging Strategic Action in an 
Age of Uncertainty Progress Report Highlighting the 2010–2011 Insights of the Strategic Foresight 
Initiative,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, January 2012, 2. 
84 Mr. Y, National Strategic Narrative (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2011), 9. 
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Before we begin our discussion of data-informed performance reviews, the 
current “new thing” in government performance improvement, let us look more closely at 
some of the solutions the best practices literature is offering public executives to improve 
the quantity, quality and application of program data to communicate progress and 
success, both internally and cross-organizationally.  
(1) Collecting Better Data. In order for governments to use 
performance data to make decisions, it must be “good,” in terms of quantity, quality, and 
accuracy. Current literature is placing an emphasis on ways to ensure the availability, 
applicability and veracity of performance data, in the face of increasing external 
skepticism and scrutiny.  
However, because the focus is still on the public manager and not 
the public citizen, the general public continues to remain mistrustful of official 
government data due to their lack of understanding and/or participation in government 
decision making.  
This lacuna has been recognized in current guidance, which 
recommends that performance data be developed in collaboration with all partners and 
stakeholders, particularly the end users or final consumers, as well as tailored to their 
unique purposes. It is important or public performance practitioners to keep this in mind, 
as data combined with analysis seen as useful to program managers will be very different 
from the same information considered useful by members of Congress and/or the 
American public. 
(2) Conducting Better Analysis. Understanding who these end 
users are and what kinds of data and data displays are necessary to provide real meaning 
to particular stakeholders should be supported by robust analysis and evaluation. Both are 
essential if government is to begin to use this type of information in actual decision 
making contributing to public trust.  
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In a recent report, “From Data to Decisions: The Promise of 
Analytics,”85 and its follow-up how-to guide, “From Data to Decisions II: Building an 
Analytics Culture,”86 several government agencies and programs were studied by the 
Partnership for Public Service and the IBM Center for the Business of Government. 
Several myths, believed to contribute to success, were debunked, such as the necessity to 
have direct control over activities in order to develop measures; that measures alone 
represent the outcomes; that everything has to be measured; or that leadership in analytics 
starts at the top. By creating a decentralized, bottom-up, managerial “data analytics” 
framework emphasizing collaboration, transparency (or accessibility), and accountability 
(or clear “line of sight” between individual employee/program contributions and 
organizational outcomes), performance management practitioners can get data to “tell a 
story,” turning it into real value-added knowledge that can be used by any and all 
stakeholders to inform and drive their decisions. 
Creating the necessary analytics culture to support such a 
framework requires identifying up front what data is needed to measure the achievement 
of desired results, as well as creating ownership of the process. Gaining acceptance and 
buy-in from all relevant parties, including the general public, will allow leaders to 
incorporate relevant and meaningful data analytics into their daily operations as a 
standard operating procedure and a means to achieve success through more informed 
(and trusted) decision making. 
(3) Making Better Decisions. As previously mentioned, the 
original GPRA was refreshed in 2010 in order to get public executives to use data and 
analyses to make decisions and set priorities. Even though, as a result of the original Act, 
agencies had produced and/or collected better data, the challenge remained to translate 
that information into real knowledge necessary to take effective and timely action.  
                                                 
85 From Data to Decisions: The Power of Analytics (Washington, DC: Partnership for Public Service 
and the IBM Center for the Business of Government, November 2011). 
86 From Data to Decisions II: Building an Analytics Culture (Washington, DC: Partnership for Public 
Service and the IBM Center for the Business of Government, October 2012). 
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To meet such a challenge, the literature reviewed often 
recommended the development of an overarching PMF, comprised of some version of the 
following elements: logic modeling, performance measurement, and program evaluation.  
Clinton T. Brass of the CRS discusses these three policy 
implementation and oversight tools in his report on the Obama Administration’s 
Government Performance Agenda.87 Like the GAO, he sees program evaluation as much 
broader in scope than performance measurement, the latter often simply being a subset of 
the former. He concludes that the three taken together, offer a viable solution to measure 
strategy because it raises questions about what exactly constitutes success and monitors 
progress toward this end-state.  
c. Logic Modeling 
Most DHS agencies assess results of programs after the fact based on pre-
established criteria and goals, using the Logic Model to associate the WHAT with the SO 
WHAT, the HOW with the WHY. 
Development of an effective PMF begins with the selection of some form 
of program theory, such as the logic model, and/or balanced scorecard, which can 
integrate program development, implementation and evaluation and performance 
measurement into one consistent framework. The logic model provides a reductionist 
rationale behind each mission/program activity, process, program, or investment and 
displays the strategy behind how a program is intended to achieve policy-level goals. It 
describes the causal relationships among current activities, future outcomes, and the 
strategies and measurements in between. The logic model is created by working back 
from the expected high-level outcomes (which justify the investment), through the 
outputs, processes, and inputs that are believed to produce these outcomes. The logic 
model also provides a useful structure to identify, develop and/or improve performance 
measures, introducing indicators along its cascading spectrum to determine whether 
logical connections actually exist and how they impact each other.  
                                                 
87 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Obama Administration Agenda for 
Government Performance: Evolution and Related Issues for Congress, 12–13. 
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The following visual display of a logic model clarifies this logical 
sequence of agency activities, programs and their intended results. 
 
Figure 2.  Logic Model 
d. Performance Measurement 
Performance measurement provides quantitative data in the form of 
different levels of performance indicators associated with individual steps along the logic 
model sequence: activities and/or inputs detailing the process of completing a good or 
service; outputs representing tangible accomplishments; intermediate outcomes 
pertaining to changes in behavior or practice; and end outcomes demonstrating actual 
accomplishments or value added.  
Best practices recommendations include identifying or developing various 
performance measure sets, in line with sound program theory (i.e., logic modeling, 
balanced scorecards, strategy mapping etc.), then tailoring them to the needs of the end 
users, based on at least one of the following eight (8) main purposes for measuring 
performance:88 
                                                 
88 Behn, “Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures,” 586–606. 
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• Evaluate: How well is my public agency performing? 
• Control: How can I ensure that my subordinates are doing the right 
thing? 
• Budget: On what programs, people, or projects should my agency 
spend the public’s money? 
• Motivate: How can I motivate line staff, middle managers, 
nonprofit and for-profit collaborators, stakeholders, and citizens to 
do the things necessary to improve performance? 
• Promote: How can I convince political superiors, legislators, 
stakeholders, journalists, and citizens that my agency is doing a 
good job? 
• Celebrate: What accomplishments are worthy of the important 
organizational ritual of celebrating success? 
• Learn: Why is what working or not working? 
• Improve: What exactly should we do differently to improve 
performance? 
Program effectiveness expressed in terms of achieving long-term 
performance goals can be demonstrated through the development and continued 
improvement of program performance measures. Performance measures determine 
whether desired results are being achieved and where resources and efforts should be 
(re)allocated to ensure continued effectiveness. Additionally, performance measures keep 
the agency focused on key goals, justify budget increases, and help focus planning and 
implementation efforts.  
e. Program Evaluation 
Properly assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of a strategy or 
program requires additional qualitative data that goes beyond the hard facts contained in 
quantitative data sets, such as performance measures. This type of “softer” analysis 
integrates additional evaluation factors, such as subject matter expertise and subjective 
judgment. 
Qualitative program evaluation, much wider in focus than quantitative 
performance measurement, offers fuller visibility of program performance. Program 
evaluation is “the application of systematic analytic methods to address questions about 
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program operations and results,”89 and is a cumulative learning process that utilizes a 
diverse palette of methods, studies and analyses to measure and understand a program’s 
results in order to better inform enterprise-wide, as well as individual office and program 
level leadership decision making. It answers questions about how programs work, how 
well they are performing (i.e., achieving their objectives), and how they can be improved.  
A 2001 report entitled, “Using Evaluation to Support Performance 
Management: A Guide for Federal Executives,” provides an assessment of how program 
evaluation is being used in the federal government, along with practical recommendations 
to support performance management and improvement in compliance with GPRA 
requirements. There are, in fact, many ways in which managers can improve 
accountability and results through the use of program evaluation and more robust 
performance information and data. 
We see that, even more than 10 years ago, emphasis was already being 
placed on transitioning from simply producing performance data, for external compliance 
reporting purposes, to actually using it, in order to impact results.  
The report offered a conceptual framework to assist agencies in using 
program evaluation tools and supporting analytical staff to institutionalize program 
evaluation and performance measurement in the context of strategic and program 
planning, implementation and assessment. It provided various types and methods of 
program evaluation to:  
• Define measurable program outcomes; 
• Design or discover tools to measure these outcomes;  
• Collect valid data;  
• Analyze these data; and  
• Present results in formats useful to a variety of audiences.  
They demonstrated the usefulness of program evaluation to ensure 
organizational alignment between strategies and outcomes. By revealing causal 
                                                 
89 Kathryn E. Newcomer and Mary Ann Scheirer, Using Evaluation to Support Performance 
Management: A Guide for Federal Executives (The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business 
of Government, January 2001), 4. 
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effectiveness or how agency programs actually contribute to achieve end results, program 
evaluation methodologies and tools can be applied to make mission and program 
improvements.  
Most best practices tailored for the use of public institutions, advocated for 
such objective performance management methodologies and tools to assess overall 
posture and measure the effectiveness of federal investments. Many stated that the 
previous focus on measuring success in output alone (e.g., accomplishing action 
milestones) was insufficient in determining future outlays of resources. Limiting 
assessment to lessons learned and best practices may allow agencies to determine 
whether they did things right, but not whether they did the right things.  
In summary, a more comprehensive performance measurement solution 
(i.e., performance management framework) is increasingly being seen as a counterweight 
to the role and influence of politics, as a way to (re)define and/or frame the discourse. 
Many of the practitioners reviewed were staunch proponents of this third GPRA-MA 
focus area, advancing their epistemologies as the “truth” and “proof” limiting the 
(political) “spoof,” and a means to prevent government leaders from cherry-picking 
priorities and programs based on political agendas, rather than on mission and operational 
efficiency and effectiveness. Materials available on this topic, therefore, were meant to 
provide agencies with the necessary tools to develop, apply (i.e., analysis) and report 
more objective, empirical data in ways that would promote mutual benefit to a 
multiplicity of stakeholders, viewpoints and objectives, in an apolitical environment.  
Even though it is a difficult task to mandate the pursuit of common 
interest, in addition to the self-interest so prevalent in the hearts of men, real objectivity, 
the bedrock of accurate assessment and evaluation, and necessary for true performance 
accountability, requires it. 
Without such independent, non-partisan oversight coupled with specific 
performance management solutions to supplement current official guidance, agencies will 
continue to emphasize compliance and “politicized” performance analysis and reporting  
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rather than focusing on actual results and improvement. In other words, they will 




Table 3.   Definitions of Types and Methods for Program Evaluation 
4. GPRA-MA Focus Area #4: Performance Reviews 
a. Official Government Policy 
Mr. Zients, the Obama Administration’s former OMB Deputy Director for 
Management and CPO, said that the “ultimate test of our performance management 
efforts is whether or not the information is used,”90 underscoring OMB’s shift from 
focusing on planning and reporting performance to using performance information in 
decision making.  
The GPRA-MA significantly changes how agencies prepare, discuss and 
communicate progress in their GPRA-mandated performance plans and reports, and the 
periodic and structured review of progress.  
The Act stipulates that enhanced information be used to drive both cross-
cutting and individual program improvements through quarterly in-person data-driven 
                                                 
90 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Changes to the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New Framework of Products and Processes, 19. 
Definitions of Types and Methods for Program Evaluation 
 
Conceptual Development—Methods (i.e., logic models and program theory) for detailing the 
pathways by which programs are intended to work. 
 
Development of Evaluation Methods and Quality Control—Detailing the procedures and 
specifications to be used for collecting data, for evaluation study designs, and for verification and 
validation of data quality (i.e., surveys, field observations, interviews, management information 
systems, focus groups, expert panel judgments, case studies, etc.). 
 
Use of Data Systems—Using data from available statistical indicators (e.g., state-collected “vital 
statistics” or regularly collected surveys), from program-specific Management Information Systems, 
and/or from Geographic Information Systems. 
 
Process and Impact Evaluation Studies—Systematically conducted assessments, usually on a one-
time basis, of the activities or interventions undertaken by a program, and/or of the results 
attributable to that program. 
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reviews. Each agency head and COO, with the support of the PIO and PIC, will analyze 
and discuss previous and current data in an open, transparent, and diagnostic manner. 
COOs are responsible for making sure that program managers regularly communicate 
actionable performance indicators, supported by value-added analysis, to both internal 
and external stakeholders in order to highlight promising practices, identify problems and 
recommend solutions. These reviews are conducted on programs identified by GAO as 
“high-risk,” or selected by agency leadership as contributing to the accomplishment of 
long-term federal government priority goals (i.e., FGPGs, CAPs, MPGs), overarching 
agency strategic goals, or near-term priority goals (i.e., APGs). Including key personnel 
from other components, programs, or agencies, these quarterly reviews are meant to 
eliminate program duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, and identify “low priority 
programs” for possible reprogramming or termination.91  
Even though GPRA-MA does not specify any oversight or deliverable 
requirement for the quarterly reviews themselves, the OMB has formed an Internal 
Reviews Working Group, primarily consisting of representatives from multiple agencies 
across the federal government who meet on a monthly basis to discuss leading practices 
in the areas of data-driven reviews, as well as associated topics, such as business 
intelligence, risk management and performance measurement. The group recently led a 
baseline study of internal agency review practices across the federal government and has 
benchmarked numerous review processes and associated performance management tools 
for government-wide application.  
In 2011, this working group conducted a baseline study of how the 24 
CFO-Act agencies were conducting their internal performance reviews. This survey was 
repeated in 2012 to monitor trends in learning, improvement and other challenges, such 
as the availability of data, and the ability to detect quarterly progress and provide timely 
reporting. The study concluded that over 80% of federal agencies were realizing the 
                                                 
91 (1) Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRA-MA); (2) GPRA 
Modernization Act, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United 
States Senate to Accompany H.R. 2142; (3) Office of Management and Budget (OMB), OMB Circular No. 
A-11, Part 6: Preparation and Submission of Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual 
Performance Reports. 
  78 
impact of performance reviews, up from 30% in 2011. Success was attributed to COO 
engagement and an evolving culture of data-driven analysis and decision making, 
organizational collaboration and increased goal tracking. Business Intelligence (BI) was 
also a keen area of focus, with 75% of agencies signaling that they were currently using 
BI solutions. The role of technology in planning and performance management will be 
discussed much more detail in the last section of this literature review, or the fifth GPRA-
MA focus area covering transparency and accountability.  
In addition to the cross-agency priority goals that are reviewed quarterly 
by the OMB deputy director with support from the PIC, OMB is expected to annually 
determine whether an agency has met the performance goals in its performance plan. 
Holding agencies accountable to achieve measurable results, GPRA-MA also requires 
OMB to annually identify goals agencies failed to achieve, and to require remedial 
action. To accomplish this requirement in a way that encourages learning, OMB applies 
the SOAR process. SOAR offers a supportive, non-confrontational, non-punitive 
environment that serves as a mechanism to reinforce strategic thinking and decision 
making by asking and answering tough questions about progress on high-level goals, and 
the most effective allocation of resources that would allow agencies to achieve higher 
performance.92 Strategies to meet any unmet goals are captured in supplemental plans 
and reports (i.e., PIPs). OMB and Congress monitor PIPs over a period of three years, 
with each year requiring specific and progressive action. If a performance goal remains 
“unmet” for either two or three consecutive fiscal years, the agency and OMB are 
required to take additional measures, including proposing statutory or legislative changes, 
reauthorizations, reprogramming or transfers. For goals that remain unmet for three 
consecutive years, programs are identified for termination or reduction.  
Finally, on an annual basis, each agency is required to eliminate 
unnecessary (i.e., outdated, duplicative) reporting by reducing and/or consolidating 
agency strategic and performance plans and reports.  
                                                 
92 Moynihan, The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act, 10, 
13. 
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Various approaches, tools and techniques are currently being offered in 
the best practices literature to improve both the performance planning, review and 
reporting processes. 
b. Best Practices Literature 
Harry Hatry and Elizabeth Davies of the Urban Institute, in a 2011 report 
entitled “A Guide to Data-Driven Performance Reviews,” provides yet another practical 
“how-to” guide, especially tailored for public institutions, with specific solutions related 
to implementing data-driven performance reviews.93 The report sheds light on how 
federal agencies can benefit from conducting periodic reviews leveraging several of the 
elements within the GPRA-MA, such as an interested and engaged leadership, timely and 
tailored performance measures, and sound analytics. It provides specific guidelines on 
how to set up and run a review, laying out who needs to be involved, what kinds of 
performance information should be collected, analyzed and assessed, and how to follow 
up afterwards in order to ensure performance improvement. 
Highlighting several examples of reviews at the local, state, and federal 
levels, the authors demonstrate how the Act can best be leveraged to instill a culture of 
results-based accountability. Incorporating successful elements from various review 
processes, in addition to best practices, this “how-to” guide provides performance 
practitioners with the basic core components of successful regular and structured data-
driven performance reviews. These recommended components can be tailored by asking 
and answering several pre-determined questions that determine the actual needs of each 
organization.  
 
GAO recently published its own report, GAO-13-228, in its Managing for 
Results series, entitled Data-Driven Performance Reviews Show Promise but Agencies 
Should Explore How to Involve Other Relevant Agencies. Their findings and 
recommendations mirror the Hatry and Davies framework, identifying nine leading 
                                                 
93 Harry Hatry and Elizabeth Davies, A Guide to Data-Driven Performance Reviews (The IBM Center 
for the Business of Government and the Urban Institute, 2011).  
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practices that promote successful data-driven performance reviews, assessing their impact 
in achieving agency high-level goals. 
Two significant recommendations, reflecting the federal government’s 
increasing focus on intra- and inter-agency interaction and collaboration, involve (1) the 
identification and sharing of best practices and (2) the establishment of cross-agency 
performance reviews to achieve common goals.  
Closely linked with these performance review processes are the 
mechanisms an agency uses to report on the success and challenges of mission and 
program achievement, effectively communicating any progress and improvement 
identified during the review process to a wide range of internal and external partners and 
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Table 4.   Questions to Address When Implementing Data-Driven Performance 
Reviews94 
(1) Performance Reporting. In addition to requiring that public 
authorities react promptly and positively to requests from members of the public for 
access to information and documents which have not been published (i.e., Freedom of 
Information Act), there is also an obligation for the government to proactively 
“volunteer” or provide information on its operations in formats that are easily accessible 
and understandable to the average citizen. This often comes in the form of one-way 
communications from government agencies to constituents, such as posting periodic 
strategic plans, annual budgets and performance reports on public websites, direct media 
relations, community education campaigns and e-government.95 One particular type of 
                                                 
94 Hatry and Davies, A Guide to Data-Driven Performance Reviews. 
95 Emerson, Menkus, and Van Ness, The Public Administrator’s Companion: A Practical Guide, 66–
69. 
Questions to Address When Implementing Data-Driven Performance Reviews  
 
The Core Team: What type of leadership is needed? Who should be included in start-up activities? 
What staffing is needed?  
 
The Meeting Structure: Should meetings focus on reporting units or on specific themes? How 
frequently should the meetings be held? How long should meetings last?  
 
The Performance Indicators: Which performance indicators should be reviewed? Does existing 
technology support regular reporting of performance indicators?  
 
Meeting Preparation: What pre-meeting preparation is needed? Should the leader notify units of 
major issues and questions in advance?  
 
Running the Meeting: Which individuals inside the organization should attend the meetings? Should 
meetings be open to individuals outside the organization? What is the content and typical agenda of 
these meetings? What should be the tone of the performance review meeting? What should be the 
physical set-up of the meetings?  
 
Following Up after the Meeting: What follow-up should be undertaken?  
 
Sustaining the Process: Who needs to support this process? What did managers recommend to 
sustain this process? Does the use of data-driven performance reviews deliver improved services and 
cost savings?  
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such public information sharing is mandated by the GPRA-MA: the reporting of data on 
government priorities, programs and performance results.  
In a recent IBM report, “Performance Reporting: Insights from 
International Practice,”96 Richard Boyle, head of research at the Institute of Public 
Administration in Dublin, Ireland, identifies the following six (6) key attributes of good 
performance reporting:  
• Consistency and comparability in performance reporting 
structures; 
• Inclusion of qualitative narrative to accompany quantitative 
performance indicators; 
• Existence of clearly identified outcome measures; 
• Availability of both target and baseline data to guide assessment(s) 
over time; 
• Good formatting/presentation and effective use of technology 
platforms; and 
• Inclusion of output and activity indicators. 
Incorporating such elements would improve the quality of the 
federal government’s performance planning and reporting processes, particularly as they 
relate to the establishment of goals, the prioritization of interests, allocation of resources, 
and the evaluation of success.97 An interim step in using data to make decisions is 
ensuring that the transparency of data, which naturally breeds self-correcting behavior 
and action, is being proactively used to influence decisions on a daily basis, perhaps even 
indirectly eliminating the need for corrective action down the line.  
These criteria reflect much of the literature’s current focus on 
communicating the effectiveness of two very important American political and 
administrative accountability processes, fiscal responsibility, and performance results.  
 
                                                 
96 Richard Boyle, Performance Reporting: Insights from International Practice (Washington, DC: 
IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2009), 6–7. 
97 Kettle, The Politics of the Administrative Process, 51–52. 
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In conclusion, performance practitioners should be more forward 
leaning in ensuring that government operations are conducted openly and transparently, 
voluntarily providing the American public with the necessary information along with 
sufficient data to judge for themselves whether the investment of their taxpayer dollars is 
not only delivering the results intended, but the ones they actually need and desire. 
The debate regarding the transparency of public policy and its 
effects as a means to ensure accountability is the focus of our next section. 
5. GPRA-MA Focus Area #5: Transparency (in Decision Making and 
Governance) and Accountability  
a. Official Government Policy 
Transparency and accountability are two of the most important 
requirements of the Act with the greatest potential to impact government performance.  
GPRA-MA requires that performance information (e.g., federal and 
agency strategic plans, annual performance plans and reports, performance updates, and 
list of programs) be streamlined and posted in online formats useful to Congress and 
relevant to the general public. Quarterly updates of agency progress toward the 
achievement of near- and long-term goals are posted on the federal government’s single 
official website, Performance.gov, established by the OMB.  
The accountability requirements of the Act have been well-received by 
most performance practitioners based on everyone’s high expectations that such an 
emphasis on creating open and transparent processes will revolutionize the way 
government does business. Senator Mark Warner, a member of the Senate Budget 
Committee, and one of the original crafters of the legislation, said that GPRA-MA of 
2010 will “achieve unprecedented levels of transparency by providing the public with 
access to planning and performance information.”98 
                                                 
98 Senator Mark Warner, Virginia, Chair on Senate Budget Committee Performance Task Force (letter 
to Acting OMB Deputy Director Management, February 3, 2012). 
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However, in spite of the initial enthusiasm and goodwill, the 
accountability aspect of the law, which calls for increased consultation with Congress, is 
promising to be one of the most challenging to operationalize.  
Similar to issues regarding the accuracy and relevancy of performance 
information produced and used by the executive branch, there are concerns involving 
accountability due to the inherent tension existing between the two branches of 
government.99 Because neither branch will agree to relinquish legitimate authority or 
control over government affairs, there is potential for lack of collective, comprehensive 
support for the management priorities coming from either branch; thus negating the intent 
of the Act to build upon past successes and maintain continuity beyond individual 
administrations. 
GAO recently produced a report to alleviate some of the tension when 
such policy disagreements and/or competing priorities arise. One of Congress’ most 
recent handbooks Managing for Results: A Guide for Using the GPRA Modernization Act 
to Help Inform Congressional Decision-Making100 was developed to encourage 
constructive communication between bipartisan and bicameral congressional leaders and 
officials of the administration, as part of their requirement to produce help guides at 
regularly scheduled intervals to guide implementation of the Act.  
Not surprisingly, many public and private sector organizations have 
already developed or are developing similar help guides to assist federal agencies engage 
Congress and identify and address management and performance challenges. 
Understandably, Congress is looking for better and less expensive ways of doing business 
in light of the growing public concern over unsustainable spending and rising debt and 
deficits. Proactively looking for innovative and flexible ways to fund government 
programs, they have shown themselves eager to embrace such recommendations on how 
to better leverage the Act’s requirements to fulfill their oversight roles. 
                                                 
99 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Obama Administration Agenda for 
Government Performance: Evolution and Related Issues for Congress. 
100 U.S. Government and Accountability Office, Managing for Results: A Guide for Using the GPRA-
MA to Help Inform Congressional Decision-Making. 
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What lessons learned from best practices can be applied to improve the 
transparency of government initiatives and programs, not only to enhance operations and 
results, but to facilitate more innovative democratic governance processes, as well, 
ultimately contributing to greater public accountability?  
b. Best Practices Literature 
We defined public administration and accountability in Chapter II, 
mentioning the challenges involved in bridging the gap between various concepts of 
accountability, public service and public trust, in reconciling the political/bureaucratic 
definition/understanding of accountability with the expectations of the general public.  
In this last section of our literature review, which focuses on transparency, 
decision making and governance, we will begin to discuss how ideas, increasingly 
prevalent in today’s best practices, and pertaining to resilient governance, or meta-
governance, can contribute to reconciling the GPRA-MA concept of organizational 
performance with these various definitions of public accountability.  
Authors Booher and Innes in their book, “Planning with Complexity: An 
Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy,” identifies the following 
components of resilient governance, typically operative in small working groups: 
diversity and interdependence, collaborative dialogue and development of knowledge, 
networks, boundary spanning, and, finally, closed-loop monitoring and feedback.101  
The most important positive benefit of meta-governance involves 
networks, which naturally form and cross-jurisdictional and sector boundaries. Successful 
application of these types of governance techniques within the public sector would mean 
inspiring greater communication and collaboration between seemingly irreconcilable 
entities, between the various branches of government, between the public and private 
sector, and between government officials and the general public. This coming together of  
 
 
                                                 
101 Booher and Innes, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for 
Public Policy, 209–211. 
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diverse and disparate stakeholders is the real game changer, with the potential to 
completely and dramatically alter the dynamics of how government monitors, obtains 
feedback, and ultimately communicates results to the public it serves.  
Greater diversity allows us to move beyond the zero sum calculation, 
prevalent in most negotiated exchanges today, and embrace more shared (i.e., mutual) 
gains. When participants engaged in public performance improvement efforts are equally 
concerned about resolving difficult issues, shared understanding based on common 
investment can culminate in more innovative solutions previously overlooked. Such 
collaborative knowledge management can have an exponential effect, wherein several 
sources of information collide to create more comprehensive, holistic solutions. 
Moreover, solutions that have taken into account multi-faceted perspectives, based on the 
interdependence of multiple contributors, will be more readily trusted and accepted. 
In Chapter VI, “Innovative Networked Meta-Governance,” we will 
demonstrate how agencies can practically leverage some of these concepts and related 
complexity theory best practices to improve inter- and intra-organizational accountability, 
within the larger context of fiscal, ethical and democratic responsibility.  
More specifically, we will see how interactive, web-enabled CoPs, and 
their supporting ICTs can be leveraged to reconcile organizational performance with the 
various definitions of transparency and public accountability. Such approaches can bring 
civic participation and learning back to the forefront, through the cultivation of more 
productive relationships based on trust and collaboration between the public and national 
leadership. Translating crowd-sourcing and co-creation into networked solutions, creating 
forums for information and idea exchange, web-enabled CoPs/ICTs can contribute to 
closing the gap in the misconception(s) regarding accountability by establishing an on-
going dialogue between average American citizens and their public officials. 
We will see how, in shifting away from the idea that technology should be 
a goal in and of itself and recognizing that information only becomes real value added 
through human interaction geared toward mutual discussion and decision making, DHS 
officials can instill a culture of accountability, focusing on people and end-users, through 
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the creation and maintenance of virtual communities/teams, and performance-based 
social networks and organizational learning forums, as opposed to the simple, one-
directional technological communication tools prevalent today. 
C. SUMMARY 
The GPRA-MA of 2010 modernizes and refines the requirements established by 
the original GPRA of 1993 by promoting a performance management framework built on 
five (5) principles. Its purpose is to replace the stove-piped strategic performance 
planning and compliance reporting mechanisms, characteristic of the original Act, with a 
more holistic approach to outcome-oriented government, focused on performance 
improvement or achieving more effective and efficient government operations through 
results-based management.  
In view of the anticipated changes we can expect to see in the coming months and 
years, as a result of the passage of the GPRA-MA, as well as the continually evolving 
political, cultural and professional landscape of the homeland security environment, the 
DHS would benefit by more fully understanding best practices in the field of government 
strategic performance management and social complexity theory.  
Indeed, because of the increasing shift in mindset regarding the role of the 
average citizen in public affairs, affecting relational dynamics between the government 
and the American people at the federal, state and local levels, the DHS should begin to 
position itself now to begin bridging the gap between organizational performance and 
public accountability, by finding ways to translate the improved effectiveness and 
efficiency of its programs into greater trust, cooperation and collaboration between and 
among its partners and stakeholders, including the general public.  
The strategic performance management practices of the past, involving complex 
multi-year strategic plans, detailed annual budgets, and quarterly performance reports, as 
well as the resulting prescriptive, one-directional (i.e., dictatorial) way of interfacing with 
the public, will need to at least be supported by (if not replaced with) a more interactive  
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dialogue based on a collaborative and sustained working relationship(s) with average 
citizens, increasingly given the opportunity to weigh in on problems and solutions that 
affect their daily lives.  
The role of innovative leadership is essential in leveraging the full benefits of the 
Act, not only to ensure accountability but also to elevate the importance of the 
performance management and improvement discipline. 
Due to the changing role of leadership in the face of an increasingly complex, and 
decentralized environment, government performance leaders are being encouraged to 
advance the GPRA-MA agenda, by creating a performance culture based on continuous 
learning and improvement.  
In addition, more innovative ways of ensuring organizational alignment both 
within and between organizations, necessary to manage strategy, develop and translate it 
into operational actions, and monitor and improve effectiveness should be favored by 
public managers.  
We discussed how the development of an overarching PMF, comprised of some 
form of the following elements: logic modeling, performance measurement, and program 
evaluation can enable performance measurement practitioners and data analysts to collect 
better information, conduct better data analysis, and make better decisions. 
Conducting regular and structured data-driven performance reviews and reporting 
out on results also contributes to instilling a culture of results-based accountability by 
ensuring that government operations are conducted openly and transparently. 
Finally, the true face of leadership is no longer hierarchical and one-directional, 
but is becoming a reflection of “relational webs” of “network power” where complex 
problems are resolved through interdependent and interactive dialogue. Up and coming 
leaders are showing a preference for meta-governance, increasingly abandoning the 
traditional top-down, open loop, governance structures prevalent in the world of today’s 
public sector. Because, “policy, defined as the attempt to achieve a desired outcome, is a 
result of governing processes that are no longer fully controlled by the government, but  
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subject to negotiations between a wide range of public, semi-public and private 
actors,”102 these types of collaborative or networked governance processes are promising 
to soon be the norm. 
Incorporating some of the more creative or innovative strategic performance 
management best practices referenced in this literature review, will allow the department 
to identify alternative solutions more meaningful to end users at all levels of the 
performance improvement continuum.  
Emphasis cannot be placed enough on how public accountability, or creating and 
maintaining a culture of high-trust, should be the main driver behind DHS mission focus 
and accomplishment. Placing organizational management, strategic planning, program 
evaluation, performance measurement, governance, accountability and decision making 
within this larger context of fiscal, ethical and democratic responsibility and 
responsiveness, would result in greater public trust, cooperation and collaboration, and 
would be an inestimable force multiplier to both DHS politically appointed and career 
officials, having the potential to revolutionize the way the United States of America 
secures and protects its homeland.  
                                                 
102 Booher and Innes, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for 
Public Policy, 7–8, 205. 
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IV. METHODS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
As previously stated, the primary purpose of this thesis is to bridge the gap 
between organizational performance and public trust by linking the theoretical/practical 
conceptualization of accountability with the GPRA-MA of 2010, encouraging DHS 
leaders and performance practitioners, partners and stakeholders to view the legislation 
differently and begin to consider and apply more innovative performance management 
and improvement strategies and solutions in light of this revised mindset.  
The overarching qualitative research goal(s) are to:103 
• Interpret the GPRA-MA in terms of strategic performance management 
best practices; 
• Describe/Evaluate some of the current performance management 
dynamics, systems, processes, relationships, and individuals within the 
DHS; 
• Demonstrate that there are performance management deficiencies at the 
DHS, manifested in all five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA legislation;  
• Verify/Prove that these barriers to successful performance management 
and improvement are caused by or resulting in various cultural conditions, 
primarily a lack of accountability; and 
• Recommend how to better leverage the GPRA-MA and strategic 
performance management best practices to remedy these conditions and 
instill a culture of accountability within the DHS. 
Addressing these various topics and issues will allow us to answer the 
overarching, fundamental research question; namely, how public and organizational 
accountability is impacting the success of the GPRA-MA and how it might best be 
leveraged moving forward to instill a culture of accountability within the department and 
vis-à-vis the general public.  
                                                 
103 Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design, 9th ed. 
(Pearson HE, Inc., 2010), 4647–4656, Kindle edition. 
  92 
B. RESEARCH METHOD 
Closing the gap between the two worlds of public administration (i.e., federal 
government SPM/GPRA-MA), and public accountability (i.e., organizational and public 
trust), will involve establishing a solid theoretical foundation for the development of 
more innovative frameworks and practices.  
The research method selected follows the Multi-Goal Policy (Options) Analysis 
approach, involving various types104 of qualitative research methodologies105 and 
consisting of six (6) phases. 
1. Analytical and Explanatory (Qualitative) Research 
a. Problem Statement Definition (Basic Research) 
• Defining the problem, in answer to the question, “What is DHS not 
doing,” by demonstrating, using a Hypothesis Testing Matrix, how 
deficiencies in all five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA 
legislation, are primarily attributable to the five (5) 
reasons/conditions (i.e., hypotheses/propositions) listed below: 
• There is a lack of the creation and sustainment of a “High-
Trust Culture” (i.e., public accountability); 
• Performance improvement is a “Wicked Problem,” 
particularly difficult to resolve, requiring non-traditional 
solutions, uncommon/unfamiliar to most government 
institutions; 
• Political considerations, wherein management decisions are 
sometimes being made based on political issues or hot 
topics instead of based on evidence that points to a 
particular alternative that would actually improve 
performance, rather than simply prove success; 
• There is an administrative/bureaucratic tendency to direct 
and control, which produces stagnation; and 
• There is inadequate administrative governance (i.e., 
management oversight). 
 
                                                 
104 Types of Research: Exploratory, Descriptive (i.e., inspectional, syntopical), Analytical, 
Explanatory, and Predictive (i.e., basic, both deductive and inductive).  
105 Research Methodologies: Multiple, Collective Case Studies, Semi-structured Interview, Judgment 
Sampling. 
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b. Exploratory and Descriptive (Qualitative) Research 
• Inspectional Research of Legislative (i.e., GPRA-MA of 
2010/GAO) and Executive Branch (i.e., OMB) Requirements.  
• A literature review of official government policy pertaining 
to the GPRA-MA of 2010 to define and/or identify the five 
(5) impact focus areas of the GPRA-MA legislation and its 
current policy requirements/goals in answer to the question: 
What does DHS have to do? 
• Syntopical Research of External Best Practices.  
• A literature review of external best practices pertaining to 
the GPRA-MA of 2010 and SPM, to generate a clear set of 
non-mutually exclusive policy alternatives and lay out (i.e., 
construct) alternative goals and solutions for the existing 
legislation and its policy in answer to the question: What 
are others doing? 
• Analytical Research of current DHS strategic performance 
management processes.  
• A discussion of DHS implementation of the GPRA-MA of 
2010, reviewing how the department is complying with its 
requirements through an annual, reiterative resource 
allocation planning process, the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) cycle in answer to the 
question: What is DHS already doing? 
c. Predictive (Qualitative) Research 
• Recommendations (Basic Research, both Deductive and 
Inductive).  
• Specific improvement recommendations that leverage the 
Act to modify current approaches to policy implementation, 
based on the qualitative criteria (i.e., alternative goals) 
identified in the best practices research and supplemental 
social complexity theory, predicting and qualitatively 
evaluating the impact that such a modification of the policy 
would have, in answer to the question: What should DHS 
be doing? 
• Implementation (Applied Research, both Deductive and Inductive).  
• Providing high-level guidance on how to implement the 
specific improvement recommendations to achieve the 
alternative policy goals (i.e., end state) relative to increased 
accountability and improved public and organizational trust 
in answer to the question: How should DHS do it? 
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The first three chapters of this thesis have sought to initially answer the questions 
in sections (a) and (b), namely “What is DHS not doing?” and “What does DHS have to 
do?” and “What are others doing?” The following chapters, supplementing our analysis, 
will be dedicated to answering the remaining questions.  
In weighing best practices against current practices pertaining to the GPRA-MA 
within and across the DHS, we will be able to determine any gaps, and make 
recommendations on how the department should be applying this legislation to instill a 
greater culture of accountability. We will accomplish this by adding to our syntopical 
research of external best practices the additional concept of social complexity theory and 
how less simplistic, more nuanced, creative approaches can inform and impact federal 
government strategic planning and decision making. 
The major outcome of the research is to make specific improvement 
recommendations to increase accountability by improving performance management 
strategies and solutions within the context of the GPRA-MA framework. Providing these 
end state outcome recommendations will require predictive (qualitative) research and 
problem statement resolution, in answer to the question: What should DHS be doing 
(differently) to improve its performance management strategies and solutions with the 
intent of increasing accountability within and across the department and vis-à-vis the 
American public? The recommendations will be based on the research results of the 
literature review, and analysis using the hypothesis testing matrix, and focus on both the 
philosophical/theoretical, as well as the practical applications of strategic performance 
management and complexity theory within the five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA-
MA, and the five (5) conditions impacting the legislation’s effectiveness.  
In order to move beyond the status quo, and ensure that the Act is improving 
performance results within the DHS, focus will be placed on actions that create, then 
cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e., high-trust). This involves improving the noted 
deficiencies in the five (5) pillars of the GPRA-MA by impacting conditions contributing 
to those inefficiencies, and selecting more flexible, creative and innovative strategic 
performance management solutions to increase public engagement, collaboration, and 
cooperation. It will mean focusing on how the DHS can better leverage the GPRA-MA, 
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as well as public and private best practices, to bridge the gap between traditional 
definitions of public accountability, or government effectiveness and efficiency, and its 
more non-traditional interpretations of improved organizational and public trust. 
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V.  FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT AND COMPLEXITY THEORY  
Having obtained a better understanding of the GPRA-MA of 2010, we will now 
discuss how the DHS is complying with its principles and requirements.  
We will start by reviewing DHS implementation of the GPRA-MA, highlighting 
any perceived deficiencies resulting from the department’s current mindset and approach. 
Then, we will further discuss these deficiencies in the context of social complexity 
theory, in the hopes of remedying them by encouraging the DHS, as a complex 
organization, to move beyond the existing traditional, reductionist Newtonian approaches 
to strategic planning and resource allocation to consider more descriptive, self-organized, 
adaptable and resilient ways of establishing its performance management policies and 
frameworks. By applying complexity theory to better understand the limitations and 
contributions of existing schools of thought in the field of strategic planning and decision 
making, DHS will see the value in selecting more creative, innovative approaches and 
configurations from among current industry best practices, tailoring them to its unique 
security context.  
A. DHS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GPRA-MA OF 2010 
Because the DHS is a large institution with over 250,000 employees and seven (7) 
separate, operationally independent components, each with their own unique approach to 
performance management, compliance with GPRA-MA requirements has been 
patchwork. Indeed, DHS, similar to most major reorganizations, has encountered 
challenges in demonstrating effectiveness and efficiency in its Management Integration 
(MI) efforts in general.106  
                                                 
106 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines MI as “the development of consistent 
and/or consolidated processes, systems, and people…for greater efficiency and effectiveness.” U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, Department of Homeland Security: Actions Taken Toward 
Management Integration, but a Comprehensive Strategy Is Still Needed (GAO-10–131), Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2009).  
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The GAO Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management 
Functions, published on August 17, 2007 (GAO-07-454), highlighted that the “lack of a 
comprehensive strategy and integrated management systems and functions [was] 
limit[ing] DHS’s ability to carry out its homeland security responsibilities in an effective, 
risk-based way.” It recognized that “DHS has generally made more progress in 
implementing its mission activities than its management functions, reflecting an initial 
focus on efforts to secure the homeland.”107 GAO continued to identify certain of these 
DHS management functions as high-risk in its follow up report “High-Risk Update,” 
published in January 2009 (GAO-09-271). These included planning and priority setting; 
accountability and oversight; as well as a broad array of additional management, 
programmatic, and partnering challenges, such as acquisition management, financial 
management, human capital management, information technology management, 
administration management, and security management.  
Following the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) and the 
Bottom-up Review (BUR), DHS became even more intent on making progress in these 
designated areas, particularly in its planning and priority setting and acquisition 
management functions. It developed an Integrated Investment Life Cycle Model, to begin 
the formalization of a PPBE structure at the strategic level, aligning investments with 
mission priorities.108 Such strategic integration of all of its investments, combined with 
enhanced acquisition management, and more mature financial and human capital 
management initiatives, has led to a significant culture change within the department’s 
budget formulation process. By maturing the strategic phase of its investment 
management processes, DHS continues to make progress toward ensuring that “mission 
needs drive budget submissions instead of budget submissions driving mission needs.”109 
                                                 
107 U.S. Government Accountability Office, High-Risk Series, An Update (GAO-09–271), 
Washington, DC: GPO, 2009, 49. 
108 DHS PPBE, originally designed by the Department of Defense, is a management and resource 
planning process aimed at articulating DHS goals and priorities; aligning DHS programs, financial 
resources, personnel, and assets to accomplish those goals; and assessing whether those goals have been 
accomplished efficiently and effectively. 
109 Department of Homeland Security, Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management: Report to the 
Government Accountability Office (Washington, DC: January 2011), 8. 
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It is one thing to make progress in terms of aligning investments with mission 
priorities, through more mature strategic planning and acquisition processes. Determining 
the actual impact of those investment decisions, is quite another. Even though DHS has 
made significant strides in developing departmental strategic frameworks and aligning its 
investments, like many federal agencies, more work remains to be done to improve the 
execution of DHS organizational strategy through the development of performance 
management methodologies that apply empirical data to the planning, programming and 
budgeting phases.  
1. DHS SPM Context and Challenges 
Hoping to close this gap, the DHS has developed its own PMF integrated with the 
department’s PPBE processes. The strategy respects the intentions of the official OMB 
GPRA-MA policy guidance, and currently consists of a DHS performance management 
community, an annual process to review and improve the quality and accuracy of its 
performance measures, and a quarterly review and reporting platform for performance 
results. By linking the QHSR strategic framework with DHS program results summarized 
in the FYHSP,110 the department has established a solid foundation to guide its homeland 
security activities toward achievement of its strategic goals, objectives, and planning 
priorities. 
We will now look at how various organizational and system complexity factors, 
particularly political and administrative leadership constraints, are impacting DHS 
strategic performance management processes in each of the five (5) GPRA-MA/OMB 
performance management focus areas.  
a. Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and 
Improvement 
So far, the role of departmental leadership in executing its performance-
related activities has emphasized outreach, education and information sharing to drive 
                                                 
110 FYHSP displays the DHS programs and associated resources (investments, construction, human 
capital, IT, and other support and operating expenses) for the budget year plus four years. DHS CFO Policy 
Manual: Chapter 5.0 “DHS Performance Guidance” (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, June 2012).  
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improvement. The DHS Office of the CFO within the Under Secretary of Management 
(US/M) supports the department’s COO and PIO by producing official performance 
measurement planning, development, analysis and reporting policy and procedures. 
Responsible for overseeing the department’s GPRA-MA activities, they also chair the 
DHS PIC to facilitate information sharing and best practices across the department 
through various communities of practice, training and consultation activities.111 This 
more focused role can be attributed to the department’s bureaucratic complexity (i.e., 
multiple layers of review and lack of cohesive and consistent leadership engagement, 
management processes and operational coordination) impeding the cultural shift called 
for in the GPRA-MA.  
With increased leadership engagement demonstrated at the top Tier 1 level 
headquarters (HQ), the DHS COO and PIO are beginning to see some usefulness of the 
Act. Unfortunately, we are not experiencing the same type of engagement at the lower 
Tier 2 levels (i.e., components, front line staff, etc.). People seem content to simply make 
progress, but not necessarily achieve ultimate success, continuing to measure themselves 
in relative terms, as opposed to absolutes, toward comprehensive end states.  
Tier 1 leadership engagement, however, can be a catch-22 situation. 
Elevation of performance to higher levels may draw attention to issues and challenges, 
but it can also hinder the purity of solutions, due to the role of politics and/or the 
personality and approach of leaders. Group think is usually not prevalent except when 
senior leaders are present, as subordinates tend to defer at these higher levels. Therefore, 
top leaders that display flexibility, creativity and innovation can go a long way in 
eliminating hierarchical resistance to change. Senior attitude determines the level and 
tone of contribution, either discouraging people to participate, through counter-
productive micro-management and the preference to direct, control, and “prove success,” 
or by encouraging actual performance improvement at the lower levels through the 
practical application of sound data analysis.  
                                                 
111 DHS CFO Policy Manual: Chapter 5.0 “DHS Performance Guidance.” 
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The role of leadership within the department, as it pertains to performance 
improvement functions, needs to be better defined, emphasizing mentorship towards a 
performance-based culture, with both political and career executives comprising the 
agency’s PIC and supporting staff.  
On the topic of high-level political appointees, of which the DHS PIO is 
one, a few challenges also remain. Focused on communications and political 
considerations involving DHS programs and projects that fall within the 1st Quadrant of 
the Covey time management framework (i.e., important/urgent), leaders do not always 
have the time or resources required to make performance management a success. In many 
DHS organizations, SPM/GPRA-MA is often too administrative and process-oriented, 
not sufficiently linked with higher-level policy and decision-making frameworks, 
typically falling within the 2nd or 3rd Covey quadrants (i.e., important/not urgent or not 
important/urgent, respectively) and, therefore, not readily assisted by individual agency 
political leadership in the way that it should. Additional processes and tools need to be 
developed to help DHS leadership focus on this discipline, associating it. More quickly 
and easily, with high-visibility stakeholder concerns, and in ways that add value.  
b. Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment  
A possible cause of leadership hesitation in making recommendations to 
improve cross-cutting programs as a means to achieve strategic clarity in mission 
integration, a major push of GPRA-MA, is the lack of a viable roadmap to coordinate the 
many duplicative areas of Congressional oversight.112 Mr. Robert Shea pointed out that 
“getting different agencies to agree on common goals and a coordinated approach to 
achieving them is hard. Agencies or programs with common goals often have different 
congressional authorizing and appropriations committees. Such programs also have 
separate constituencies who […] fight to preserve the status quo. If program managers 
                                                 
112 Robert Shea, “Go For Results Rather Than Reorganization,” The Public Manager, Summer 2011, 
39. 
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don’t agree with the coordinated approach, agencies have multiple outlets they can use to 
get their way.”113 And indeed they often do.  
Understandably, the current departmental congressional oversight 
structure, with its conflicting demands and requirements, allows each of the various DHS 
components to march to the sound of a different drum, rather than together in one accord, 
impeding the department’s ability to consolidate programs and eliminate duplication and 
redundancy. Unfortunately, resolution in this arena is currently beyond agency control. It 
lies elsewhere, at the doorstep of Congress. 
DHS internal efforts to reorganize haven’t fared much better to eliminate 
silos either, and 10 years in, we’re still trying to complete the challenging task of mission 
integration. As a result, DHS performance results have been primarily couched in terms 
of outputs, rather than outcomes, meant to gauge the performance of individual programs 
as opposed to providing a holistic vision of overarching mission success, and/or the 
achievement of broader strategic goals. DHS is really now just beginning to ask and 
answer the following questions: Are we making progress toward achieving overarching 
goals? Are we receiving the value intended with the dollars we are spending, across the 
board?  
Cross-organizational collaboration is as important to achieving strategic 
clarity, organizational alignment and mission integration, as it is difficult to do. The 
complexity and interdependency of the DHS mission make alignment particularly 
challenging. Innovative meta-governance, or more democratic (i.e., representative) 
governance structures that allow for all diverging perspectives and opinions to be seen 
and heard, would be one way to avoid the current reductionist approaches to creating the 
clear line of sight required for effective strategic and operational decision making. 
Without cross-organizational collaboration, intra- and inter-agency problems, even so-
called cross-cutting initiatives, can very quickly devolve into isolated and insulated little 
discussions and stove-piped efforts, rather than across-the-board exportable best practices 
and comprehensive solutions.  
                                                 
113 Shea, “Go For Results Rather Than Reorganization,” 39. 
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These types of interactive debate are also required to identify true 
priorities, an important task in the planning phase, and essential for successful 
programming and budgeting. GPRA-MA processes may contribute to the transparency of 
priorities, knowing whose programs are being put forward and who’s 
agreeing/disagreeing with them, but it struggles with to find commonality among them.  
Even though we have made some progress toward the streamlining of 
priorities, due to the QHSR, the DHS Strategic Plan and the resulting FYSHP Line of 
Business (LoB) frameworks and program, sub-program and activity measures, better 
mission integration, which logically should be the result, still tends to be rather 
happenstance. Because the GPRA-MA mandate to develop strategic plans, performance 
plans and reports and annual performance goals is not required at the DHS component-
level, performance management/improvement efforts continue to occur in disparate ways, 
at different levels of maturity throughout the department, negatively affecting DHS 
strategic clarity and organizational alignment overall.  
Mission integration is extremely important and necessary if the 
department is to take a much broader and rigorous look at its future, moving away from 
the here and now of day-to-day operations, in order to proactively consider more 
comprehensive, longer-term solutions to securing the homeland. We have been told for so 
long to simply continue doing the things we have been doing, but only better, that many 
have come to associate strategic planning with intelligence-based operational action.  
Common operational planning, based on standard doctrine and supported 
by central databases creating a common operating picture, would mitigate some of these 
challenges, as they would facilitate finding the appropriate mix between centralization 
and decentralization, between strategic and operational decision making, to define, 
prioritize and measure success.  
c. Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation  
Even though most organizations are not naturally interested in 
performance evaluation, because of the increased Congressional/OMB interest in DHS 
operations, departmental officials are now understanding that empirical data analysis is 
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necessary to adequately discourse with external oversight bodies. However, because there 
is still so much emphasis on the budget driving strategy, and the tendency to associate 
performance measures strictly with increased or decreased funding (i.e., reward or 
punishment), there is little room for focusing these efforts on non-punitive performance 
planning and improvement, much less, on impacting public and/or organizational 
accountability and trust.  
Constantly wavering between the influences of “messy” democratic 
governance with its resulting complexity, and the strict confines of bureaucratic processes 
preferring simplicity, DHS continues to display pockets of both success and failure 
regarding the use of performance measures to evaluate mission and program 
effectiveness. Sometimes, on certain occasions, there are timely, accurate/objective, and 
relevant measures adequately informing decisions and improving performance, and at 
other times and on other occasions, there is a total lack of robust performance-based 
analysis.  
In spite of this volatile cultural dynamic, there is general consensus that 
some progress has been made in the arena of performance measurement due to 
improvements made in both the quality and accuracy of the department’s externally-
reported organizational performance data.  
Thanks in large part to the recent QHSR and subsequent BUR individual 
programs are now linked to overarching goals. In addition, through its annual, reiterative 
performance measure development and improvement cycle, coordinating multiple 
stakeholder views,114 DHS continually refreshes its GPRA-mandated strategic- and 
management-level measures. The intent is to develop much more outcome-oriented 
performance indicators that reflect the consolidated perspective of the QHSR mission 
areas, replacing many of the programmatic measures developed for the former Bush 
Administration’s PART gauging the results of the individual FYHSP programs. 
Questions pertaining to subjectivity and risk aversion, exacerbated by 
political considerations and/or the fear of failure, have been raised regarding the setting 
                                                 
114 Shea, “Go For Results Rather Than Reorganization,” 39. 
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of annual targets for DHS’ public-facing (i.e., GPRA) performance measures and targets. 
Some even suggest the department has developed many of these, solely based on 
externally imposed political expectations and a push to demonstrate progress. Indeed, 
leadership and staff, desirous to prove success and downplay shortcomings, will 
sometimes purposely and/or unconsciously insert bias into their performance 
measurement processes, “gaming the system” by establishing easily achievable measures 
and targets in order to prove success.115 DHS has a robust performance measurement 
verification and validation program that determines the completeness and reliability of its 
performance data, in compliance with GPRA-MA of 2010 stipulations, to mitigate some 
of these challenges involving objectivity and bias. It should be expanded to encompass all 
departmental GPRA measures, supported by internal component self-assessment 
initiatives.  
Regarding the use of empirical data in program evaluations, and similar to 
themes previously iterated, there are limitations in the DHS organizational capacity to 
process, organize and understand performance information in a way that leads to 
meaningful analysis. This may be attributed to the multiplicity of bureaucratic layers and 
the lack of integration of DHS performance data with other cross-cutting policy and 
management processes. The inability to make performance data relevant to decision-
makers is further exacerbated by the GPRA-MA requirement to produce high-level 
outcome-oriented performance measures, which often separate or distance the processes 
and products required by the Act from the data that is actually used and/or needed by 
agency leaders and program managers in their day-to-day management and operational 
decision making.116 As a result, most measures developed by departmental subject matter 
experts are not considered in developing policy or making long-term strategic decisions, 
but rather used to inform short-term day-to-day operations. This may be attributed to the 
lack of forward looking, cross-cutting, outcome-based perspective in existing 
(operational) measure sets.  
                                                 
115 John Peery, Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act at DHS: A Study in 
Organizational Change, Field Project Report for the University of Maryland Baltimore County, 2012, 18. 
116 Ibid., 12–14. 
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To remedy this, DHS is working in collaboration with internal PPBE 
partners and stakeholders to integrate its GPRA-mandated performance measures with 
additional empirical data used in other management and resource allocation processes 
and decision making. Attempts are being made to place measures within some type of 
overarching strategic context to get conversations going and define success in layman’s 
terms based on a direct understanding of the current operating environment, future 
projections of the environment (i.e., how it might look different in 4 years), and what 
might be needed to plan for it. Applying logic modeling methodologies and supporting 
information technology systems, the department hopes to improve its analytical 
capabilities through quality data sets, sufficiently granular to inform strategic, tactical and 
operational decision making.  
As we segue into our next section pertaining to performance reviews, it is 
important to note that successful departmental performance measurement and evaluation 
functions require two fundamental perspectives: keeping sight of the intended use of the 
data, and ensuring that it is relevant, accurate, and timely enough to inform decisions. If 
there are no decisions to make, then it is impossible to determine whether data is 
sufficient in either quantity or quality. A lot of the performance information currently 
available is simply not useful. More is not always better. If you do not need to make a 
decision, then NO data is more than enough.  
Finally, other sources of qualitative evidence, such as evaluations, subject 
matter expert judgments, narrative, storytelling, analogies, etc. are just as important as 
quantitative data. Counter-intuitively, data sets that contradict and teach are preferable to 
empirical data that is meant to justify strategic direction already taken and/or decisions 
previously made.  
c. Performance Reviews 
Regarding the performance review stipulations of the Act, the OMB 
philosophy for agency internal performance reviews has been to focus on studying and 
resolving any and all challenges involving the achievement of long-term goals through 
regular data-rich performance progress reviews and relentless follow-up.  
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Even though we are making progress and improving both the quality and 
the usefulness of our performance data, there is general consensus that DHS capabilities 
in this arena are still primarily focused on structured leadership-driven review processes 
and top-down compliance monitoring and reporting. The DHS Deputy Secretary 
conducts quarterly reviews with component senior leadership to discuss the department’s 
cascading performance measures aligned with its mission (strategic-level measures), 
priority goals (strategic- and management-level measures), and FYHSP programs 
(management- and operational-level measures), but still does not make any real 
operational decisions based on the information discussed.  
Likewise, DHS promotes transparency through annual and quarterly 
performance reports, accompanied by representation and advocacy of DHS mission 
success and performance measure results with both internal and external stakeholders, but 
it does not always draw conclusions or make recommendations for further improvement.  
Concerns have been raised that this limited, minimally compliant 
engagement from leadership is creating a vicious circle of cynicism as to the usefulness 
and benefits of the GPRA-MA of legislation within the DHS.117 
Next steps would include moving beyond simply reviewing the 
implementation status of performance goals in order to embrace a continuous 
(performance) improvement mind-set through robust program analysis and evaluation 
processes integrated into overarching governance frameworks and supported by DHS-
wide institutional dashboards and data-mining capabilities able to provide a holistic, 
strategic view of mission performance in real time.  
The common institutional failure speeches, along with their standard 
excuses as to why we cannot improve, are increasingly falling on deaf ears. Federal 
government leaders and strategic planning and performance management decision-
makers across the board have accepted the fact that executing the DHS mission involves 
                                                 
117 Peery, Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act at DHS: A Study in 
Organizational Change, 21. 
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coming together to solve “wicked” problems requiring the relentless pursuit of success, 
pushing through in spite of challenges, set-backs, and/or seemingly intractable situations.  
d. Transparency and Accountability 
Even though public transparency and accountability are basic 
requirements of democratic governance, many within the DHS believe that they are not 
necessary to ensure agency performance. The common observation is that public 
accountability is not our responsibility, but rather mission success. Moreover, the 
“public” in most DHS officials’ minds does not refer to average citizens, but to 
government management and oversight bodies, such as OMB and Congress, GAO, etc. 
To them, “publically” reporting information simply means “politicizing” discussions. It is 
believed that we can be entirely successful in executing our mission, while entirely 
unsuccessful in communicating, showcasing this success to these external stakeholders. It 
is easy to see how such a mindset might result in hubris.  
In spite of this, most people feel that we can do a better job explaining to 
external constituencies what we do, as well as the challenges we face. Current 
recommendations include using plain language that is both meaningful and relevant, in an 
attempt to educate, rather than simply inform, various government stakeholders on what 
DHS is actually doing and/or meant to do as opposed to what it can and/or should be 
doing.  
There is also some talk that DHS analytical products should be used to 
somewhat inform the direction political decisions on the Hill might take, providing topics 
or focus areas for discussion, while still stopping just short of saying that DHS analyses 
and evaluations would actually be used to influence these macro-level decisions in any 
meaningful way. In other words, any conclusions and/or recommendations made by the 
department would simply be seen as good ideas or suggestions by our powerful political 
overlords, rather than impactful game changers.  
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In the end, because (public) transparency and accountability are seen as 
outcomes beyond the influence and control of most departmental leaders and decision-
makers, it remains a secondary focus, a collateral (un)intended consequence of success, 
but not an actual contributor to it.  
e. Summary 
Even though it appears that DHS is displaying a commitment to increasing 
the quality and consistency of its performance information, significant challenges remain 
regarding the use of data in meaningful ways. This would lead one to conclude that DHS 
performance management and improvement methodologies and processes continue to 
lack the necessary governance structure, implementation tools, and communication and 
reporting venues to provide the independent, objective analysis needed to drive true 
performance improvement.  
Satisfying a political rather than a public agenda and proving success, 
rather than reflecting actual program outcomes that can lead to improved performance, 
continues to influence the DHS performance management framework, stifling the full 
intent and effect of the legislation within the department. 
2. GPRA-MA Deficiencies and SPM Culture within the DHS  
a. GPRA-MA Deficiencies 
More specifically, in spite of ongoing efforts and recent progress, the 
GPRA-MA of 2010, similar to most of the traditional strategic performance management 
frameworks of the past, is failing to significantly impact DHS performance and results, 
due to deficiencies manifested in all five (5) of the legislation’s major focus areas: 
(1) Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning 
and Improvement. Insufficient leadership engagement and lack of commitment to drive 
performance improvement has prevented the creation of a positive learning and 
performance management culture at the department. Insufficient cross-organizational 
collaboration and group think has resulted. Also noted, has been a persistent resistance to 
change perpetrated by hierarchical, cultural and traditional forces within the various DHS 
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organizations. This lack of flexibility, creativity and innovation has often contributed to 
best practices, necessary to tackling the particularly difficult challenges inherent with 
managing for results, being neglected to the preference of common, more expedient, 
practices.  
(2) Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment. DHS’ 
ability to align individual, program, and agency priorities is often hindered by a lack of 
connectivity among agency plans and performance results, resulting in competing, and 
often contradictory priorities, unintentional gaps and duplicative or redundant efforts. 
Consistent and integrated performance management frameworks allowing for the 
successful development and monitoring of strategy, are replaced with top-down, 
prescriptive, and stove-piped approaches to strategic planning and reporting that open the 
door to unnecessary political considerations, and/or negotiated compromise, negatively 
influencing decision making toward mission achievement.  
(3) Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation. The 
goal of improving the quality of performance measures, by building analytical capacity to 
produce and analyze, timely, actionable performance information for decisions, is 
thwarted due to the inadequate application of performance management/ 
measurement/evaluation principles and insufficient quantity and quality of data. There 
are also credibility issues, involving bias or lack of objectivity, where responsible parties 
sometimes game the system by establishing easily achievable measures and targets.  
(4) Performance Reviews. There is an absence of periodic, 
data-driven reviews to improve performance outcomes and reduce costs. When 
discussions do occur, the default perception and reaction is more often than not punitive 
rather than inquisitive, resulting in performance information that is produced but rarely 
used in strategic, management and operational decision making. In addition, there is 
insufficient feedback and/or follow up due to the bureaucratic complexity of multiple 
layers of review and non-cohesive or inconsistent management processes and/or 
operational coordination.  
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(5) Transparency and Accountability. Communicating and 
reporting transparent performance information frequently and effectively to improve 
decision making and results, is impeded by inadequate governance structures, systems 
and processes. This results in compliance reporting rather than accountability, leadership 
disengagement, and by extension, a lack of internal and external (i.e., public) 
understanding of how government works. Political/bureaucratic hubris fills the gap 
between public accountability, or what the public needs and expects, and public 
administration, or what elected and appointed officials are actually accomplishing with 
taxpayer dollars. 
b. Cultural Conditions 
The lack of success demonstrated by deficiencies in these five (5) major 
focus areas of the GPRA legislation is primarily attributable to the five (5) performance 
management cultural climate/conditions (i.e., hypotheses/propositions) listed below:  
• There is a lack of the creation and sustainment of a “High-Trust 
Culture” (i.e., public accountability) (HA1); 
• Performance improvement is a “Wicked Problem,” particularly 
difficult to resolve, requiring non-traditional solutions, 
uncommon/unfamiliar to most government institutions (HA2); 
• Political considerations, wherein management decisions are 
sometimes being made based on political issues or hot topics 
instead of based on evidence that points to a particular alternative 
that would actually improve performance, rather than simply prove 
success (HA3); 
• There is an administrative/bureaucratic tendency to direct and 
control, which produces stagnation (HA4); and 
• There is inadequate administrative governance (i.e., management 
oversight) (HA5). 
(1) Accountability/High-Trust. Reiterating several of the 
themes previously highlighted, the general consensus at the department appears to be: 
never sacrifice the good in search of the perfect. 
 
  112 
The idea of instilling a culture of accountability, or trust, is 
understood as part of the entire change of government that has been occurring over the 
past several years to make it more customer-orientated and service-based. As a result, 
DHS officials understand that they are simply to be good stewards of the government 
resources they have been (temporarily) entrusted with. They may have been given 
permission to manage or shepherd programs, but not make dramatic or “revolutionary” 
changes to them. Public trust, therefore, entails concentrating on being good at what we 
have been empowered to do, rather than focusing on creating or maintaining a culture of 
accountability; a “revolutionary” change to come later, as a collateral consequence, a by-
product of success, a result of having made improvements in all the other areas, but not as 
a main focus.  
Another common obstacle to promoting trust as a principle 
objective of departmental efforts is the lack of a clear, widely accepted, definition of 
trust, or the absence of shared values in this arena. What exactly is a high-trust culture? Is 
it only integrity (i.e., upholding/enforcing the law)? If so, we are doing great. Is it doing 
things better with less money? If so, we are trying. Does it mean, trust, but verify? If so, 
then trust is not really an important factor since we can empirically and analytically prove 
that we are right. Does it mean getting the benefit of the doubt from Congress so that we 
do not have to continually justify ourselves and/or the utility of our programs? If so, then 
Congress has already extended such trust, having authorized our programs in the first 
place. All of this boils down to one rejecting argument: Who needs accountability and 
trust anyway? We are doing things well, and GPRA-MA is simply a tool for us to 
showcase our success.  
(2) Complexity of Performance Management Challenges. 
OMB distinguishes between performance management and performance improvement 
when speaking of challenges, as well as solutions. The former is not recognized as a 
“wicked problem,” but simply as measuring progress toward strategy achievement, 
facilitated by established frameworks and processes, such as the GPRA-MA, the OMB  
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Circular A-11 and the PMF. Performance improvement, on the other hand, is considered 
a wicked problem, one that requires innovative, outside-of-the-box solutions requiring the 
free flow of information and more creative ideas.  
OMB’s SOAR process, meant to provide continuity across 
administrations, even decades, is an attempt to stay out of the dogmatic PART-type 
approach with its reductionist, short-term prescriptive solutions to complex, multi-faceted 
and difficult/persistent problems. This stat-based performance review process involves 
the integration of multiple partner/stakeholder perspectives, even multiple approaches, 
pushed up and down the decision-making chain, and is meant to get people fully 
recognizing how complex performance improvement can be. 
We are just starting, at the department, to conceptualize such 
concepts. We understand that we need good data to conduct good reviews, and that we 
need to apply sound analytical products and resulting discussions and decisions to 
overcome challenges. However, we are still applying common practices, such as 
benchmarking, in our attempts to do so. The idea that “non-traditional” can also mean, 
changing mindsets in our approach to doing business, such as pooling all resources 
together, giving up unjustified budget monies to other programs that may need them, 
relinquishing control over, or even ratcheting down, programs in order to combine or set 
aside funding for future investments, hasn’t quite fully entered into departmental psyche.  
(3) Political Considerations. Most government officials like to 
see themselves as apolitical, even tone deaf to political dynamics, preferring to focus on 
mission first, and sometimes only. Everyone seems to accept political considerations as a 
simple fact of life when working within the DHS mission space; something that is, and 
always will be. Many feel, however, that politics should not be seen as constraints, but 
rather as opportunities to affect change, a challenge to work around, even overcome, as a 
normal part of one’s job.  
Bureaucracy, as well, is also often seen in a positive light by many 
DHS agents. In our democratic world of complexity, bureaucracy, as standard operating 
procedure, creates stability. However, we still seem to struggle with knowing when we 
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have gone too far in our efforts to simplify the world, with knowing when to catch 
ourselves in our attempt to solve paradox with conundrum through ill-conceived 
initiatives “standardizing innovation.”  
(4) Administrative Tendency to Direct and Control. 
Surprisingly, even though DHS officials generally recognize that, as bureaucrats, they 
have the tendency to direct and control, most increasingly appear willing to embrace 
change in this area.  
Because traditional leaders tend to contribute to status quo, even 
stagnation, whereas more collaborative leaders can change mindsets and paradigms, 
leadership that is more conducive to innovative meta-governance needs to be encouraged.  
OMB agrees, which is why they have emphasized the importance 
of senior leadership adopting interdependent and interactive dialogue to cut through 
hierarchical stove-piping, resolving complex problems through “relational webs” and 
creative “networked power,” replacing the current centralized, command-and-control 
model, where power is mostly concentrated at the top. As a step in this direction, they 
have extended the timeframe of short-term priority goals to cover 24 months, rather than 
the former 18-month period, pushing them beyond the tenure of political appointees, still 
allowed sufficient time to contribute to results, but not singularly “own” success.  
Even though some bureaucracy is considered useful, as a check 
and balance protecting us from “rule breakers,” we are beginning to see major cultural 
change in this arena and a call for courageous leadership to evolve beyond existing 
conditions. 
(5) Insufficient Management Oversight. One of the main 
purposes of the GPRA-MA and the resulting OMB A-11 guidance and PMF, is to 
establish an executive branch decision-making framework that would ensure 
government-wide management oversight. Many people feel that we have been successful 
in reaching the initial goals we have set for ourselves in this arena.  
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Everybody now seems to be working on finding the correct 
balance between external and internal oversight, reconciling these two diverging 
perspectives along with their differing informational requirements. Recognized as equally 
challenging, is the building of supporting governance structures that enable decisions to 
be made as close to operations as possible, as opposed to directing components and 
functions from afar. 
In Chapter VI, “Innovative, Networked Meta-Governance,” we 
will propose a creative, “next generation” way to find such a balance, between 
controlling and monitoring, between micro-managing and empowering.  
c. Analysis Using the Hypothesis Testing Matrix 
Having just reviewed the specific deficiencies manifested within the 
department across the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas, as well as the five (5) conditions 
believed to contribute to those deficiencies, let us now look more closely at the causal 
effect between the two in an attempt to influence outcome and obtain better results.  
There is more than just a simple correlation between the previously 
referenced deficiencies (i.e., evidence), displaying lack of success, and the five 
hypotheses (i.e., climate/conditions) contributing to those deficiencies. There is, in fact, a 
causal relationship, demonstrating, more consistently, than inconsistently or 
ambiguously, that the conditions are actually causing the failure(s).  
Using the Hypothesis Testing Matrix below, the initial premise was that 
all five hypotheses/conditions directly contribute to and result in the noted deficiencies, 
particularly the first hypothesis relating to accountability. As such, they were initially 
annotated HA, or alternative hypotheses. Following analysis, some were proven to be null 
hypotheses. Null hypotheses, or HO, exist where there are more inconsistent (I) or 
ambiguous (?), than consistent (C), causal linkages between the reason/condition and the 
evidence of failure. When such was the case, the hypotheses in question were re-
categorized as null.118 
                                                 
118 Hypotheses 101 and other social science concepts by Lauren F. Wollman, PhD. 
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GPRA-MA of 2010 Focus Areas  
#1 - Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and 











Insufficient leadership engagement/commitment to drive 
performance improvement (i.e., limited, minimally compliant 
leadership engagement) 
C ? ? I C 
Insufficient cross-organizational collaboration C C ? C ? 
Organizational group think ? C C ? ? 
Common (vs. Best) Practices C C ? C ? 
Lack of flexibility, creativity, innovation C C C C I 
Hierarchical, cultural and traditional forces systematically 
resisting change C C C C ? 










Lack of connectivity among agency plans, programs and 
performance results (i.e., disjointed goal setting and misaligned 
performance measures) 
? ? ? C C 
Competing and often contradictory priorities C C C ? ? 
Unintentional gaps and duplicative, or redundant efforts ? C C ? C 
Top-down (vs. bottom-up) goal (and/or priority) setting C ? C C I 
Prescriptive vs. descriptive strategic performance management 
(i.e., centralized, formalized, stove-piped approaches to strategic 
planning and reporting) 
C C ? C ? 
Politics or negotiated compromise, inadvertently resulting in 
mission slippage and drift C ? C C ? 
Lack of consistent/integrated frameworks, processes, sub-
processes and tools to develop strategy, translate it into 
operational actions, and monitor progress and improve 
performance 
I C ? I I 










Inadequate application of performance 
management/measurement analytics C C ? ? ? 
Credibility issues, involving bias or lack of objectivity (i.e., 
subjective vs. objective judgments) C ? C C ? 
Insufficient quality, accuracy, and timeliness of data C ? C ? C 
Output- vs. outcome-oriented performance measures C C C C ? 
“Gaming the system” by establishing easily achievable measures 
and targets C C C C C 










Absence of periodic progress reviews C C ? C C 
Punitive (vs. inquisitive) performance reviews C C ? C ? 
Information/data is produced, but not used (i.e., in management 
and operational decision making) C C ? I C 
Insufficient feedback and/or follow through (i.e., improvement 
plans) C C ? I C 
Bureaucratic complexity (i.e., multiple layers of review and lack 
of cohesive and consistent management processes and C C C C I 
  117 













GPRA-MA of 2010 Focus Areas  
operational coordination) 










Lack of transparency in communicating and/or reporting 
performance results C ? C C ? 
Stove-piped strategic performance planning and reporting C C ? C C 
Political hubris (i.e., decisions influenced by power politics, 
rather than purely objective and neutral decision making C C C C ? 
Lack of public understanding of how government works (i.e., 
lack of public access to agency planning and performance 
information) 
C ? C C ? 
Proving success (i.e., compliance reporting) vs. improving 
performance and results (i.e., accountability) C C C C ? 
Ad-hoc Congressional engagement C C C C C 
Unnecessary (i.e., outdated, duplicative) strategic and 
performance plans and reports ? ? C C ? 
Multiplicity of congressional authorizing and appropriations 
committees C C C C I 
Inadequate performance monitoring and reporting systems 
integrating large amounts of relevant quantitative and qualitative 
data from diverse sources to provide situational awareness (i.e., 
common operating picture) 
C C C C C 









Table 5.   Hypothesis Testing Matrix119 
Deleting evidence that was consistent with all of the hypotheses, as well 
as conditions for which there was significant inconsistent evidence, demonstrates that 
there is indeed a correlation between the “symptom” (i.e., insufficiencies in government 
performance and results) and the “disease,” primarily identified as both a lack of the 
creation and sustainment of a “High-Trust/Accountability Culture” (i.e., HA 1), and the 
particular challenges/difficulties involved in resolving the “wicked” problem of 
performance improvement (i.e., HA 2).  
 
                                                 
119 Morgan D. Jones, The Thinker’s Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving (Random 
House, Inc., 2009), 2823–2824, Kindle edition. 
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Also noteworthy, is how the bureaucratic tendency to direct and control 
remained an alternative hypothesis (i.e., HA 4) further linking it to the lack of 
accountability or trust, thus upholding the original premise. Namely, that our past failures 
and current limited successes are primarily due to our inability to relinquish even the 
slightest control over our respective areas of influence, and that this inability to “let go” is 
due to a lack of trust caused by, and exacerbating, the absence of true accountability, both 
significantly diminishing opportunities to find innovative solutions to solve “wicked” 
problems.  
Of particular interest, as well, was the “elimination” of conditions 3 and 5, 
as alternative hypotheses, or those directly impacting results (i.e., evidence). Both 
political considerations and insufficient oversight, respectively HO3 and HO5, were 
relegated to the status of null hypotheses. In other words, they were identified as not 
necessarily having any direct influence on the results. As both of these considerations are 
major elements of the GPRA-MA, currently representing the legislation’s interpretation 
and primary focus (i.e., political and administrative oversight), this finding goes a long 
way in perhaps explaining why these types of strategic performance management 
frameworks have had such a limited impact in improving performance and results to date.  
By extension, then, working to create, then sustain a “High-Trust Culture” 
(i.e., Public Accountability), as well as treating performance management and 
improvement as a “Wicked Problem” that requires non-traditional solutions, would 
alleviate the identified deficiencies of the GPRA-MA framework, since these two 
elements were demonstrated as having a direct impact on its performance. 
Likewise, seeking to mitigate the bureaucratic tendency to direct and 
control could plausibly contribute to improved results, in light of the fact that this 
condition remained an alternative hypothesis, having a direct correlation on the efficacy 
of the GPRA-MA strategy. 
Finally, redirecting the GPRA-MA emphasis on the role political and 
management oversight plays in improving public performance accountability, and placing 
it on the other above-mentioned elements, could paradoxically contribute to greater 
  119 
accountability. This is an important finding and possible solution/remedy, since it is 
widely accepted that increasing oversight, as opposed to increasing true accountability, is 
believed to be one of the most important factors in obtaining results. Analysis, using the 
Hypothesis Testing Matrix, however, demonstrates that this might not be the case, and 
that in fact, quite the opposite is true. 
Improving performance within the Department will “counter-intuitively” require 
paying particular attention to certain GPRA-MA focus areas and conditions that have 
been minimized and/or neglected to date. That means recognizing GPRA-MA focus areas 
1, 4 and 5, and conditions 1, 2 and 4 as significant leverage points, which is contrary to 
and contradicts the legislation’s primary emphasis on performance measurement in 
support of strategic clarity and organizational alignment, and political/administrative 
governance and oversight, as being the key factors affecting change.  
“Counterintuitive” is often the most appropriate word to use when describing 
complex systems, however, because as systems become complex, their behavior can 
become surprising, having leverage points that are frequently not intuitive, and when they 
are, often used “backward” to maintain status quo, as opposed to improving or 
innovating, systematically worsening whatever problems one is attempting to solve.120 
Even though we are stuck with working within the strict parameters of the Act to 
affect federal government performance, we should at least attempt to move its “levers” in 
a more radical fashion than has been attempted before. 
It is not that parameters are not important— they can be, especially in the short 
term and to the individual who’s standing directly in the flow. People care deeply about 
[…] variables […]. But changing these variables rarely changes the behavior of […] 
system[s]. If the system is chronically stagnant, parameter changes rarely kick-start it. If 
it is wildly variable, they usually do not stabilize it. If it is growing out of control, they do 
not slow it down.121 
                                                 
120 Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer, 2734–2736. 
121 Ibid., 2774–2778. 
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In summary, moving beyond the status quo will require radically focusing 
on creating, then cultivating a culture of accountability (i.e., a high-trust) within the 
department, and vis-à-vis the general public in order to positively affect the overall 
cultural climate. Improving the noted deficiencies in the five (5) pillars of the GPRA-MA 
will involve placing special emphasis on how more flexible, free-flowing and creative 
solutions to increase external public and internal organizational engagement, 
collaboration, and cooperation can be brought to bear on the discipline of strategic 
performance management. In particular, social complexity theory and the study of 
complex adaptive processes have much to contribute in terms of changing the status quo 
regarding GPRA-MA implementation. Along with strategic performance management 
best practices, they can provide direction for DHS to change the overall cultural climate 
by bridging the gap between traditional definitions of public performance accountability 
(i.e., improved government effectiveness and efficiency) and its more non-traditional 
interpretations of organizational and public trust. 
B. DHS GPRA-MA IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLEXITY THEORY 
The basic tenants of the law—leadership participation, cross-organizational 
communication and collaboration, transparency and accountability—make up the 
foundational management philosophy adopted by legislators and executive branch 
officials in their efforts to improve government performance. But how realistic and 
effective is DHS’ current approach to implement such a philosophy? 
There are reputable schools of thought that would put into serious question the 
efficacy and the feasibility of the department’s methodologies to adopt the law’s 
underlying principles and guiding policy. In the midst of self-congratulatory 
encouragement, we might want to consider measuring the DHS’ current reductionist, 
predictable and linear strategies against more nuanced, creative approaches. There are 
indeed alternative ways to build mission and program resiliency and maximize 
organizational effectiveness.  
The GPRA-MA can very easily become, like its predecessor(s), a mere political 
or bureaucratic solution to the more creative and critical thinking required to identify and 
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communicate real paths toward continuous improvement and sustainable success. We 
have already determined that building a bridge, or appropriate strategy, between the 
mandate (i.e., the GPRA-MA) and the policy (i.e., OMB Circular A-11) that will lead to 
real world performance improvement solutions within agencies requires a valid road-map 
based on best practices, as opposed to simply common practices.  
In “Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist,” Gregory D. Foster states 
that strategy is ultimately about exercising power.122 Having authority conferred by 
either the American people or the President of the United States often has the effect of 
squashing any real dialogue and/or critical analysis within government institutions. “If 
it’s the law of the land, then do we really have any choice?” seems to be the default 
mindset. If this is true and we are operating in such a hierarchical environment where 
ideas and the ability to generate them seem increasingly unlikely, then how might 
performance management and improvement be advanced within government 
organizations? What mechanisms can we put in place to facilitate more out-of-the-box 
thinking as opposed to more of the same top-down, command-and-control structures, 
such as the PPBE solutions currently being adopted by the DHS?  
The fact that we are not even asking these questions, much less attempting to 
answer them, suggests political and bureaucratic stagnation, or worse, hubris.  
A simple definition of a politician (and/or proxy bureaucrat) is “someone who has 
been given power to implement a mandate,” irrespective of “objective truth,” the latter 
having been replaced with a subjective agenda. The objective truth is that the GPRA-MA 
of 2010, as it is currently conceived, is simply a framework with a governance structure 
that will contribute to a common understanding of and commitment to the political and 
bureaucratic intent of elected and appointed officials. Success in the current GPRA-MA 
world of government performance and accountability is not being stated in terms of how 
we are achieving a better society, but in terms of how well we are implementing a 
presidential and/or congressional agenda. Perhaps couching the GPRA-MA in the truly  
 
                                                 
122 Gregory D. Foster, “Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist,” Joint Force Quarterly, 
Spring 1996, 111. 
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political environment from which it issues and currently lies, is the start of recognizing 
the limitations of the focus and approach of the legislation, so that we can begin to look 
for alternative options elsewhere.  
Performance management and improvement is a “Wicked Problem.” Much like 
diagnosing a disease, a problem is deemed “wicked” if it meets any one of ten (10) 
criteria.123 The term “wicked” is used, not in the sense of evil, but rather to designate 
situations or problems that are extremely difficult or impossible to resolve due to 
incomplete, contradictory, or changing requirements and the complex interdependencies 
that define them. The best way to tackle “wicked problems” is to create forums were 
data-informed discussions can occur and generate insights into what’s working and 
what’s not working within well-defined environments, build a consensus of what exactly 
constitutes the problem and then gather momentum toward finding (a) solution(s). The 
danger lies, not in attempting to limit the universe in order to reach consensus about a 
problem and elicit engagement to obtain resolution, but in thinking that a specific 
configuration represents actual reality. It may reflect one reality, but not another.  
                                                 
123 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, Policy Sciences 4, Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1973), 155–169.  
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Table 6.   10 Characteristics of Wicked Problems 
Social complexity theory provides a possible way out of this conundrum by 
causing us to understand that the world is much more complicated than we first thought, 
requiring responses that go beyond the simplistic, top-down, command-and-control, 
machine-like systems and approaches we have created and deferred to in the past.  
Just as it takes a leaderless network to defeat and/or compete with another 
leaderless network, only a complex system, able to continually learn, (re)organize and 
adapt to dynamic environments will be equipped to “solve” wicked problems. 
Performance management policies and frameworks that are designed to encourage self-
organization, system-wide learning and adaptability will contain the following 
characteristics: 
10 Characteristics of Wicked Problems 
 
Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, in their article “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 
identified 10 characteristics that would determine whether a problem would be categorized as “wicked.” 
“Wicked Problems” are particularly difficult to resolve and require non-traditional solutions.  
1 There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem. 
Defining the problem requires a complete understanding of all its possible solutions, as they alone can frame the 
problem.  
2 Wicked problems have no stopping rule.  
The problem will never be fully resolved due to the complexity of the variables. Making progress, rather than 
achieving perfection, is the definition of success. 
3 Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, but good or bad.  
There are no objective, scientific formulas to weigh solutions, which will largely be based on subjective opinion or 
non-verifiable “proof.” 
4 There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.  
Determining the validity of a solution requires indeterminate time to discern the repercussions of choices. The “fruit” 
of one’s efforts must ripen before it can be tasted (i.e., tested) and appreciated (i.e., evaluated).  
5 Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot” operation; because there is no opportunity to learn by 
trial and error, every attempt counts significantly.  
Every solution, or choice, will have long-lasting repercussions that can undermine success. There is very little room 
for error, and bad decisions quickly close windows of opportunity.  
6 Wicked problems do not have an exhaustively describable set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-
described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan.  
There are no common criteria to limit the working framework of solutions. 
7 Every wicked problem is essentially unique. 
There are no standard best-practice solutions.  
8 Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.  
Symptoms are unrecognizable from causes, and it is extremely difficult to identify the actual source of problems. 
9 The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways.  
There is no rule or procedure to identify, beyond any reasonable doubt, the reasons for problems, or by extension, 
their solutions.  
10 The planner has no right to be wrong.  
Failure means not resolving the problem, no matter how much effort was applied. There are no second chances 
because the consequences of failure are grave.  
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Agents The system comprises large numbers of individual agents connected through multiple networks. 
Interactions 
The agents interact dynamically, exchanging information 
and energy based upon heuristics that organize the 
interactions locally. Even if specific agents only interact 
with a few others, the effects propagate through the system. 
As a result the system has a memory that is not located at a 
specific place, but is distributed throughout the system. 
Nonlinearity 
The interactions are nonlinear, iterative, recursive, and self-
referential. There are many direct and indirect feedback 
loops. 
System Behavior 
The system is open, the behavior of the system is 
determined by the interactions, not the components, and the 
behavior of the system cannot be understood by looking at 
the components. It can only be understood by looking at 




The system displays both the capacity to maintain its 
viability and the capacity to evolve. With sufficient 
diversity the heuristics will evolve, the agents will adapt to 
each other, and the system can reorganize its internal 
structure without the intervention of an outside agent. 
Table 7.   Characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
Decision-making frameworks, such as Cynefin,125 can help leaders organize 
issues and problems involving Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) into categories of 
complexity, ranging from the simple to the chaotic, so that they can select solutions based 
on contextual/relative reality, rather than situational preference. Indeed, as cavalier 
creatures of habit, we tend to simplify the world we live in to make things easier on 
ourselves. Often choosing paths of least resistance, we prefer expedient “sense-making,” 
                                                 
124 Booher and Innes, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for 
Public Policy, 32. 
125 The Cynefin Framework, created by Cognitive Edge PTE LTD., categorizes issues into five 
contexts as determined by internal factors of cause and effect. Four of these, simple and complicated 
(ordered), and complex and chaotic (disordered), can be resolved once causal effect has been determined, 
with the ordered context having more readily visible cause and effect linkages, and the disordered 
categories less so. The fifth category, disordered, is simply a placeholder for issues until the accurate 
context can be identified.  
  125 
quickly judging where people and things belong, as opposed to suspending judgment 
until everyone and everything has weighed in or been weighed. Moreover, in our zeal to 
seek reassurance that “all is well” so we can get back to doing what we enjoy, rather than 
what we must, we will artificially categorize issues and problems to quickly “solve” 
them, instead of letting them evolve naturally, and perhaps even resolve themselves. Like 
Cinderella’s wicked step sisters before the glass slipper, we say over and over again that 
“we’ll make it fit,” often hobbling ourselves in the process. 
Achieving true success will involve more ethereal models that shatter “control” in 
the traditional sense. True leaders have the capacity to admit that their subordinates might 
be better at resolving problems than they are. It takes humility to select a leader other 
than oneself or adopt a different leadership style than what one is used to, as a better fit 
for an evolving situation. Acknowledging the utility of social complexity theory and 
applying it to enhance strategic performance management practices will require such 
leadership. Such leadership entails relinquishing control.  
True leaders are capable of admitting to the existence of uncertainty without 
giving way to the fear of failure by overly compensating with dictatorial power. Current 
policy and practices, unfortunately, encourage just the opposite. Even though the world is 
complex, with multiple and constantly evolving theories of knowledge, modern Western 
societies, and their institutions built on the expectations of certainty, continue to demand 
of its professionals, precise calculations and certainty in predictions. However, true 
resilience would demand that these same experts be allowed to adopt mindsets involving 
greater ambiguity and volatility.126  
Complexity theory offers a way to calm our anxieties as we set out on our journey 
into the unchartered domain of the uncertain, by letting us know that there are legitimate 
alternatives to definitive conclusions and rigid courses of action toward pre-set outcomes; 
that recommendations based on contingent conclusions and experimentation are also 
viable options toward success.  
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Government should begin to embrace this mentality as part  
of the standard paradigm of its professionals. 
 
A complex system has many components, free elements or agents, capable of 
interfacing with each other and their environments, independent of any standard 
expectations of cause and effect, rationality, and/or intentionality.127 In other words, the 
behavior of complex systems can neither be predicted, nor their actors expected to act in 
predictable ways. It is particularly challenging to prescribe solution sets for complex 
systems, where traditional analysis and approaches to solving problems often break 
down. Moreover, complex systems cannot be understood by studying various parts in 
isolation. The only way to discern the true identity and impact of a complex organization 
is to comprehend how the numerous and multifaceted interactions between multiple parts 
can lead to certain behaviors, actions and/or decisions. Therefore, complex systems must 
be analyzed holistically and in movement.  
DHS is a complex system. Unfortunately, PPBE and logic modeling are not. They 
reduce the myriad of actions and influences of a multiplicity of different directorates and 
offices and seven (7) separate components, many with their own individual culture, 
history and legacy, into a simplistic framework of programs, sub-programs and activities. 
And we haven’t even mentioned the overall Homeland Security Environment (HSE), or 
the macro-level within which DHS functions.  
Like many complex organizations, DHS is not simply the sum of its parts, and 
deconstructing them into malleable pieces, subjecting them to microscopic review and 
laboratory experimentation may only result in simplifying the complex and complicating 
the simple, with unintended consequences. The real question is: can reductionist (i.e., 
deconstructive) “Newtonian-type” frameworks, such as PPBE, improve decision-makers 
ability to observe complex homeland security systems at sufficient levels to increase 
understanding of interrelationships that can contribute to improved system behavior, 
robustness and adaptation? Or, will these models continue to maintain and strengthen  
 
                                                 
127 C. F. Kurtz and D. J. Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense Making in a Complex and 
Complicated World,” IBM Systems Journal 42, no. 3 (2003). 
  127 
status quo by oversimplifying stove-piped mission sets lacking adequate coordination and 
integration, believing end states are simply the result of linear cause and effect 
relationships?  
Author Philip Anderson, in his article “Complexity Theory and Organization 
Science,” stated, “the task of those responsible for the strategic direction of an 
organization is not to foresee the future or to implement enterprise-wide adaptation 
programs, because nonlinear systems react to direction in ways that are difficult to predict 
or control. Rather, good managers establish and modify the direction and the 
boundaries within which effective, improvised, self-organized solutions can evolve 
[emphasis is the author’s]. They set constraints upon local actions, observe outcomes, and 
tune the system by altering the constraints, all the while raising or lowering the amount of 
energy injected into the dissipative structure they are managing.”128 He also stated that 
“there does not yet exist a theory that will help managers predict the type of emergent 
outcome that will result from altering the configuration of a network in a particular 
way.”129 In other words, the man behind the curtain, somehow moving the levers in just 
the right way to get us back to Kansas, is a myth. 
Will DHS PPBE allow us to study the organization at all levels and fully grasp 
the whole, in order to appropriately frame a strategy that drives operations where 
“effective, improvised, self-organized solutions can evolve?” Or will it continue to be a 
matter of hit-and-miss, of programmatic “whack-a-mole,” where leaders prescribe 
solutions rather than discern them by describing what’s actually happening and working 
on the ground?  
Instead of dictating patterns to constitute strategy, managers should understand 
and shape the context within which natural patterns emerge and are sustained in the 
dynamic and constantly changing real-world environments we actually operate in. This 
would facilitate movement from chaotic contexts, to complex, complicated, and then 
simple ones. In other words, it would facilitate finding and managing workable, yet 
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innovative, solutions, as espoused by the Cynefin Framework. Being able to manage 
dynamic change well is particularly important in the public sector, due to the transient 
nature of political leadership which places organizations in a constant state of flux, where 
programs, projects, and activities are continually being created, dismembered, and 
dismantled.130  
Because the GPRA-MA is not looking to detect patterns, but rather to 
manufacture them, the legislation will require more to contribute to true “success,” by 
encouraging agencies to identify and measure the best or even better solution, rather than 
the good enough solution. The GPRA-MA, like its predecessors, is currently mostly a 
political instrument, a marketing tool for those who have been conferred power in order 
to make a difference for the better, if not the best.  
The question remains: will future DHS solutions be able to evolve beyond this?  
C. SPM AND COMPLEXITY THEORY 
It is believed that the systems and processes adopted and/or currently being 
developed within the DHS will provide effective and efficient top-down command-and-
control frameworks and bring increased oversight and accountability of operations. They 
are in full compliance with the basic requirements of the GPRA-MA. However, many of 
these approaches still lack the proper mechanisms to facilitate out-of-the-box thinking 
that could lead to more innovative solutions.  
As already stated, these types of governance-based approaches, like the Act itself, 
simply contribute to a common understanding of and commitment to the political and 
bureaucratic intent of elected and appointed officials.  
Current DHS efforts to implement GPRA-MA should be assessed against 
additional criteria and best practices in the field of strategic planning and decision 
making, informed by social complexity theory, as a possible means to develop alternative 
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solutions more meaningful to end users at all levels of the performance improvement 
continuum (e.g., civilian, political, executive, managerial, operational, etc.).  
The following section offers suggestions on how to apply the concepts of social 
complexity theory within the realm of strategic performance management, in the hopes of 
providing DHS leaders with encouragement to choose evolution, the first step in finding 
worthier strategic planning and decision-making solutions.  
1. Strategic Planning and Decision-Making Best Practices 
Authors Ahlstrand, Lampel and Mintzberg, in their groundbreaking work Strategy 
Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management rendered service to 
all strategic planners and managers, both seasoned practitioners and neophytes, in writing 
their in-depth and painstaking analysis of the various strategic management schools of 
thought that have been around since the beginning of the 1960s. By framing the 
discipline using five (5) definitions and ten (10) different schools or philosophical 
approaches to strategy formation, the authors established a solid foundation to conduct a 
serious assessment of exiting practices, not only in public and non-profit organizations, 
but also in private industry.  
The authors define strategy simply, as a “plan, pattern, position, perspective, or 
ploy”131 that allows someone to get from here to there. They whimsically compare 
strategic management to an elephant, and strategists to blind men, who, each in their 
separate corners and through tactical means alone, attempt to comprise a mental picture 
of the whole beast based on its disparate parts.  
In their metaphor, each member represents a separate school of thought reflected 
in current management practice, each with its own unique perspective focusing on one 
major aspect of the process. Ten (10) distinct schools are detailed along with their 
limitations and contributions to the field: 
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• The Design School: strategy formation as a process of conception 
• The Planning School: strategy formation as a formal process 
• The Positioning School: strategy formation as an analytical process 
• The Entrepreneurial School: strategy formation as a visionary process 
• The Cognitive School: strategy formation as a mental process 
• The Learning School: strategy formation as an emergent process 
• The Power School: strategy formation as a process of negotiation 
• The Cultural School: strategy formation as a collective process 
• The Environmental School: strategy formation as a reactive process 
• The Configuration School: strategy formation as a process of 
transformation 
The authors further categorize the ten schools into three groups. The first three 
schools are prescriptive, or more concerned with how strategies should be formulated 
than with how they actually form and are implemented in the real world. Schools four 
through nine, concentrate on specific aspects of the process by describing actual strategy 
formation. The final school combines aspects of all nine approaches, and therefore, is 
considered to be both prescriptive and descriptive in nature.  
Achieving success in strategic performance management (i.e., strategy 
development, implementation and assessment) involves much more than the rational or 
prescriptive side of a process captured by the first three schools of design, planning and 
positioning). Yet this has been and remains the primary philosophical approach of both 
public and non-profit organizations seeking to direct and improve their operations at the 
formal corporate or governance level.  
GPRA-MA does relatively little to change this status quo. This is because, the 




  131 
Those who work in the field of strategic performance management, the “strategy 
freaks” who have visions of sugar plums, or smell food for the killing, every time the 
words “strategic plan” or “performance measures” are mentioned, will find a valuable 
ally in the descriptions of the ten schools in their attempts to apply the discipline within 
their own organizations. 
Each school will be reviewed below from the performance perspective in order to 
highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the current GPRA-MA universe. For our 
discussion, we have adopted a different metaphor, however, likening successful strategic 
performance management to building a home from the ground up. 
2. The Design School: A Process of Conception 
In the Design School, strategy formation is a process of formal design or 
essentially that of a master ARCHITECT’S mental (re)conception of reality. Through the 
application of a simple two-step process involving the identification and reconciliation of 
internal capabilities (i.e., strengths and weaknesses) and external possibilities (i.e., 
opportunities and threats or challenges), strategies are conceived in controlled (i.e., 
stable) environments, and are thus ordered, clear, expedient, and fully representative of 
the unique vision, or “bird’s eye view” of leadership.  
Here, as we shall see is the case with all three prescriptive schools, strategy 
formation is a process of conception rather than learning. Since there is really nothing to 
learn (because we already know-it-all), there is a tendency to dismiss the inherent 
complexity of strategic development by overly simplifying reality in order to seek 
premature closure. This type of planning is leadership dominant, where learning is 
bypassed, and thought (i.e., formulation) is separated from action (i.e., implementation). 
In this delineable, stable, and machine-like, centralized/formalized environment, there is 
very little room for flexibility, for “incrementalism” or “emergent” strategies, where 
formulation is allowed to continue on, during and after implementation. This is “grand 
strategy” development: formulaic, quickly and easily done.  
 
  132 
The Design School approach seems to have been adopted in order to develop a 
plan that is externally (top-down) compliant rather than internally (bottom-up) useful. Its 
theory makes good shelf-ware products, but not necessarily feasible, implementable or 
impactful strategy. Strategy is simply a recommendation, made, but not implemented; 
unwanted and unneeded data, produced, but not used. 
a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations 
The GPRA-MA requirement to eliminate “duplicative” or “redundant” 
reporting by reducing and/or consolidating agency strategic and performance plans and 
reports, is a subtle (and unflattering) admission that many of the strategic planning 
documents produced by government agencies in the past were done so unnecessarily.  
The GPRA-MA, similar to the Design School approach, is limiting in its 
emphasis on a top-down, leadership formulation of success. Even though it attempts to 
interject differing perspectives into its processes, by advocating for more collaborative 
approaches to strategic performance management, it still remains somewhat simplistic, or 
insufficiently complex to tackle the “wicked problems” of strategy formulation, 
implementation and assessment. 
GPRA-MA of 2010 buys into the erroneous premise of the Design School 
that simply because information reported up the hierarchy has been verified and validated 
by lower levels, as in an echo chamber, it must be an accurate reflection of reality. On the 
contrary, forcing someone to prove success using empirical data, does not necessarily 
translate into improved performance. In fact, the two have separate and often competing 
goals, reconcilable only in a world where true transparency, objectivity and 
accountability exist. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case where Design School power 
players are involved. Operating in various halls of power, their GPRA-MA frameworks 
and models are often only being developed to service the needs of powerful clients with 
pre-established agendas. 
This preference for order and obedience “through standardized 
bureaucratic procedures, carefully limited agendas, use of specialized discourses, 
carefully defined problem frames, and invitations for participation to individuals whose 
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contributions are predictable,” is what currently characterizes DHS strategic planning and 
decision-making processes. This state of affairs can be explained by an increasing anxiety 
over uncertainty, resulting in a call for even greater control.132 Unfortunately, this type of 
twentieth century executive decision making will not suffice in the communication and 
information highway of the twenty-first century. Increasingly, power in an interconnected 
world is no longer synonymous with hierarchical leadership, but rather with a diversity of 
knowledge and information, even if that knowledge is called into question or resisted by 
skeptical experts and professionals. Because of the challenges to traditional power and 
the changes in interactional dynamics caused by the general public, enlightened by the 
(new) media, policy and planning professionals should be proactively seeking ways to 
question the status quo, that of bureaucratic reign and the tyranny of the subject matter 
expert, kept in place by established standard operating procedures based on simplistic, 
increasingly obsolete paradigms and methodologies.  
b. Summary 
The GPRA-MA framework offers a sufficiently controlled environment 
that will allow government leaders, managers and strategic management subject matter 
experts to question their current epistemologies in a “safe environment” as they strain to 
entertain alternative approaches to performance improvement.  
3. The Planning School: A Formal Process 
The Planning School emphasizes the process behind the design. In oxymoron 
fashion, it “institutionalizes innovation” seeing strategy making as a detached and 
systematic process of formal planning.133 
Now that the ARCHITECT has conceptually designed the house, capturing its 
major features on blueprints, the REAL ESTATE BROKER enters the scene to pre-sell 
it, developing brochures with in-depth descriptions of each floor, detailing amenities and 
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advantages room-by-room, providing comparison charts displaying how this particular 
house will turn out to be the best deal in town, etc. The desire is to provide the future 
homeowner with the information necessary to make the best decision possible (which, 
they hope, will be none other than selecting the show house). 
It is all about “Mr. Strategy,” as everyone sets about measuring how well the 
blueprints have been drawn, without actually discussing the needs of the homebuyer. 
Everyone simply assumes that buying this particular house is already a done deal, so they 
all empress themselves to bedazzle the “ivory tower” managers with their well-oiled 
processes to “make it all happen.”  
The Planning School, like the Design School, thrives in simple, stable (i.e., 
predictable), and controllable environments. Creativity and choice are almost non-
existent. Prediction and anticipation is neither predicted nor anticipated. The end result is 
not attended to, nor even fully defined.  
Strategies, through a rigorous set of steps, are decomposed into sub-strategies and 
programs. Formal, decomposed, deliberate (i.e., prescriptive) instructions are given, 
followed by periodic, incremental controls for decision making.  
Ostensibly, in such a structured, procedurally acquiescent environment, decisions 
can quickly become static, even artificial. Group think is also often the result of these 
large machine-like (i.e., centralized, formalized, stove-piped) approaches to strategic 
planning.  
We are reminded of the all too familiar world of “cascading strategy 
development,” mandated by the original GPRA of 1993. Long-term (usually five years) 
comprehensive, “strategic” plans perch at the top, to be implemented through 
decomposed sub-strategies followed by medium-term plans, giving rise to short-term 
annual operating plans. Sound familiar?  
Leadership’s desires (previously articulated in the Design School) are now 
captured in the form of programmatic goals and objectives. Strategy is subsumed, 
disappearing as an issue that has been resolved once and for all. The ephemeral world of 
strategy development has been replaced with the formal planning process, uncertain 
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values and dispositions with the certainty of goals, the fallible qualitative assessment with 
the infallible quantitative evaluation; success becomes synonymous with obsessive-
compulsive control.  
This is federal government “strategic planning” at its best, but unlike the Rise and 
Fall of the Third Reich, this planning approach has yet to know its sunset. Still in its 
apogee, it is the “best practices” strategic planning methodology most often employed by 
public and non-profit sectors today.  
a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations 
Strategic performance management within the federal government upholds 
and implements similar dictums. The GPRA-MA institutionalizes its own performance 
management “innovations” through the OMB Circular A-11, and individual agency-level 
solutions, such as the DHS PPBE, fully in line with the premises of both the Design and 
Planning Schools. 
However, the idea that strategy can be developed in a structured, 
formalized process is rejected by the authors of Strategy Safari, who believe that much of 
the information truly important for strategy making and assessment remains tacit, never 
becoming hard transferrable fact. They prefer the word programming, rather than 
planning to describe the GPRA-MA world of frameworks and models, which often 
adopts explicit data as Gospel truth.134 
Because authorizations, oversight and appropriations at the department 
still remain a largely disjointed process, where projects continue to be proposed along 
departmental or component lines, the true utility of GPRA-MA of 2010 and PPBE 
frameworks, models, and tools is to provide the necessary structure to synthesize inputs 
necessary to conduct analysis. Like calculators, such frameworks are able to process but 
not analyze data; synthesize, but not draw conclusions. They should not be seen as 
offering or mandating specific policy or strategy solutions, even though they are often  
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used to do just that. We need to remind ourselves that we are the humans, and they are 
the machines, and that information must be accompanied by interactive dialogue in order 
to become knowledge. 
This tendency, which is clearly at odds with collaboration, is linked to the 
dominance of instrumental rationality—the ideal of goal directed behavior 
guided by experts and designed to find the “right” policy. As a result, we 
end up with the Decide, Announce, Defend syndrome (DAD), which 
wreaks havoc on public engagement with decision making. This syndrome 
in turn is grounded in a culturally embedded mechanical metaphor for 
policy making. We tend to see a problem as being like a machine that 
experts can take apart and fix, reassembling it so it is again in working 
order.135 
Indeed, innovators must remain on their guard against these traditional 
school approaches, which buy into many of the fallacies relative to data analysis and 
decision making. The GPRA-MA of 2010 itself encourages inflexibility through its goal 
and target-setting mandate as a formal means to structure the priority of projects and to 
inform senior management about them. Put simply, it only reinforces strategies already 
being pursued, without offering a framework for alternatives. It also requires decision 
making by remote, and therefore can quickly devolve into a strategic planning and 
decision-making guidebook for dummies.  
b. Summary 
We must never forget that the GPRA-MA should only be seen as a support 
for legislative and executive branch management decision making rather than as a means 
to attend to strategy making or measure success. A fine line exists between enabling and 
controlling. It remains to be seen whether the execution and implementation of 
departmental GPRA-MA solutions (whatever they end up being) will make such a 
distinction. 
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4. The Positioning School: An Analytical Process 
The third (and final) prescriptive school is less concerned with the process of 
strategy formation than with the actual content of strategies. It is referred to as the 
positioning school because it focuses on maintaining strategic positions in specific 
environments. 
The Positioning School sees strategic management as the process of selecting the 
right solution, from among a highly constrained set of generic strategies. Here, the 
HOME BUILDING INSPECTOR or HOME DEPOT© INTERIOR DESIGNER descends 
with his/her standard checklist or paint palette seeking standard conditions to satisfy. This 
is strategic planning as science, or at least as recipe: a little here, a little there, and often. 
Solutions are selected, rather than designed or formulated, based on in-depth and 
somewhat aloof analysis. Empirical data and calculation is front and center. Strategy is 
not complicated. It is not complex. It is simple, stable and seemingly mature, typical of 
industrial tried-and-true solutions, standard issue ware: mass-produced, globally 
understood. No-mess, self-cleaning, instant strategy in a box: just add water...  
The Positioning School does not take roads less traveled. It stays on paths already 
traced; focuses on navigating options already well established. This is planning by 
“Critical Path,” maintaining position (i.e., status quo) versus creating/innovating new 
ones. 
This rational approach to decision making is based on objective data, logical 
deductive analysis and systematic comparison of alternatives, the guiding philosophy of 
most public sector budgeting processes. This “powerful normative model […] grounded 
in positivist epistemology [where] neutral experts […] gather, compile and analyze data 
[and] use [it] to make decisions” remains the most dominant today, despite current 
challenges to it.136 
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How effective such a strategy can be internally, however, is questionable; 
especially, if it has been developed by external consultants, using generic or standard 
ingredients. Its limitations are similar to those of the Planning School, neglecting many of 
the softer influences involved in strategy building: power, politics, culture and social 
elements.  
The authors suggest that the one redeeming quality of the Positioning School, 
with its ready-made solutions, is that it indirectly admits to the “dirty little secret of the 
strategy industry […] that it doesn’t have any theory of strategy creation.”137 Indeed, we 
keep trying, never admitting defeat, expecting to find the real answer/solution, but finally 
opting for one of two roads: (a) doing nothing and being accused of dereliction of duty; 
or (b) doing something (easy) and calling it success. The Positioning School resolves this 
issue by choosing the second option. Basta! Now we can focus our energies on something 
else. Such as pursuing management’s true gift, analysis, while ignoring its deficiencies, 
planning, which we have just determined is not a true science. 
a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations 
The Positioning School argues, like the OMB GPRA-MA of 2010 policy, 
that only a few key strategies (i.e., priority goals) are desirable. This approach can be 
particularly appealing, playing as it does into the dogmatic mindset prevalent in today’s 
strategic planning and performance management communities. People choose options 
then defend them to the death, with very little adaptation and/or directional change in the 
process. Unfortunately, results reflect this lack of flexibility, of going to the extreme, or 
at least too far, in one’s premises. 
Today’s government strategic planners have bought into the rational and 
prescriptive side of the strategic planning process, or the first three schools of design, 
planning and positioning, or what is referred to as “the operationalization of planning.” 
They have once again chosen the HOW over the WHAT, placing emphasis on top-down, 
hierarchical, command-and-control design processes.  
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It is no wonder then that strategies for measuring success also follow 
along in lock step. The official message from Congress and OMB may be “engagement 
and collaboration, cultural learning, continual innovation and improvement, and 
transparency and accountability,” but everybody knows better. Like Pavlov’s dog, we’ve 
been trained to expect certain desires and behavior from our Congressional and OMB 
masters. It is the messenger, rather than the message, which still rings the loudest, making 
us salivate, at just the right time, in all the right places.  
“We’re from higher levels of government and we’re here to help” may 
indeed be true, but will not be believed by the worker bees until verified and validated.  
b. Summary 
The jury is still listening to evidence in the trial on the GPRA-MA and the 
DHS PPBE response to it. Will power players at all levels be able to resist the urge to use 
information to simply justify agenda-motivated (i.e., political) decisions, or will they 
actually use the information to make objective, evidence-based decisions? Will they even 
be allowed to? Operators know that those who will not (or cannot) do this, should not be 
trusted with “real” data, and they will continue to keep the “good stuff” in-house and 
close-hold. 
5. The Entrepreneurial School: A Visionary Process 
As we transition from prescriptive to descriptive strategy, we begin to associate 
strategy with entrepreneurship, describing the process in terms of vision creation by a 
great, even an inspirational leader who begins to say to us with an exotic accent, “This is 
what you’re saying it should be; this is what it could be...if you would just let it.” 
The Design School sees a leader, not as the prophesied Messiah, but as the “ho-
hum” head(s) of an organization. This is not so with the Entrepreneurial School, which 
leans much more heavily on its leaders, seeing them as revolutionary geniuses to be 
vaunted.  
In step with our own metaphor, we would now be looking to the personal, creative 
(i.e., intuitive) even iconic HOME IMPROVEMENT DESIGNER à la the Home and 
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Garden Network©, or the world-renowned Chef of the Food Network©. The hope is that 
he/she will bring flexibility into the process through personal charisma and vision, 
relying heavily on judgment, wisdom, experience and insight.  
The Entrepreneurial School says that this type of strategic philosophy would be 
particularly well suited for new and or existentially threatened organizations, where 
deliberate, broad-lined strategy can be defined then flexibly implemented based on 
emergent (sic treacherous) situations. 
This is leadership by adventure, the strategic planner as Indiana Jones, looking for 
the diamond in the rough, the one great gem of an idea that will change everything. 
Unfortunately, the way forward is only as good (and as bold) as the leader. Very 
few leaders have that spark of genius necessary to inspire and evoke the emotional 
resources of an organization, and appropriately leverage its physical, tangible assets.  
Needless to say, such a philosophy is not well adapted to the federal government, 
whose default reaction is to maintain both balance and status quo. With its occasional, 
opportunistic and revolutionary, short-term, versus evolutionary, long-term leadership 
style, the Entrepreneurial School often has the tendency to go too far for government 
officials. “Me too” strategies, resulting from uncreative or detached management, are 
much simpler and safer. Thank you very much. Besides, how could the glass houses of 
government weather such volatility, anyway? Breaking eggs is fine, as long as the end 
state actually produces an edible omelet.  
a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations 
The sound philosophical and somewhat inspirational contributions of the 
GPRA-MA and its subsequent policy have been established. In order to translate these 
noble premises into actionable and effective strategy at the agency level, true 
entrepreneurial leadership will be required. The legislation acknowledges the necessity 
for strong, political leadership and the role of appointees, who with their strong need for 
control, ability to be independent, built-in drive to leave behind a “legacy,” and 
accompanying tendency to accept moderate risks, are in the best position to affect 
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positive “revolutionary” change in the arena of government strategic performance 
management. But how many have answered the call? More importantly, how many are 
actually inspired?  
It will take such inspired, courageous leadership, operating out of strong 
conviction(s), to transition public agencies to embrace more collaborative practices, 
totally currently at odds with today’s bureaucratic norms, seemingly obsessed with 
simplicity and the instant resolution (i.e., gratification) of problems. Complex and 
contributive processes are often seen as confusing and a threat to the power of politicians 
and agency heads, and the control they wield to maintain the existing, more traditional 
institutional structures and norms.138 
b. Summary 
Superhuman entrepreneurial ship will practically be required to break the 
symbiotic relationship existing between elected and appointed officials always looking 
for simple, objective information to justify (versus inform) their decisions and the 
bureaucratic rationality entrenched to satisfy those needs. Once again, the GPRA-MA 
model, if appropriately leveraged, can break such a “bunker mentality” and allow DHS 
leaders to adopt more collaborative decision making based on a multiplicity and diversity 
of knowledge.139 
6. The Cognitive School: A Mental Process 
If strategy can be a personalized vision, then strategy formation also has to be 
understood as the process of “concept attainment” in a person’s head.140 Such is the 
premise of the Cognitive School.  
This school of thought crystallizes the strategic management process as an 
individual mental strain occurring in the mind of the strategist. Strategy is no more than 
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the strategic planner’s social construction of reality, which has somehow yielded inputs 
from the environment, initially distorted, but finally emerging as strategic “perspectives - 
in the form of concepts, maps, schemas, and frames.”141 The whole strategy making 
discipline is reduced to hermeneutics, or how people analyze patterns and process 
information. 
Therefore, a small but important cognitive school has developed using cognitive 
psychology to enter the strategist’s mind and better understand how strategies are 
mentally conceptualized. 
OK, that is nice. But, how can such an ephemeral approach possibly be leveraged 
to enhance public strategic planning and performance management, in practical terms? 
Understanding what is psychologically or sociologically happening in the mind of the 
strategist and how he/she is processing information is all rather theoretical and does not 
seem very useful in guiding collective strategic planning and/or performance 
management processes.  
Perhaps one can look at it this way: in order to “close the deal” one must 
understand the deal makers and breakers, which in our home analogy would be the actual 
HOMEBUYER. Remember him/her? Understanding how he/she thinks in order to better 
understand his/her particular needs and make proposals to satisfy them, is akin to 
understanding the end users of strategic planning frameworks in order to determine what 
decision-making structures best fit into their worlds. The Cognitive School is, in essence, 
requirements identification.  
a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations 
As previously mentioned, GPRA-MA is a simple solution to a wicked 
problem. GPRA-MA, as a strategic performance management framework, creates 
imaginary lines between “events, objects, and situations so that [they] become 
meaningful for the members of an organizational world,”142 influencing decision-makers’ 
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beliefs about their internal and external environments. The idea is that, by making the 
world rational, recognizable, and ultimately, collectively understandable, the framework 
can be used to effectively impact decision making. 
The Cognitive School reminds us that the mind is a very complex place, 
where accurate decisions require much more than simple and often redundant empirical 
evidence, much more than clear, single point decision making. It challenges us to beware 
of the simplistic, reductionist GPRA-MA of 2010 framework, which may only be 
providing decision-makers with an inaccurate mental representation of reality.  
Admittedly one has to start somewhere, because as the authors state, a 
“wrong mental representation, is better than no representation at all, for at least it gives 
encouragement, which can stimulate action.”143  
This author agrees with the legislation’s attempt to influence such shared 
understanding, by providing similar cognitive maps, schemas, models, etc. As long as 
this is counterbalanced by the Cognitive School’s warning that groupthink can also result 
from such an approach and that we should constantly strive to avoid becoming overly 
dependent on one interpretation of reality to the point of resisting or dismissing all 
evidence to the contrary. 
This School’s philosophy has the potential to act as an antidote against the 
administrative tendency to reduce everything into a best practices “one-size-fits-all” box 
in our desire to optimize, or find that one best solution. As previously mentioned, 
performance improvement is a non-static wicked problem with multiple and often 
conflicting goals, and institutionalizing performance management processes based on an 
overly simplified (i.e., optimized) framework in the name of greater effectiveness and 
efficiency will simply lead to a Kafkaesque-like performance management bureaucracy 
made up of arbitrary rules and procedures rather than tailored solutions resulting from the 
input of a multiplicity of contributors, including (gasp) lay people.144  
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Therefore, the GPRA-MA should be constantly interpreted in light of the 
Cognitive School’s special emphasis on reframing perceptions in order to affect thought 
paradigms. In our present context of strategic performance management, this ushers in 
greater dialogue toward improved collaboration, learning, and creativity, and away from 
the current traditional linear model, with its emphasis on the expert knowledge, reasoning 
and argumentation of government functionaries.  
Cognitive frames are so embedded in people’s thought processes that they 
are largely subconscious. It takes persevering reiteration to reframe an issue, situation or 
practice in ways that would allow for the development and implementation of revised 
policies and practices. This School encourages this new form of reasoning, or 
“intellectual bricolage,” by drawing on the experience and broader component knowledge 
of many players.  
b. Summary 
The idea that the GPRA-MA should only be adopted and applied to 
vehicle formal, deliberative, argumentation and logical conclusions should be rejected, 
because it totally neglects other kinds of reasoning and/or premises, based on group 
dialogue, narratives, even visioning, role playing and storytelling. Such alternative voices 
can indeed provide valuable knowledge about how partners/stakeholders, including the 
general public, are experiencing the current situation and how certain options might 
affect that outcome. Only in this way, can new or alternative options, approaches, and 
strategies be developed and courses of action taken to adequately address such 
concerns.145  
7. The Learning School: An Emergent Process 
Each of the following four schools opens up the strategy making process to 
include more than the single (or few) individual(s). For the Learning School, the world is  
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too complex to allow strategies to be developed all at once as clear plans or visions. 
Hence strategies must emerge in small steps, incorporating other forces and actors, as the 
organization adapts, or “lives and learns.” 
The Learning School believes that organizations reach end state through a never 
ending process of small, successive steps as opposed to large quantum jumps. Success is 
achieved through “logical incrementalism,”146 through trial and error, by constantly 
incorporating “lessons learned” into overall action plans.  
This School recognizes the limitations of omnipotent leadership in the real world 
of complexity, diversity, unpredictability, emerging perspectives and continuous change. 
Therefore, centralized direction is deemphasized in favor of decentralized 
experimentation, believing that control and direction should be provided by a much more 
extensive professional cadre involved in strategy making. Top, middle and front-line 
managers “manage up” through bottom-up descriptive action-learning loops as opposed 
to top-down prescriptive command-and-control strategy formulation-implementation 
processes. The goal is to produce more effective, less “clever” strategies that do not 
separate thought from action, formulation from implementation, theory (i.e., prescriptive) 
from practice (i.e., descriptive). 
Here, we have the free-lance professional PHOTOGRAPHER, roving from floor 
to floor, going from room to room, taking pictures to share ideas and best practices with 
everyone involved in our building project.  
For a Learning School organization, its “strategy” is the staff’s focus and 
ideology—how it works is how they work. Beauty is truly in the eye of the beholder. 
Strategy is what you see happening, improvement what you see working, and 
management, what you see being decided.  
The Learning School, however, is not the panacea, particularly in situations where 
conditions are rather stable, or in times of crisis where decisive leadership is called for. 
Moreover, overly focusing on “incrementalism” alone, with little or no hierarchical 
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control, could rapidly lead to no strategy at all, only a few stove-piped tactical 
maneuvers. Without direction, one ends up simply maintaining status quo, or 
serendipitously making progress.  
The Learning School approach must be coupled at some point, preferably 
initially, with a few prescriptive parameters. Otherwise, the home builders might end up 
building something other than a house, or no building at all.  
a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations 
The GPRA-MA acknowledges the utility of such “grassroots” models for 
strategy formation and strategic learning, because it acknowledges the organization’s 
capacity to experiment, to fail. The deficiency, however, is improperly or insufficiently 
defining failure. For homeland security or law enforcement agencies involved in making 
life and death decisions, where there is zero tolerance for error, would the learning school 
be appropriate? 
In such environments, where failure is acknowledged but not really 
accepted, logical incrementalism can be used to manage change, to impact culture, rather 
than to develop strategy. In the words of Ahlstrand, Lampel, and Mintzberg: 
The role of leadership thus becomes not to preconceive deliberate 
strategies, but to manage the process of strategic learning, whereby novel 
strategies can emerge. Ultimately, then, strategic management involves 
crafting the subtle relationships between thought and action, control and 
learning, stability and change.147 
Several of the GPRA-MA formal governance, interaction strategies (e.g., 
the PIO, PIC, quarterly performance reviews, etc.) encourage such learning environments 
where agencies “actively seek to move knowledge from one part of the organization to 
another, to ensure that relevant knowledge finds its way to the organizational unit that 
needs it most.”148 This aspect of the law should be more vigorously pursued to assist in  
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transitioning from standard, traditional governance structures to what some refer to as 
“meta-governance” structures with political (i.e., legislative) and organizational (i.e., 
administrative) frameworks that foster cooperation and learning.  
b. Summary 
Elected and/or appointed leaders, serving more as neutral facilitators or 
process mediators, should allow their staff to create and communicate organizational 
narratives, which can lead to a (re)framing and eventual resolution of issues.149 Without 
official legitimacy given to dialogue, the actors may never move beyond simply admiring 
the pictures, while continually asking for more. Click, click, click… 
8. The Power School: A Process of Negotiation 
The Power School treats strategy formation as a process of negotiation, of 
bargaining and compromise among conflicting individuals, groups, and coalitions within 
an organization grappling with both internal (i.e., micro) and external (i.e., macro) 
environments. 
Such negotiation is carried out by an organization’s legitimate institutions of 
power, which the authors identify as its “formal authority, established culture, and 
certified expertise.”150 Strategy development is not what it should be, but what internal 
power interests allow it to be, strategies are simply negotiated “truths.” As is typical with 
politics, where objective truth is most often replaced with something else, “planning” 
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Proponents of this school argue that it is not possible to formulate, let 
alone implement, optimal strategies: the competing goals of individuals 
and coalitions ensure that any intended strategy will be disturbed and 
distorted every step of the way, and the end state will simply reflect the 
interests of the most powerful groups in the organization—they will, if 
you like, [only] “map” the existing power structure.151 
The homebuyer is no longer the individual looking for a place to make a home 
and raise his/her family, but rather a FLIPPER, motivated by other, less altruistic, desires 
and interests.  
Evolutionary theory is validated in the Power School, because in these types of 
organizational jungles, only the strongest survive. Only the loudest voices are heard, only 
the needs of the most vigorous are satisfied. All the other voices are muffled, muted, 
perceived intermittently through various strategic alliances, and occasional stakeholder 
analyses. This is truly regrettable, however, because planning in complex environments 
requires face-to-face dialogue among the ensemble of all stakeholders. When missing, 
this translates into deal breakers and/or lethargic implementation because there were no 
opportunities to ensure and display mutual gain, resulting in lack of buy-in later on. 
These purely political planning styles where selling or marketing a strategy is 
more important that actually implementing it, where quantitative and qualitative data is 
collected to prove a point rather than (re)solve a problem, and finally, where anecdote 
through word-of-mouth reigns supreme over independent, objective analysis, can be 
countered (i.e., balanced out) by small group and diverse task teams. Unfortunately, in 
the Power School, loyalty to leadership is often more important than actually 
accomplishing things for the greater good of the organization.  
a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations 
When hierarchical, cultural and traditional forces systematically resist 
change, power has become a stagnant and negative force. Here, checks and balances 
might be useful to overcome skepticism and self-interest. Political pressure, from more 
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objective sources, can be applied to promote the necessary change. Political operatives 
(i.e., PIOs), working behind the scenes, can stimulate innovation that is being blocked by 
this type of intransigence. Acting as objective strategists and decision-makers, PIOs can 
leverage additional alliances and diagnostic tools to make the planning process more 
democratic, ensure that all sides of an issue are fully debated, and help decrease 
resistance once a decision has been made.  
They should not look to the GPRA-MA for assistance, however, as there 
are currently no levers in the law to mitigate the same challenges occurring at the higher 
levels, between the executive and legislative branches, that would contribute to the 
development of deliberate strategy as the collective realization of shared intent. The 
legislation itself is a honed political beast with its own power centers, varying and 
opposing perceptions and interests, all pitted against each other at the highest levels of 
national leadership. The hypocritical Act, therefore, practically guarantees that decisions 
within agencies will be influenced by power politics, rather than purely objective and 
neutral decision making. 
b. Summary 
Politics or negotiated compromise, which often inadvertently results in 
mission slippage and drift, is no way to make a strategy or measure success. Here, 
strategic planners and performance practitioners really should do as elected officials say, 
not as they do.  
9. The Cultural School: A Collective Process 
In the Cultural School, strategy formation is rooted in the culture of the 
organization where the process is viewed as fundamentally collective and cooperative. 
If the Power School spotlights the slightly Machiavellian, aloof flipper, the 
Cultural School considers the HOME BUYER’S IMMEDIATE AND DISTANT 
FAMILY, FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES in making decisions, a “social-power 
school” if you will. 
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Here, strategic planners try to involve various groups and departments across the 
organization in its strategy development, in order to reflect organizational culture. This 
approach takes into account the crucial role social processes, beliefs and values play in 
strategic planning and decision making, which also provides an explanation as to where 
and why there might be resistance to change. 
Needless to say, this is not often a strategy adopted by federal government 
players, because it is too vague, can actually feed resistance to change and be used to 
justify the status quo. Don’t ask. Don’t tell. Besides, who really cares about touchy-feely 
“community culture,” anyway? When it comes to making and accepting hard decisions, 
people will just need to “buck up.” Such an attitude is regrettable, because the Cultural 
School approach can provide decision makers with the “pulse” of an organization as they 
work to develop and implement various change management strategies.  
a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations 
The GPRA-MA acknowledges the importance of creating a performance 
culture of continuous improvement to affect change, and recommends leveraging 
community resources by forming independent, specialized “communities of practice” to 
face some of the challenges posed by stagnant leadership and “dug-in” mentalities. 
Currently these types of forums, however, are either non-existent, powerless, or too 
immature to truly bring about the monumental change necessary to shift the strategic 
performance management philosophy from prescriptive to descriptive, and bring into the 
fold the much “softer,” and hopefully longer lasting, influences of the latter schools. 
The GPRA-MA can be leveraged to establish such communities and invest 
them with authority to tackle the more recalcitrant problems facing government decision 
makers. These innovative learning forums are replacing the standard formulaic procedure 
of establishing and implementing goals, then measuring their success based on data 
collection and analysis, by ushering in more non-traditional, non linear approaches to 
problem solving, that engage all partners and stakeholders, and are based on common 
perspectives and concerns and shared understanding of reality. We have already 
mentioned how additional insight might be gained, by dialoguing with as many players as 
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possible, particularly lay people, looking for knowledge that reveals general public 
preferences. This is just as important for analyzing a situation and formulating responsive 
policy, as officially recognized subject matter expertise or “scientific” knowledge.152 
Planning and decision making in complex environments requires joint, 
collaborative fact finding: 
The term joint fact finding is in some respects a misnomer as it belies the 
full implications of this activity. It is far more than fact finding, or perhaps 
less. This term implies that the practice is built on scientific or positivist 
principles and that facts are objective things out there. In practice, joint 
fact finding is built on a social constructivist view of knowledge. The 
process weeds out dubious findings, uncovers assumptions, identifies 
biases, and dismisses unsupported claims. In the end truth is what the 
group decides it is. It is not just about “facts” but about relationships, 
causes, predictions. It is about “truth” deeply embedded in a context, a 
time and a place.153 
b. Summary 
In the next chapter of this thesis, Innovative Networked Meta-
Governance—The “Next New” Thing in SPM, we will look at ways the Cultural 
approach can be practically translated into the creation and modification of knowledge in 
a way that creates real value to end users, literally creating and redefining culture, 
through CoPs and ICTs, and leveraging them to advance inter- and intra-community 
learning and collaborative problem solving within the context of the GPRA-MA of 2010. 
10. The Environmental School: A Reactive Process 
Theorists within the Environmental School believe that strategy formation is a 
reactive process where initiative is not stimulated by inside players, but by outside 
pressures.  
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Just as a home cannot get built without first obtaining the necessary permits from 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, construction workers and homeowners often find they 
have to comply with requirements established by others beyond their control.  
Called to mind once again, are the three pillars of strategy making, leadership, 
organization and environment, with the latter being the most overbearing, leaving very 
little choice to the first two. The environment, as the main actor, rather than simply a 
factor, becomes the architect of an organization’s strategy. Like a boat in the midst of a 
perfect storm, it is no longer the captain or crew steering the ship, but category five 
hurricane winds unleashed by an out-of-control mother nature. The captain and crew shift 
from a state of driving the craft to one of surviving the crest.  
What is ultimately produced, say the environmentalists, is a strategy that is no 
more than a response to the many challenges posed by external factors, which have 
forced one to evolve or go extinct. Strategy is merely a desperate reaction, rather than a 
measured selection among many valid options. 
a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations 
Very little is being said about the impact of the environment on 
performance management and improvement processes. As the role of leadership is 
primordial in the prescriptive schools, privileged by government, there is even denial that 
strategy is something that happens involuntarily to an organization. If anything, 
individuals and agencies fight to maintain choice in all matters, often at the expense of 
reaping benefits from more collaborative, acquiescent approaches. However, when 
overwhelming external factors, such as extreme fiscal environments and draconian 
budget cuts, impose certain decisions upon agencies, leadership often borrows from the 
Environmental School playbook to affect unwanted change by saying: “PPBE is not our 
fault, the devil is making us do it.”  
b. Summary 
Before arriving at this point, GPRA-MA solutions should proactively seek 
to apply Environmental School principles by striving to understand how strategic 
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decisions can impact and be impacted by external partners/stakeholders, including them 
in strategy and decision making, where feasible. Working together in such a collaborative 
way, seeing reality from a different perspective, will enable us to better “weather the 
storm” together, anticipating, then mitigating some of the more devastating effects of 
uncontrollable environments.  
11. The Configuration School: A Process of Transformation 
In the Configuration School, strategy formation is a process of transforming the 
organization from one type of decision-making structure to another, by applying various 
approaches from the nine preceding schools when and where appropriate.  
The Configuration School tells us that we should be seeking to find a sense of 
balance between all nine schools, selecting from a portfolio of possible approaches to 
manage strategy, considering the nine differing philosophies as no more than different 
dimensions or perspectives of a single process: strategic planning and decision making.  
Perhaps successful strategic performance management is really only, in the end, 
successful change management, involving the application of appropriate force and 
control at just the right time, in just the right places. Leveraging the various tools of the 
Configuration School means applying the concepts and principles of all nine schools in 
order to ensure that the entire organization moves forward, both formally and informally. 
The difficulty is in understanding when and where to adopt the most appropriate 
configuration(s) in order to (1) choose/change direction, and then (2) stabilize that 
direction. Ultimately, strategy making should ensure stability, while avoiding stagnation; 
contribute to improvement and innovation, yet avoid insecurity and disruption.  
Here, the skills of an agile CONSTRUCTION SITE MANAGER will be called 
upon to pull everything together and ensure forward momentum. In the world of 
performance management, such a role would ideally be filled by the federal government 
PIO.  
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a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations 
Does GPRA-MA of 2010 have all the elements of the five descriptions 
and ten schools of thought? If so, what does that mean? If not, how will that affect its 
success?  
We have already determined that performance management and 
improvement is a “wicked” problem, requiring complex, perhaps multiple solutions and 
approaches. Could one of those approaches be to ensure multiple layers of structure and 
process are applied to translate GPRA-MA of 2010 principles into actionable strategy?  
Thinking outside the box means moving beyond the simple recording and 
the vaunting of status quo. It means stimulating true innovation in performance 
management and improvement processes. One approach would be to consider evaluating 
specific strategic performance management frameworks against the criteria of the 10 
schools of thought to see how they measure up. 
Because one size does not fit all, all of the time, in all places, GPRA-MA 
strategies, in the near term, should begin to supplement its existing approaches by 
adopting principles from the Configuration, Learning and Cultural schools. Through 
learning and adaptation, building flexibility and agility into strategic planning and 
decision-making processes, involving a multiplicity of players, federal government 
agencies will come closer to finding solutions best adapted to their own unique mission 
requirements and stakeholder needs. 
Collaborative planning and policy may not be appropriate for those 
decisions that would fall into the Cynefin categories of simple and complicated (ordered), 
where there is already agreement about capabilities and requirements, where closed 
system, non-interdependent programs are at play, easily displaying logic model cause and 
effect. Collective negotiation is not appropriate, either, when split second, life and death 
decisions need to be made (i.e., putting out fires). Rather, collaborative planning is more 
likely to generate feasible and legitimate decisions than traditional decision making when 
more complex, seemingly chaotic (disordered) problems (i.e., preventing the fires) are 
involved. Adept planners and performance management practitioners would be able to 
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assist both leadership and managers in appropriately categorizing issues and challenges 
and apply alternative strategic planning and decision making processes where needed.154 
The principles defining the Configuration School can assist in this transformational 
process.  
b. Summary 
We need to stop insisting that the world be simple. We need to stop having 
zero tolerance for failure. On the contrary, we need to accept failure because there is so 
much to learn from it. What we need to avoid at all costs is laziness, indifference, hubris 
and ignorance. 
Successful change flows from learning, growth, and development. Change 
can’t be managed. Change can be ignored, resisted, responded to, 
capitalized upon, and created. But it can’t be managed and made to march 
to some orderly step-by-step process.155 
D. SUMMARY 
In the end, GPRA-MA and the DHS strategy to implement it will ultimately 
involve choices between strategic management or control and strategic planning or 
innovation, between public administration and public accountability. Will the GPRA-MA 
of 2010 and/or the DHS PPBE solutions translate into the fully-fledged strategic planning 
system necessary to improve departmental strategy? Before anyone can actually measure 
the effectiveness of a model, the model must first be implemented. Before it can be 
implemented, it must first be developed. We are still in the process of developing these 
frameworks. So, who knows? But we have high hopes.  
The problem with the GPRA-MA and PPBE frameworks is that they are not 
comprehensive. They only plan, implement and measure what comes into view. We are 
often told that strategic plans need not be comprehensive, all inclusive, but only 
concentrate on select focus areas, issues, challenges and/or gaps.  
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What about the rest? Is anybody watching? Does anybody care? What can social 
complexity theory teach us? Can emergent strategy or patterns really be the most 
important things we should be looking at, but do not because they fall outside our sphere 
of control and influence, outside the premises of the first three (3) prescriptive schools?  
Because true strategy is not induced, but rather emerges, are not government 
strategic plans really a lot like artificial national borders drawn on a map by powerful 
world leaders (i.e., conquerors), but never fully understood or integrated into the human 
psyches or social structures of the people actually living within these borders? My 
passport may say that I belong to such and such a country, and I know that I should have 
it with me when I intend to travel or enter into areas controlled by border guards, but in 
my heart and mind, I know that I am someone else, something much more. 
What can strategic management practitioners do to change the status quo in the 
arena of strategy planning and assessment? What needs to be done to move away from 
the control processes of the design, planning and positioning schools, to embrace more 
creative and innovative processes that will contribute to the detection and leveraging of 
natural patterns? Experts believe that, in effect, emergent or realized strategy may be 
more comprehensive and successful, than intended strategy. They are, in any event, less 
dogmatic. 
Government decision-makers must understand that the ultimate goal of the 
GPRA-MA of 2010 is to create a high-trust environment, as a natural pattern. GPRA-MA 
and the OMB provide directional philosophy and strategy process recommendations that 
should be taken into account as contributing in this arena.  
Avoiding myopathy, or the inability to see the forest for the trees, of getting lost 
in the weeds, requires that one continually assess existing strategy or approaches for 
implementing GPRA-MA. This means doing more that simply complying with its 
prescriptive instructions, of satisfying the letter of the law. It means embracing its 
underlying concepts, understanding the spirit behind the law. It means going above and 
beyond the “call-of-duty.” 
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This will involve incorporating different strategic planning philosophies or 
perspectives into existing strategies and processes, based on current practices and lessons 
learned from other homeland security directorates or components. There are also valuable 
perspectives to be gleaned from complexity theory and other industry strategic planning 
and decision-making best practices, such as the five (5) definitions and ten (10) schools 
of thought outlined in “Strategy Safari.”  
In the next chapter, we will demonstrate how applying some of the more salient 
aspects from these various sources can produce a workable, more innovative alternative 
to the one-time, one-dimensional (i.e., mechanical) approach to problem solving currently 
espoused in most government strategic planning and decision-making practices today.  
We must begin to broaden our horizons, question existing beliefs, boundaries, 
barricades and buy-in when it comes to strategic performance management, because, 
ultimately, it is the performance of the organization that matters the most, not the 
performance of its bureaucratic processes. 
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VI. INNOVATIVE NETWORKED META-GOVERNANCE – THE 
“NEXT NEW THING” IN STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT  
In light of the various principles covered in the literature review and our follow up 
complementary discussion on social complexity theory, this chapter will lay out the next 
new thing with the greatest potential to impact federal government strategic performance 
management moving forward: innovative networked governance. 
Combining best practice principles from all five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas and 
the various complexity theory epistemologies we covered in the last chapter, we are now 
able to arrive at our one overarching performance improvement concept and first 
workable solution.  
Building on the idea of resilient, innovative, networked governance, or meta-
governance, previously espoused in chapter three, we will now practically demonstrate 
how agencies might improve inter- and intra-organizational learning and collaboration, 
combining these principles and related best practices with information technologies. As 
always, we speak of these solutions within the larger context of fiscal, ethical and 
democratic responsibility, in our efforts to continually reconcile GPRA-MA 
organizational performance with the overarching definition(s) of public accountability 
defined in chapter two. Indeed, totally separating performance results from their broader 
social, legal, and moral settings and relationships would eliminate any prospect of 
oversight and/or enforcement, and in essence “de-fang” the concept of true public 
accountability as an ultimate goal. 
A. INNOVATIVE, NETWORKED GOVERNANCE AS A SOLUTION TO 
ENSURE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY  
The DHS Performance Community often quotes the saying “What gets measured, 
gets done.” But, what if agencies are measuring the wrong things? Won’t GPRA-MA of 
2010 and its supporting framework only ensure that these “wrong” things still get done, 
only more efficiently and effectively? Should not the legislative and executive branches 
be eliciting participation and commitment from all parties along the performance 
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improvement continuum (i.e., public, political, executive, managerial, operational, front 
line, end users, etc.) before committing to goals and being held accountable for them? 
Getting the average citizen, as well as other impartial/independent stakeholders, 
more involved in government affairs and operations would ensure that neither policy 
makers nor executors were exercising power in ways that failed to maintain liberty and 
true political legitimacy.  
The public views accountability differently than the public manager does. So, 
when government institutions opt to implement simple performance-based accountability 
systems to prove success, as opposed to adopting more interactive approaches to improve 
performance, they are only demonstrating good management skills in the execution of a 
political or administrative agenda. Such bureaucratic leadership tends to communicate to 
the public the information they are currently using to manage, but not necessarily, the 
information the public needs, expects, or even fully comprehends. Unfortunately, this 
seems to be the current unspoken philosophy of most public performance accountability 
systems in existence today.  
Strategic performance management models, such as the GPRA, and its 
modernization in 2010, will require much more descriptive solutions based on learning, 
collaboration and relational capabilities. In today’s increasingly centralized federal 
government environment, any attempt to move away from the current approach of 
leadership-driven, top-down, informational command-and-control might be initially seen 
as heretical, impractical, and counterintuitive, but such a paradigm shift is not 
unwarranted.  
In order to move away from the prescriptive, one-directional (i.e., dictatorial) way 
of interfacing with the public, government entities might consider forging working 
relationship(s) with average citizens, creating a more interactive dialogue with them 
through technology-based knowledge sharing environments, affording constituents the 
opportunity to use their electoral and administrative voices to discuss and address 
problems directly impacting them.  
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Cross-organizational CoPs, and their supporting public-facing ICTs, can “soften” 
the more traditional autocratic systems, combining the best of both prescriptive and 
descriptive paradigms, information sharing and relational networking, leading to the 
discovery of more creative and/or innovative solutions to problems.  
Web-enabled CoPs, due to their focus on interactive inquiry and relational 
information sharing, are particularly well suited to improve transparency, collaboration 
and learning. In fact, CoPs are the easiest, quickest and least onerous way to ensure that 
government agencies are communicating expectations, progress and success both 
internally and externally. Internally, they stimulate synergistic thinking and best practices 
sharing, providing valuable platforms for the right people with the necessary expertise 
and resources to offer and obtain feedback in efforts to attain both near- and long-term 
organizational goals. Appropriately leveraging these information technologies would 
allow public administrators to first develop a common understanding of success, in 
collaboration with all concerned stakeholders, especially the American people, in order to 
develop a comprehensive framework to measure and report out on progress.  
Combining CoPs with interactive, web-enabled ICTs can result in greater 
transparency and increased public and performance accountability. Through their 
potential to improve communication and collaboration, these interactive forums are able 
to bring the inner workings of government into the public arena, and thus contribute to 
the overarching concept of performance management and improvement as a tool to 
increase public trust.  
We discuss below in further detail how CoPs and web-enabled ICTs are 
advancing accountability by improving performance outcomes (i.e., what is working and 
merits replication and what is not working and needs attention). We place particular 
emphasis on how government institutions can translate improved performance into 
increased trust through these types of relational information sharing technologies based 
on innovative-networked governance, or meta-governance.  
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B. INNOVATION 
Government has been noted in the past as being, “insufficiently innovative, 
inflexible and unresponsive, unable to integrate […] separate activities [to form a greater 
whole], and harness and manage private capacities effectively in the service of [common] 
goals.”156 As a long-standing institution with a set organizational structure and well-
defined rules of engagement, government encounters particular challenges when it tries to 
adopt creative and innovative solutions to problems. Currently, within the federal 
government context, accountability does not mean achieving a profit or producing goods, 
or even providing services to a limited number of stakeholders, but rather, meeting the 
expectations of political overlords and administrative oversight and management entities. 
In such an environment, the terms flexibility, creativity, innovation and accountability, all 
important drivers of performance excellence, carry different meanings.  
Because power comes with both responsibilities and constraints, the natural 
default reaction of most public institutions is to maintain balance and status quo, rather 
than creatively innovate. The philosophy of occasional, opportunistic and revolutionary 
remedies, so characteristic in private industry, is not well adapted to serve the 
evolutionary, long-term needs of the public enterprise, with obligations to respect the rule 
of law and achieve a myriad of results for a panoply of diverse, often contradictory, 
interests. Here, one is not “gambling” with private equity, but with the state’s resources, 
and government officials must always have a higher than usual expectation that what they 
attempt to do will actually succeed.  
The simple fact is that government is designed to perform reliably, not adapt to 
changing circumstances. Government institutions do not weather any type of volatility 
well.  
Couple such a raison-d’être with the myriad of Congressional and management 
oversight bodies, to include the GAO, Inspector General offices, and a seemingly 
increasingly critical and pessimistic public, and any potential for risk-taking or “rocking-
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of-the-boat” required for innovative change and improvement is effectively nipped in the 
bud before it even begins.  
In such an operating environment, government employees are often forced to 
harness and apply collaborative or innovative approaches to problem-solving that still 
allow them to stay within the stringent parameters imposed on public organizations, 
always under the obligation to achieve social outcomes for the common good.  
A recent report produced by the Partnership for Public Service and IDEO, entitled 
“Innovation in Government,”157 specifically speaks to the unique barriers that public 
officials have to confront in dealing with change, as well as their responsibility to change, 
offering a few “government-proof” (i.e., safe) techniques for change. 
Much like performing acrobatics in a straight jacket, almost “tricking” 
government officials into innovating, they establish a pre-defined, and rather rigid, 
process along with a government-wide infrastructure to support it. Their primary 
contribution to innovation is that this rather familiar, traditional six-step process,158 and 
its underlying principles, requires relational networking to be successful, characterized by 
a diverse community of committed, optimistically confident, goal-focused individuals, all 
possessing inter-disciplinary skills that can be applied within and across a multiplicity of 
connected, interactive and flexible governance structures: Innovative Networked 
Governance.  
C. NETWORKING 
The private sector speaks of this type of innovative networking in terms of 
crowdsourcing and co-creation.  
Crowdsourcing literally means outsourcing an activity to a large and undefined 
group of people, a crowd, to elicit innovative ideas and solutions to problems.159 It is 
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ideal for generating new inventive ways of doing business, but has drawbacks when 
knowledge-intensive answers are required. Intermediaries are required to overcome such 
hurdles and bridge the gap between the greater “free-thinking” society and the subject 
matter experts existing within specific disciplines. Such intermediaries ensure a 
streamlined and controlled transfer of knowledge between the various entities that may 
lack smooth working or collaborative relationships.  
Co-creation goes one step further by allowing analysts to dig even deeper and 
further plumb the depths of the untapped intellectual resources of these few targeted 
individuals within the larger group. The original concept of co-creation was value 
creation, which states, “informed, connected, empowered, and active consumers are 
increasingly learning that they too can extract value at the traditional point of exchange. 
[…] The aim of co-creation is to enhance organizational knowledge processes by 
involving the customer in the creation of meaning and value.” 160 
Co-creation recognizes the importance of congruence and continuity, emphasizing 
“active, creative, social collaboration [and long-term commitment and involvement].”161 
The idea is to establish real working relationships through an ongoing and mutually 
sustained exchange in an environment of ease and trust. 
Crowdsourcing and co-creation are somewhat scary for government, as they often 
evoke scenes reminiscent of the wild, wild, west where unruly citizens (i.e., hecklers) 
shout epitaphs at their elected and appointed officials during town hall meetings. Private 
industry, however, is less intimidated and remains non-pulsed before these types of 
“messy” interactions, considering them a valid means to innovate.  
For crowdsourcing and co-creation to become palatable to government 
institutions, they must be translated into language and concepts that they can understand, 
into approaches or solutions that can be better managed and controlled. 
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Authors Goldsmith and Ketle, in Unlocking the Power of Networks: Keys to 
High-Performance Government, suggest that this idea of networked government might 
provide an answer to finding the “balance between the values democratic governments 
are politically and constitutionally required to protect and the adaptability and flexibility 
that is required to allow [them] to adapt to an environment that is both heterogeneous and 
dynamic in its demands.”162 In other words, softening the constraints and expanding the 
boundaries of Weberian bureaucracy. 
This is what The Starfish and the Spider refers to as the sweet spot between 
sufficient decentralization, for creativity, and sufficient structure and control to ensure 
success.163 The authors claim that in any industry dependent upon information, there is a 
tendency toward decentralization, while in areas where security and accountability are 
important, the preference is for centralization. There appears to be a conundrum here for 
government, particularly the DHS, which can be defined as information-dependent, 
requiring safety and security, yet still having to produce proactive and flexible results. 
Quite logically, therefore, DHS leaders and decision-makers find themselves in constant 
flux between decentralized (i.e., networked) and centralized (i.e., top-down command-
and-control) options/solutions.  
Governments are no longer operating in a world where the uniformed masses will 
simply be satisfied with hierarchical, vertical, one-way communication coming from 
governmental subject matter experts. True visionaries already see the writing-on-the-wall 
with regards to the public’s demand for (and right to access and impact) information. 
Forward leaning officials will proactively seek to adapt their public communication 
mechanisms in anticipation of the coming tsunami of concerned citizens desirous to 
meaningfully engage in policy development and evaluation.  
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CoPs readily offer such innovative-networked solutions, in ways that are still 
“safe” for government. They “metastasize the cancer” by creating forums for information 
and idea exchange, “open[ing] dialogues between leaders and the public on how to 
address and merge […] differing perspectives.”164  
CoPs can contribute to closing the gap in accountability misconception(s) by 
establishing an on-going dialogue between average American citizens and their political 
representatives and/or public appointees.  
Interactive, web-enabled CoPs, and their supporting ICTs, can be leveraged to 
bring civic participation and learning back to the forefront, cultivating more productive 
relationships between the public and national leadership; one that enhances problem 
solving, and generates trust and cooperation: 
One of the most telling characteristics of high-achieving communities—
those where citizens are in the habit of coming together to solve 
problems—is the way these communities learn collectively from their 
efforts. This type of learning involves citizens evaluating both outcomes 
and goals. And it involves assessing the community itself—the way it 
performs—as well as the results of projects.165  
Most proponents of public accountability assert that true innovation will require 
more than simply interjecting new ideas, approaches or processes into existing structures 
and approaches. It will require an entirely new dynamic created through “loosely 
managed organizations that provide open, collaborative “spaces” that are flexible, loosely 
coupled, [and] decentralized.”166 
Leveraging such alternative thinking, coming from diverse sectors, including the 
general public, would allow public leaders to better connect with the people they are 
serving in ways that could actually help them tackle some of society’s more intransigent  
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problems. Listening to discern alternative answers from citizens, as opposed to simply 
communicating a political or administrative official’s own predetermined position(s) 
would indeed be a novel approach to governing.  
Government performance and results can advance public accountability, but only 
when goals and objectives are defined and monitored by an ensemble cast working within 
a multitude of institutional settings and cultural contexts. This requires fostering 
operating environments where additional “soft factors,” such values, norms, beliefs, 
attitudes and expectations, are given free expression.167 Contrast this with the current 
high-level, and often removed, political and/or bureaucratic leadership dictating 
according to strict rules of engagement.  
Our public institutions should be able to weather questions and challenges coming 
from lay people, applying more parochial (i.e., local) knowledge to find solutions, if 
indeed the assumptions of our policy professionals and experts are truly grounded in and 
supported by solid data-based theory as opposed to purely politically-motivated (i.e., 
agenda-driven) anecdote.168  
Ultimately, the true dynamic of a legitimate public performance accountability 
framework, is one that brings us back to our original definition of accountability as being 
“social in nature;” one that is developed in civitas and res publica, a public entity, 
belonging to the people.  
1. CoPs 
The American Heritage Dictionary refers to a community of practice as “a group 
of people having a common identity and professional interests, […] that undertake to 
share, participate and establish a fellowship.”169  
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Authors Wenger, McDermott and Snyder, in their Guide to Management 
Knowledge: Cultivating Communities of Practice, provided a most comprehensive 
discussion of CoPs, defining them in simple terms, as “groups of people who share a 
concern, set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and who deepen their knowledge and 
expertise in this area by interacting on an ongoing basis.”170  
The term community suggests that these groups are not constrained by 
typical geographic […] or functional boundaries, but rather by common 
tasks, contexts, and interests. The word practice implies knowledge in 
action — how individuals actually perform their jobs on a day-to-day 
basis [i.e., descriptive] as opposed to more formal policies and procedures 
that reflect how work should be performed [i.e., prescriptive].171 
This ability to canalize “evolving knowledge” is a primary characteristic of CoPs 
and particularly compelling within the performance management discipline where much 
of the knowledge is tacit, or not easily found in searchable databases and libraries, but 
found in people’s heads, and based on past experience, carefully cultivated subject matter 
expertise, and the development and maintenance of relationships. CoPs are ideally suited 
to affect change by combining both types of knowledge, explicit and tacit.  
Much like androgogy, where the student takes personal responsibility for learning, 
versus pedagogy, the more static and formal process of educating “sophomores,” CoPs 
offer opportunities to better steward information, because they allow the end users to 
liberally create and/or modify the knowledge themselves, whether tacit or explicit, 
creating and (re)defining culture. This improves upon the temporary, one-dimensional 
(i.e., mechanical) approach to problem solving, espoused in most operational working 
groups, project teams or the centralized, single-directional centers of excellence, un-
integrated with actual day-to-day operations. 
CoP members may never actually produce tangible deliverables, such as tools, 
standards, manuals, etc., because the primary benefit of forming and being a part of such 
a league, or professional guild, is the evolving body of knowledge acquired, shared and 
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fed back, not only within the immediate group focusing on the topic at hand, but also 
exponentially, to one’s larger organization working to solve the latest “wicked” problem. 
There are many different types of CoPs, according to Wenger, based on size (i.e., 
small or big), duration (i.e., long-term or short-term), location (i.e., collocated or 
distributed), composition (i.e., homogeneous or heterogeneous), scope (i.e., inter- or 
intra-agency), origin (i.e., spontaneous or intentional) and formality (i.e., unrecognized or 
institutionalized).172  
The one thing COPs should all have in common, however, is an emphasis on the 
key components of collaborative rationality, or DIAD (i.e., Diversity, Interdependence, 
and Authentic Dialogue), where participants, as equals, listen to each other and/or to 
information coming from formally recognized external experts. DIAD goes beyond the 
typical Western approach of scientific, purely objective, rationality by preferring more 
interpretive, pragmatic, experiential and dialectical ways of understanding, of engaging in 
joint understanding, explanation, meaning and learning. The DIAD network’s three (3) 
dynamic, interactive elements keep participants within the realm of rationality by 
reiteratively framing and reframing the various exchanges, through:173 
• Diverse and Interdependent Participation; 
• Reciprocal, Relational, Educative and Creative Dialogue; and 
• System Adaptation For Shared Identities and Meanings  
Authors Wenger et al. capture these important components of group effectiveness 
by defining seven principles necessary for networked government arrangements to 
flourish: (1) Design CoPs for evolution; (2) Open a dialogue between inside and outside 
perspectives; (3) Invite different levels of participation; (4) Develop both public and 
private community spaces; (5) Focus on value; (6) Combine familiarity and excitement; 
and (7) Create a rhythm for the Community.174  
                                                 
172 Wenger, McDemott, and Snyder, Cultivating Communities of Practice, 24–27. 
173 Booher and Innes, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for 
Public Policy, 17.  
174 Wenger, McDemott, and Snyder, Cultivating Communities of Practice. 
  170 
The idea is to cultivate CoPs that create spaces where there is “active participation 
by all members; clear communication of ideas and feelings; influence based on expertise, 
ability, and access to information, rather than on the basis of authority or power; flexible 
decision making procedures responsive to the needs of the situation; use of critical 
analysis of each other’s conclusions and reasoning to promote creative decision making; 
and explicit recognition of conflicts, and efforts to resolve them constructively.”175 
In the aggregate, CoPs are seen as an effective and efficient means to create 
learning environments for organizational transformation or improvement, becoming 
veritable force multipliers when combined with information technology enabled 
knowledge management systems and processes.  
We continue our discussion below with a brief overview of ICTs and how they 
can contribute to knowledge management within the context of information-sharing 
COPs operating in various organizational, cultural and behavioral settings.  
2. ICTs 
We cannot discuss performance- or results-based management, of which the 
GPRA of 1993 and its 2010 update are the main legislative drivers, without mentioning 
the types of open information technology systems preferred by most government 
performance practitioners at the federal level to communicate performance and results: 
ICTs, Management Information Systems (MIS) or Knowledge Management Systems 
(KMS).  
Wenger purports that a knowledge management system includes “two highly 
interdependent processes by which knowledge is produced and applied:”176 knowledge-
development (i.e., production) wherein tacit and explicit knowledge is converted into 
tangible, visible (i.e., accessible) information, and knowledge-application (i.e., analysis) 
which applies this information to deliver products or services to customers, partners 
and/or stakeholders.  
                                                 
175 Wenger, McDemott, and Snyder, Cultivating Communities of Practice, 123. 
176 Ibid., 166. 
  171 
Knowledge management, therefore, simply means managing the knowledge-
production and analysis processes in a way that creates true value to end users and 
consumers.  
Technological approaches and solutions to governmental performance 
management seek to improve operations by collecting, monitoring and communicating 
empirical data through web-enabled information technology software applications, such 
as performance monitoring and reporting systems or performance-based accountability 
systems (PBAS), Management By Objectives (MBO), and ZBB. These performance-
based BI technologies pull inchoate information, existing in diverse databases (e.g., data 
warehouses, data-marts and enterprise resource planning, programming, budgeting and 
execution systems, etc.), into one central repository. Their purpose is two-fold, (1) 
leverage an organization’s complete intellectual assets, to include capturing, 
documenting, and disseminating both collective and individual explicit and tacit 
knowledge in order to offer one version of “truth;” and (2) provide accurate real-time 
information (i.e., data plus analysis) to inform decision making.177  
The logic may be simple, in theory, but it is much more complex and challenging 
to implement, in practice.  
In order to leverage the full benefits of web-enabled information technologies to 
impact organizational performance, people- or interaction-based knowledge management 
should be preferred over knowledge- or information-based knowledge management. In 
other words, connecting “knowers” is more important than linking “knowledge.”178  
In fact, when it comes to the role and impact of information technology as a 
learning and knowledge-sharing tool, these technologies can be used by COPs as tools for 
overcoming geographic and organizational barriers, but they are generally unnecessary 
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for a successful CoP and cannot replace them.179 The emphasis is on human- (versus 
computer-) interaction as a means to ensure effective inter- and intra-organizational 
communication and collaboration. The focus should not be on technology, but on people 
and end-users, the latter simply being enhanced, rather than established or defined by the 
former. 
The philosophy has shifted from technology being a goal in and of itself to that of 
being no more than an enabler, allowing information (i.e., raw data) to reach program 
managers and decision makers who, through human interaction and discussion, create the 
real value, or actual knowledge. Technology is no longer seen by anyone as the magic 
“silver bullet” where new information technologies are able to capture all the knowledge 
of an organization into easily accessible databases. This may still be the idea for some 
knowledge management practitioners as a way to improve situational awareness or 
accomplish simple, process-oriented tasks (i.e., assembly line production), but it is no 
longer seen as a way to resolve some of the more complex, intractable problems facing 
today’s public organizations.  
Any technological support solution to advance performance management or 
improvement within federal institutions will have to walk lock step, in parallel with 
participative, interactive, learning frameworks and processes based on real-human 
dynamics and face-to-face interaction.  
While ICTs may contribute to improved communication and transparency, the 
preference within the overall performance community is toward CoPs as the being most 
viable solution to satisfy GPRA-MA of 2010 requirements. They are in line with the 
growing trend to leverage the benefits of inter- and intra-community learning and 
collaborative problem solving, and are, what Wenger, McDermott and Snyder call “living 
repositories.”180 
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D. GOVERNANCE 
There are several practical examples of private industry firms or even academic 
institutions applying the principles of CoPs to real world situations with great success. 
Without overlooking or diminishing these case studies, we prefer to concentrate on ways 
that ICT-supported CoPs can be integrated within the field of government strategic 
performance management as part of a leadership decision-making process (i.e., 
governance).  
Agreeing with the myriad of both short- and long-term benefits CoPs offer to 
organizations and individual members,181 the greatest advantage they provide to 
powerful government entities pertains to their ability to alleviate the burden on 
government to operate within strict parameters, constraints and limitations, yet still 
produce results. Public sector CoPs have the potential to:  
• Create long-term intangible outcomes, in a world where emphasis is 
placed on short-term tangible outputs;  
• Nurture relationships, in a world where acceptable behavior between 
government officials and the citizens they serve is often dictated according 
to strict rules;  
• Foster personal and professional collaboration, in a world where 
interaction follows a hierarchical, top-down, command-and-control 
trajectory; and finally,  
• Cultivate learning environments where curiosity and innovation can find 
expression in a risk-adverse culture, constantly seeking to maintain 
balance and status quo. 
The Partnership for Public Service OMB PIC 2009/2010 Fellows Cohort provided 
four very distinct objectives that drive the formation of public performance CoPs:182  
• Promote innovation, and the sharing of knowledge, information and 
resources; 
• Enhance active collaboration among internal stakeholders; 
• Ensure the organization has consistent business practices; and 
• Facilitate resolution of issues and implement change. 
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We discuss these potential contributions and objectives of CoPs within our now 
already familiar GPRA-MA of 2010 framework below.  
CoPs can be leveraged to ensure Leadership Engagement and Collaboration, and 
Learning and Improvement (i.e., GPRA-MA of 2010 focus area #1), as they are a unique 
combination of three fundamental elements: a domain of knowledge, which defines a set 
of issues; a community of people who care about this domain; and the shared practice 
they are developing to be effective in their domain.183 In the context of the GPRA-MA of 
2010, government-wide strategic performance management is the domain, the community 
is the PIC and supporting government-wide performance community. Together they 
create/adjust the shared practice, defined as “a set of common approaches and shared 
standards that create a basis for action, communication, problem solving, performance 
and accountability: case stories, theories, rules, frameworks, models, principles, tools, 
experts, articles, lessons learned, best practices, and heuristics.”184  
What is unique about the legislation is its articulation around the concept of 
developing and evolving CoPs to improve organizational learning and collaboration. By 
codifying the recommendations of Executive Order 13450, requiring participation in the 
OMB PIC and its activities, the GPRA-MA, in fact, institutionalizes CoPs, requiring that 
the sharing of explicit and tacit knowledge pertaining to an organization’s performance 
improvement efforts, should take place within and through the legislation’s officially 
mandated community of practice, the OMB PIC:  
The PIC is envisioned as a hub for the government’s performance 
management framework/network, charged with improving government-
wide performance, achieving priority goals, and identifying and tackling 
specific problems as they arise. The PIC will serve as a home for federal 
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such as regulatory matters, and some by methods, such as quality 
management. These communities will be expected to develop tools and 
provide expert advice and assistance to their colleagues.185 
CoP best practices are also being applied to evolve and improve the role of 
leadership within the federal government performance community, emphasizing, “all 
CoPs depend on internal leadership, but healthy communities do not depend entirely on 
the leadership of one person.”186 Characteristic of the OMB PIC, as well as innovative-
networked governance, is diffused leadership, wherein recognized experts from both 
within and outside of the community are regularly invited to share perspective and 
suggestions in the form of practical techniques and tools. 
Wenger states, “the most successful communities of practice thrive where the 
goals and needs of an organization intersect with the passions and aspirations of 
participants. […] This intersection of personal meaning and strategic relevance is a potent 
source of energy and value.”187 In CoPs, everyone benefits and adds value, each 
individual member being recognized as a legitimate “leader among peers.”  
The focus of successful CoPs within the federal government is multiple and calls 
on its public and private organizational members to supplement the existing capacities of 
typical Weberian administrative structures through both: 
• Formal, top-down mechanisms, where high-level government decision 
makers are asked to create and lead a network to tackle a specific 
performance problem; or  
• Informal, bottom-up configurations, where government officials, through 
persuasion, coalition building and supporting cutting-edge technologies 
form working groups.  
 
 
                                                 
185 Partnership for Public Service and Grant Thornton, A Critical Role at a Critical Time: A Survey of 
Performance Improvement Officers, 2. 
186 Wenger, McDemott, and Snyder, Cultivating Communities of Practice, 36. 
187 Ibid., 32. 
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In addition to the benefits, structural elements, and leadership of performance-
focused CoPs, their main purpose and functionality within GPRA-MA focus areas #2–4 
(i.e., Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment, Performance Measurement and 
Program Evaluation and Performance Reviews) involves knowledge management 
pertaining to: 
• Using goals, measurement, incentives, analysis feedback and measured 
experiments to motivate the discovery and promotion of effective action; 
• Presenting and disseminating information inside the federal government 
and to delivery partners in support of priority setting, to stimulate 
discovery and innovation, and to motivate performance improvement; 
• Exchanging lessons from individual agency experiences; and 
• Cooperating on pilot projects across agencies to gather new insights.188 
CoPs, as evolving bodies of knowledge, are also increasingly being employed to 
advance the Transparency and Accountability aspect of the federal government 
performance management discipline as well (i.e., GPRA-MA focus area #5). 
As previously stated, the GPRA-MA requires that performance information be 
streamlined and posted in online formats useful to Congress and relevant to the general 
public, with high expectations that such an emphasis on creating open and transparent 
processes will revolutionize the way government does business.  
Performance.gov, overseen by the OMB PIC, is one example of a public-facing 
ICT, supported by a myriad of cross-organizational CoPs, both large and small, long-term 
and short-term, collocated and distributed, homogeneous and heterogeneous, inter- and 
intra-agency, spontaneous and intentional, unrecognized and institutionalized.  
This website serves as the public window communicating federal government 
goals and performance results in key areas of focus. It is the single, government-wide 
ICT mandated by the GPRA-MA and includes information on (Cross-) Agency Priority 
Goals, and Agency Strategic and Performance Plans and Reports in machine-readable 
formats.189  
                                                 
188 Shelley Metzenbaum, Performance Management Recommendations for the New Administration 
(Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2009), 46. 
189 OMB Circular A-11. 
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A centralized website makes information about government goals and 
performance easier for the public, Congress, delivery partners, agency employees, and 
other stakeholders to find. It is also used by the OMB PIC to support cross-agency 
coordination and decision making in the advancement of government-wide goals.  
A successful example of an interactive web-enabled CoP, which combines the 
concepts of both CoPs and ICTs, is the DHS Transportation Security Administration’s 
(TSA) IdeaFactory, which was launched to provide creative solutions in support of the 
TSA mission. Named by the White house as a model of open government, the 
IdeaFactory, through the creation and fostering of a collaborative community of engaged 
employees committed to initiating effective change, uses social media concepts to 
connect employees and expand upon the traditional suggestion box.  
The IdeaFactory operates with characteristics similar to most COPs by 
empowering all TSA employees to submit ideas, provide comments on how to improve 
new concepts, and rate ideas with specific recommendations for implementation. This 
interactive web-enabled CoP fosters information sharing by providing employees with a 
voice to: 
• Contribute to relevant and important topics aligned with agency priorities;  
• Talk, educate, and inform each other through online communities; and 
• Provide valuable and impactful feedback regarding the effectiveness and 
efficiency of TSA programs directly to agency headquarters and staff. 
1. Meta-governance: Innovative, Networked Governance 
We have reviewed best practices relative to CoPs and ICTs, and seen how they 
can be leveraged to marry two separate concepts of public accountability within the 
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Internally, CoPs can be leveraged to transition from current traditional 
governance structures to more collaborative, networked ones (i.e., meta-governance). The 
following table demonstrates the differences between these two types of decision-making 
frameworks and the leadership and management styles that dominate each:190 
 
Governance Dimension Traditional Governance Collaborative Governance 
Structure Top down hierarchy Interdependent network 
clusters 
Source of Direction Central control Distributed control 
Boundary Condition Closed Open 
Organizational Context Single authority Divided authority 
Leadership Approach Directive Generative 
Role of Manager Organization controller Mediator, process manager 




Managerial Activities Planning, designing, and 
leading  
Selecting agents and 
resources, influencing 
conditions 
Goals Clear with defined 
problems 
Various and changing 
Criterion of Success Attainment of formal policy 
goals 
Realization of collective 
action and conditions for 
future collaboration 
Nature of Planning Linear Nonlinear 
Public Participation 
Objective 
Legal conformity, inform 
and educate, gain support of 
public for agency policies 
Create conditions for social 
learning and problem-
solving capacity 
Democratic Legitimacy Representative democracy Deliberative democracy 
Source of System 
Behavior 
Determined by component 
participant roles 
Determined by interactions 
of participants 
Table 8.   Traditional Versus Collaborative Governance 
Externally, ICTs and CoPs can contribute to improved public accountability when 
used as tools to facilitate “the exercise of power or authority—political, economic, 
administrative or otherwise—to manage a country’s resources and affairs. [CoPs can  
 
 
                                                 
190 Booher and Innes, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for 
Public Policy, 202. 
  179 
serve as] the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups 
[can] articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and 
mediate their differences.”191 
CoPs and their supporting information technologies enhance leadership 
engagement, collaboration, learning, transparency and decision making, which together 
can result in greater accountability. Whether we discuss accountability through the eyes 
of the general public or the public administrator, the GPRA-MA of 2010 offers a valid 
framework to ensure a common understanding of and commitment to the goals and 
objectives of both elected and appointed officials. Leveraging CoPs in order to move 
beyond the current status quo and identify shared (i.e., collective) goals involving a 
multiplicity of both public and private stakeholders, all working toward the achievement 
of a better society, represents an important first step in building public trust, collaboration 
and cooperation.  
Ultimately, interactive web-enabled CoPs are oases in the middle of a dry desert, 
an orbiting space station in the midst of an almost endless universe, a frontier outpost 
providing much needed supplies, advice, and encouragement to “emigrants travelling 
West,” not yet fully decided on whether they will embark on that one additional trip, 
hesitant before that additional perilous leg of their voyage into unchartered territory. 
E. SUMMARY 
Due to the post industrial knowledge creation environment we are now operating 
in, a different value proposition than has been available previously is emerging in our 
current system of democratic governance: the increasing demand by U.S. citizens to 
directly participate in the development of the policy and strategy adopted by the 
executors of legislation, and this, at all levels of public service (i.e., federal, state and 
local). 
In order to adequately respond to these demands, DHS may be required to step 
away from current standard performance management and improvement processes based 
                                                 
191 E-Governance (Mumbai, IND: Global Media, 2009), 208. 
  180 
on traditional iterative strategic planning and incremental progress, focused internally, 
and embrace more innovative-networked solutions to governance and decision 
making.192  
To ignore these demands and continue on with the same types of one-way 
dictatorial top-down command and control communications with each other and the 
American public on the “progress” the government is making, would be to ignore 
potential threats on the horizon (i.e., public indifference, civic unrest, civil disobedience, 
etc.). In order to appropriately prepare for and respond to the anticipated coming changes 
in the cultural and political environment, homeland security strategies will require more 
than simple, reductionist rules-based methodologies. They will require innovative-
networked solutions, such as the one we’ve just covered involving web-enabled CoPs and 
supporting ICTs, which “recombine [...] technology and human social and cultural 
behavior.193  
How, then, can DHS move away from its current “false sense of linear order and 
predictability” and respond to “what is in reality an interactive, complex, and evolving 
web of forces, constraints, incentives, and conditions?”194  
To begin with, DHS leaders, management partners and stakeholders should 
recognize and acknowledge “the power of the [powerless] few,” and in the face of an 
increasingly complex, and decentralized cultural and professional landscape, be willing to 
adopt more innovative leadership and management styles that showcase collaboration, 
participation and networking. More specifically, the DHS can establish a solid foundation 
for more innovative performance management and improvement practices by better 
leveraging the epistemologies and best practices reviewed in this thesis, refreshing and 
(re)modeling its current GPRA-MA strategies and solutions.  
                                                 
192 Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of “the Few”: A Key Strategic Challenge for the Permanently 
Disrupted High-Tech Homeland Security Environment,” Homeland Security Affairs 7, art. 19 (December 
2011): 14. 
193 Ibid., 16. 
194 Ibid., 2. 
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Chapters I through VI of this thesis have attempted to answer the following 
questions in our effort to establish a solid theoretical foundation for the development of 
innovative yet practical strategic performance management practices: 
• What is DHS (currently) doing (in the arena of strategic performance 
management)? 
• What is DHS not doing? 
• What does DHS have to do? 
• What are others doing?  
The next two (2) chapters will be dedicated to answering the two remaining 
questions from our research design: “What should DHS be doing?” and “How should 
DHS do it?”  
Culling from our synthesis of external best practices, complexity theory and the 
concept of innovative, networked meta-governance solutions, we have made specific 
improvement recommendations within the context of the GPRA-MA framework that are 
intended to increase public and organizational performance accountability in answer to 
the question: What should DHS be doing (differently) to improve its performance 
management strategies and solutions with the intent of increasing accountability within 
and across the department and vis-à-vis the American public?  
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VII.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are meant to instill a culture of greater public 
and organizational accountability leveraging the GPRA-MA framework and 
incorporating best practices into DHS performance management and improvement 
solutions, pulling from the research results of our literature review and subsequent 
discussion on social complexity theory. The recommendations focus on both the 
philosophical/theoretical, as well as the practical applications of strategic performance 
management as it pertains to the five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA-MA, and the 
five (5) conditions identified as hindering the legislation’s effectiveness. Which of the 
general overarching “perceptions of reality” within the best practices merit replication in 
the context of the GPRA-MA of 2010 mandate? How can they be institutionalized to 
enhance federal government SPM? 
Even though the recommendations may indirectly result in improving the noted 
deficiencies in the five (5) pillars of the GPRA-MA, as well as impact the cultural 
conditions contributing to the lack of success, the proposed suggestions do not represent a 
comprehensive, all inclusive, solution to the department’s overall performance 
management policies and practices, nor are they meant to improve specific DHS 
programs and/or activities.  
Rather, they are intended to display ways DHS can better leverage public and 
private best practices, in the context of the GPRA-MA of 2010, to cultivate greater 
accountability within and across the department and vis-à-vis the American public. 
Included, therefore, are only those actions that contribute to bridging the gap between 
traditional definitions of public accountability (i.e., organizational performance or 
improved government effectiveness and efficiency) and its more non-traditional 
interpretations of improved public and organizational trust.  
A. TRUST AS ACCOUNTABILITY 
All power is a trust; and we are accountable for its exercise. 
—Benjamin Disraeli 
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In Chapter II, public and organizational accountability was defined in detail. Here, 
in order to propose straightforward answers and solutions, accountability will only be 
equated with trust, along with an equally straightforward definition: giving and getting 
the benefit of the doubt. 
In their book, “The Speed of Trust,” authors Stephen Covey and Rebecca Merrill 
present a model that distills trust down to a function of two essential elements: 
CHARACTER (i.e., integrity, motive, and intent) and COMPETENCE (i.e., capabilities, 
skills, results, and track record), expressed in five (5) distinct waves (and interdependent 
principles).195  
• Self-Trust (Credibility) 
• Relationship Trust (Consistent Behavior) 
• Organizational Trust (Alignment) 
• Market Trust (Reputation) 
• Societal Trust (Contribution) 
The authors believe that “once you create trust, [a function of] genuine character 
and competence […], almost everything else falls into place.”196 
They continue by detailing the characteristics of both organizational trust and 
mistrust.  
Low-trust organizations are filled with internal departmental rivalries and stove-
piping, people bad-mouthing other departments and staff behind each other’s back, 
chronic complaining and staff not feeling like they can make a change. Organizational 
communication is driven by gossip rather than leadership interaction and messaging. 
There is limited innovation, lack of staff development and career progression, and a 
culture dictated by urgency rather than impact or importance.  
Less trust results in less information being shared, naturally resulting in increased 
suspicion, ultimately culminating in less trust.  
                                                 
195 Stephen M. R. Covey and Rebecca R. Merrill, The SPEED of Trust (Simon & Schuster, Inc., 
2006), 32, Kindle edition. 
196 Ibid., 10. 
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Table 9.   Organizational Mistrust and Trust 
In the world of SPM and the GPRA-MA of 2010, mistrust would translate as 
follows: 
• Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and 
Improvement: Less trust means that individuals will not be empowered to 
make decisions, much less create or innovate, which, in turn, would 
contribute to maintaining status quo within the existing hierarchical, 
cultural and traditional forces of the various DHS organizations. Less trust 
would perpetuate management and staff resistance toward more 
innovative, non-traditional, outside-of-the box solutions, necessary to 
solve “wicked” problems. Such a lack of leadership investment and 
engagement in driving continuous performance improvement, as an 
underlying philosophy, would result in common, simplistic solutions being 
In the “The Speed of Trust,” authors Stephen Covey and Rebecca Merrill 
distinguish the difference between low- and high-trust organizations. 
 
Organizational Mistrust 
1. People manipulate or distort facts; 
2. People withhold and hoard information; 
3. Getting the credit is very important; 
4. People spin the truth to their advantage; 
5. New ideas are openly resisted and stifled; 
6. Mistakes are covered up or covered over; 
7. Most people are involved in a blame game, bad-mouthing others; 
8. There is an abundance of water cooler talk; 
9. There are numerous “meetings after the meetings”; 
10. There are many “undiscussables”; 
11. People tend to overpromise and under deliver; 
12. There are a lot of violated expectations, for which people try to make excuses; 
13. People pretend bad things aren’t happening or are in denial; 
14. The energy level is low; and  
15. People often feel unproductive tension—sometimes even fear. 
 
Organizational Trust 
 Information is shared openly; 
 Mistakes are tolerated and encouraged as a way of learning; 
 The culture is innovative and creative; 
 People are loyal to those who are absent; 
 People talk straight and confront real issues; 
 There is real communication and real collaboration; 
 People share credit abundantly; 
 There are few “meetings after the meetings”; 
 Transparency is a practiced value; 
 People are candid and authentic; 
 There is a high degree of accountability; 
 There is palpable vitality and energy—people can feel the positive momentum.  
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proposed to resolve complex situations. There would be missed 
opportunities to decentralize information sharing and cross-organizational 
networking contributing to the creation of a positive learning and 
performance management culture leading to greater trust. Leaving in place 
centralized control would engender inflexible group think and continued 
Resistance to change, resulting in Stagnation.  
• Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment: Less trust would mean 
less communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration, 
resulting in stove-piped strategic planning and decision making, 
culminating in competing, and often contradictory priorities, unintentional 
gaps and duplicative or redundant efforts. This lack of alignment and 
connectivity between individual, program, and agency behavior and action 
would sow Confusion and Doubt concerning leadership motive and intent, 
further diminishing trust.  
• Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation: Less trust in this 
arena would pertain to credibility issues, involving bias or lack of 
objectivity. Inaccurate information or analysis would mean less 
understanding and the absence of sound decision making. As a result, 
Inconsistency and Indecision would come to characterize agency 
performance measurement and evaluation functions, which require valid 
data and trusted empirical evidence to establish confidence in perceived 
progress and results.  
• Performance Reviews: Less trust would translate into the lack of the free 
flow of information, resulting in inadequate knowledge management and 
lack of situational awareness. Transparency, required for knowing where 
one stands within the greater whole, is a prerequisite for trust and 
appreciative inquiry. Fear of punitive rather than inquisitive performance 
reviews would result, discouraging any initiative to share information or 
know more, culminating in Indifference and Passivity.  
• Transparency and Accountability: Less trust would result in disengaged 
public servants preferring compliance reporting over more democratic 
governance structures, systems and processes, necessary for true 
transparency and public accountability (trust). Lack of (Public) 
understanding of how government works, would allow political hubris to 
dictate options, culminating in fewer real, longer lasting solutions. (Public) 
Criticism and Conflict would dominate.  
Organizational high-trust, on the other hand, fosters cross-functional team 
building to solve problems together. Behavioral issues and low morale are the exception 
instead of the norm. Innovation is encouraged and rewarded. Leadership, management,  
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and staff communication is open, consistent, and constant. Career paths are established 
with staff, empowered to develop themselves, and, finally, outcomes and impact drive 
decisions.  
The world would look much better, as well, in SPM/GPRA-MA terms: 
• Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and 
Improvement: Giving and getting the benefit of the doubt in the general 
arena of overarching strategic performance management, would lead to 
greater Engagement from agency leadership, management and staff, 
committed to the creation and maintenance of an overarching performance 
culture focused positively on continuous improvement through 
transparency, open information sharing and the ability to discuss 
performance in non-punitive ways. Innovative leadership from the agency 
PIO, garnishing the respect and trust of the entire organization, would 
oversee the selection and testing of more creative and resilient strategic 
vision and decision-making methodologies, based on value creation and 
mutual benefit, all culminating in the production of real, long-term 
solutions. Agency PICs, espousing meta-governance principles and 
collaborative, interactive learning environments, would have become 
veritable “living laboratories,” creating real Momentum for progress to be 
made in the remaining GPRA-MA focus areas.  
• Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment: Giving and getting the 
benefit of the doubt in the annual DHS planning and goal setting process 
would mean that there was no difference, or light of day, between what 
internal Tier 1 senior leadership and Tier 2 management and front-line 
personnel understood as contributing to individual, program, and agency 
priorities, and what external partners and stakeholders, both public and 
private, elected and non-elected officials, understood as success and the 
means to achieve it. Uncertainty and unpredictability, due to complexity, 
would not automatically translate into confusion and doubt regarding 
leadership motive and intent, or fear of the loss of command and control, 
but rather would be seen as an opportunity to entertain more complex, 
non-linear, participative solutions to achieving strategic Clarity and 
reaching consensus, ultimately leading to greater organizational and public 
Confidence.  
• Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation: Giving and getting 
the benefit of the doubt in the development and application of empirical 
data and analysis would mean greater Credibility and trust vis-à-vis 
agency analytical and decision-making processes. Such legitimacy would 
translate into a willingness to invest more in the organization’s 
measurement and evaluation capacities and capabilities, stimulating  
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improved intra- and inter-agency Collaboration, necessary to identify and 
incorporate relevant and meaningful data and analytical products, tailored 
to the needs of end users, especially the public. 
• Performance Reviews: Giving and getting the benefit of the doubt in the 
context of agency data-driven performance review models would mean 
that these informal discussions and/or formal meetings, convened to 
reduce costs and improve outcomes, would finally become true value 
added to agency leadership and management. Characterized by diversity, 
interdependence and authentic dialogue (i.e., collaborative rationality), 
these forums would create the Motivation and Initiative necessary to 
overcome inconsistent DHS processes and disjointed mission 
coordination, leading to the discovery of true cross-cutting goals and 
solutions facilitated by greater intra- and inter-agency interaction and 
collaboration. Performance data and analytical results would no longer be 
communicated simply to prove success to a rather limited audience of 
official government management and oversight bodies, but integrated into 
daily operations as a standard operating procedure to better inform agency 
decision making and results.  
• Transparency and Accountability: Giving and getting the benefit of the 
doubt when communicating and reporting performance information means 
that there would be reconciliation between the way the public understands 
the current departmental mission to secure the homeland, and the way 
DHS leaders understand it, as expressed in their actual goals and priorities. 
This would allow citizens to judge for themselves whether their taxpayer 
dollars are really delivering the results they expect. Simple compliance 
reporting would have given way to true public accountability thanks to 
innovative meta-governance structures, systems and processes, linking the 
GPRA-MA of 2010 with the theoretical conceptualization of public and 
organizational accountability. Internally, these robust closed-loop strategic 
performance management frameworks would mitigate and/or resolve the 
deficiencies in the department’s performance management and 
improvement practices, while at the same time, positively impact the 
prevailing cultural conditions contributing to these deficiencies. 
Externally, these frameworks would be bridging the gap between 
improved government efficiency and effectiveness and public trust, 
reconciling the political/administrative definition and understanding of 
organizational performance accountability with the concerns of the general 
public. Greater (Public) Optimism and Contribution to the DHS mission 
would be the benefit. 
Creating a climate or culture of accountability and trust entails getting 
organizations to move from requirements-based to integrity-based actions, from 
compliance (i.e., pressure from without) to congruence (i.e., motivation from within), 
from minimum to optimum performance.  
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Prescribing actions to instill a high-trust culture within the DHS, both intra- and 
inter-agency and vis-à-vis the general public, should be done in a straightforward, “spin-
less” manner, and expressed in dichotomous terms of success or failure. Do DHS 
performance management/improvement processes involve valid and specific 
recommendations (i.e., programs, projects, activities, initiatives, etc.) that 
increase/improve trust or limit/diminish it? Yes or no. If not, then what can be done about 
it?  
B. THE COMPETING VALUES FRAMEWORK 
The following recommendations to establish a solid theoretical foundation for the 
development of effective strategic performance management frameworks and practices, 
based on trust, have been articulated around the Competing Values Framework (CVF). 
The CVF, developed by University of Michigan faculty members, identifies four 
cultural archetypes to diagnose and make proper changes to organizational culture and 
improve the execution of new strategic direction: (1) collaborate; (2) control; (3) 
compete; and (4) create, each of which differ in the degree to which the organization is 
internally or externally focused or more flexible or rigid in nature.  
 
 
Figure 3.  The Competing Values Framework (CVF) 
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The upper left quadrant identifies values that emphasize an internal, organic 
focus, whereas the lower right quadrant identifies values that emphasize external, control 
focus. Similarly, the upper right quadrant identifies values that emphasize external, 
organic focus whereas the lower left quadrant emphasizes internal, control values. These 
competing or opposite values in each quadrant give rise to the name for the model, the 
CVF. 
As an integrated and consistent approach to individual and organizational 
development and progress, the framework can be used to organize change management 
recommendations in the field of performance management and improvement.  
Each CVF archetype displayed below will contain specific courses of action to 
increase both public and organizational accountability associated with each major hub or 
GPRA-MA/cultural condition category and/or theme. These recommendations are 
addressed to both higher and lower level officials, and are intended to be equally feasible 
whether current guidance and solutions are prescriptive (top-down) or descriptive 
(bottom-up), or whether current accountability mechanisms are primarily vertical or 
horizontal. 
The recommendations have been loosely placed, independent of any particular 
order of importance, within one of the four (4) CVF quadrants below in order to avoid 
running the risk of committing the same error attributed to current strategic planning and 
performance management practices, that of simplifying complex problems into simple 
formulas. The following recommendations, therefore, are not meant to solve specific 
problems at specific moments in time and/or within specific timeframes, but rather, 
contribute to the changing of mindset(s), behavior(s) and ultimately culture(s), over time, 
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1. Collaborate 
One (1) 
CVF Archetype Emphasis Organizational Focus Social Complexity 
COLLABORATE Human Relations Internal/Flexible Organic/Descriptive 
 
Any performance management improvement tools and techniques to increase 
accountability primarily involving teamwork, collaboration, talent management, 
empowerment, or inter-personal relationships (i.e., long-term development, doing things 
together) have been listed under the upper left quadrant. 
 
Figure 4.  CVF Archetype: Collaborate 
The main contribution of social complexity theory to this archetype is the idea 
that one leader, one perspective, one solution is not enough. This is where problem 
solving morphs into action learning, where strategic planners and decision makers realize 
that the world is too complex and evolving for them to be able to single handedly “fix” 
problems simply by finding the “right” formula. Entertaining more holistic, interactive 
approaches to issue resolution, based on “self-organization, system-wide learning and 
[adaptation],”197 policy makers discover that true COLLABORATION means power 
distribution, ushering in new styles of (collaborative) leadership, new forms of 
                                                 
197 Booher and Innes, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for 
Public Policy, 32. 
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(networked) governance and more (leveling) management practices. Isolated, hierarchical 
top-down, command-and-control epistemologies are displaced by methods emphasizing 
multiple perspectives, mutual dialogue, shared meaning, contextual understanding, and 
joint action.  
a. Collaborate Recommendations  
(1) COLLABORATE #1. Require an Innovative (Democratic) 
Networked Governance Factor and Indicator of Success in SES performance plans—
With the intent of cultivating public service motivation among employees, the OPM, can 
further link performance management and strategy achievement with overall public good 
by adding an additional (public) engagement factor to one of the five (5) critical elements 
within federal SES performance plans. In line with the current duties and functions of 
SES members, there would be a measure of success encouraging outreach to external 
constituencies (i.e., Congress, state and local governments, interest groups, the media, 
etc.) through participation in collective networks experimenting and/or innovating in the 
design, alignment, use, and communication of public performance information. The 
factor would be added to the existing elements (i.e., leading change, leading people, 
business acumen, building coalitions, and results driven), and be fulfilled in collaboration 
with all appropriate internal agency offices (i.e., Congressional affairs, public affairs, 
etc.) in compliance with current OMB policy governing the engagement of unelected 
government officials with external public partners and stakeholders. 
(2) COLLABORATE #2. Encourage Internal Agency 
Communication, Collaboration, Outreach between PIOs, and Congressional and Public 
Affairs Liaisons—The federal PIO and staff should establish, long-term, collaborative 
working relationships with the agency’s internal Legislative and Public Affairs Offices in 
order to better embrace the power of politics and public messaging as positive rather than 
negative forces impacting the performance management discipline. Rapprochement 
between these networks would assist performance practitioners in two ways: (1) better 
understanding and reconciling the different interpretations of success defined by elected 
and non-elected public officials, public and private partners and stakeholders, including 
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average citizens; and (2) communicating departmental performance progress in terms that 
can be easily understood and embraced by these various groups, particularly 
Congressional leaders and the general public.  
Through such collaboration, performance management 
practitioners would also be in a better position to adopt plain language that non-
performance staff can better relate to. Agency progress and success against goals and 
objectives would be communicated in a standard performance or business nomenclature 
that minimized government jargon, yet still respected the overarching policy and 
priorities of both the legislative and executive branches. The common standardized 
language could then be used to communicate with Congress and the public through 
various mandatory and optional forums, such as the OMB public website, 
Performance.gov, Congressional reports, annual performance and accountability 
reports/updates, and/or additional two-way, interactive means of communicating with 
government officials at the state, local, and tribal levels.  
(3) COLLABORATE #3. Apply the Innovative (Democratic) 
Networked Governance Principle of Crowd-Sourcing at the State and Local/Tribal Levels 
to Advance the DHS Mission—Performance management, or measuring progress toward 
strategy achievement, is based on established frameworks and processes (such as the 
GPRA-MA of 2010 and the OMB Circular A-11). As such, it is not a “wicked problem.” 
Actual performance improvement, however, is, and will require much more innovative, 
outside of the box solutions, involving the free flow of information and creative ideas. In 
partnership and close collaboration with national Congressional representatives and State 
and local/tribal leaders, PIO, Congressional and public affairs staff should establish DHS 
information campaigns meant to educate and mentor local communities, both individuals 
and groups (i.e., businesses and non-profits), regarding the DHS mission set, its current 
programs, projects and activities. In line with the principles of true democratic 
governance, these “DHS 101 Seminars” would contribute to maintaining the federal 
government’s covenant with citizens and communities by going beyond the current one-
way public communication initiatives that simply “market” the DHS brand. In addition to 
communicating how DHS programs contribute to securing the homeland, at a much more 
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granular and interactive level than the current public-facing ICTs we are using today, this 
new type of two-way, interactive means of communicating with officials at the state, 
local, and tribal levels, would provide specific suggestions, according to a pre-established 
democratic governance framework explaining how individuals and organizations within 
local communities can contribute to the DHS mission. This framework would be 
comprised of several outreach efforts or events, such as attending town hall or 
neighborhood council meetings, participating in public surveys and focus groups, serving 
on boards, commissions, and oversight committees, sponsoring initiatives, and/or 
volunteering, all representing opportunities for the public to directly participate in the 
affairs of government. This public socialization of the DHS mission would include step-
by-step instructions along with supporting material/references on how individuals and 
organizations within local communities can get more involved in DHS strategic planning 
and decision making. See also recommendation [Create #1]: Apply the Innovative 
(Democratic) Networked Governance Principle of Co-Creation at the State and 
Local/Tribal Levels to Advance the DHS Mission. 
2. Compete 
Two (2) 
CVF Archetype Emphasis Organizational Focus Social Complexity 
COMPETE Rational Goals External/Focused Control/Prescriptive 
 
Tools or techniques, such as competitiveness, fast response, decisiveness, driving 
through barriers, or goal achievement (i.e., short-term performance, doing things fast), 
have been placed under the lower right quadrant. 
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Figure 5.  CVF Archetype: Compete 
COMPETITION in the world of social complexity theory means winning, but 
only as co-members, or equal partners on a team, where everyone has been granted equal 
access to information in an attempt to collectively mold policy. Opinions are swayed and 
decision-makers persuaded through open communication and sound argumentation, 
based on widely accepted assumptions built and interpreted through inclusive dialogue. 
The terms typically associated with competition, such as “autocratic leadership and 
culture,” “personal ambition,” “Machiavellian cunning and duplicity/manipulation,” and 
“political savvy,” are shunned to the preference of other more egalitarian concepts, such 
as “interactive empowerment,” “personal responsibility,” “mutual contribution,” 
“authenticity and legitimacy,” and “openness and shared control.” Moving up is 
synonymous with doing good work (together). 
a. Compete Recommendations  
(1) COMPETE #1: Select the PIO/Deputy PIO Based on 
Factors of Trust—The Act stipulates that the federal PIO can either be a career or non-
career (i.e., political) member of the SES. However, because of the importance the 
GPRA-MA places on the contributions of this particular leader to create a positive 
learning and performance improvement culture, overseeing all agency performance-
related activities, it is extremely important that the PIO and/or Deputy PIO be known by 
those within his/her existing organization, and already enjoy high-trust from peers, 
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colleagues and those hierarchically above and below. If people do not know and/or trust 
the PIO/Deputy PIO, based on a combination of previously demonstrated character and 
competence, then their attitude toward the GPRA-MA and the overarching discipline of 
strategic performance management will be affected as well. Their positive or negative 
disposition toward the mandate’s principle change management agent, can either impede 
implementation of the Act, or cause it to be seen as a force multiplier within the agency.  
In addition, these trusted administrators would need to be placed in 
positions that are sufficiently hierarchically influential to affect real change, such as 
through the establishment of a centralized office of strategic performance management 
reporting directly to the CEO or his/her equivalent. Power influences implementation and 
execution, setting the tone, and can be positive (i.e., encouraging bottom-up congruence), 
or negative (i.e., forcing top-down compliance). The personality and approach of the 
PIO/Deputy PIO should display an understanding and respect of internal culture. Trust is 
equally important, and when combined with power, can prove invaluable to leaders of 
organizations, both external political appointees and internal career executives, 
possessing only one, but not the other characteristic. Trust allows others to lead and 
manage based on subject matter expertise, not hierarchical position, helping organizations 
find that elusive “sweet spot” between centralization and decentralization, control and the 
free flow of information, thus minimizing the unnecessary territoriality and stove-piping 
that often impedes true innovation and change.  
(2) COMPETE #2: Develop Innovative Networked (Meta-) 
Governance Leadership Training for Federal PIOs and Staff—The OPM and OMB 
should work with agencies to develop and deliver strategic and innovative leadership 
training for federal PIOs and their staffs. Emphasizing the “soft” (i.e., culture, beliefs, 
relationships, etc.) components of strategic leadership and management, this training 
would supplement and build on the “hard” performance management and improvement 
training requirements associated with the five (5) focus areas outlined in the GPRA-MA, 
and articulated around the formal structure and hierarchy of the OMB PMF, its 
governance structures, control systems, and processes. 
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Because traditional leaders tend to contribute to status quo, 
whereas more collaborative leaders can change mindsets and paradigms, it is important to 
select and develop “innovative” leaders capable of focusing on the unique nature of 
strategic vision and system-wide decision making, as opposed to only the short-term, 
stove-piped, day-to-day operations. Such an innovative performance manager/practitioner 
educational framework, therefore, would impart and nurture executive-leadership styles 
at the strategic, tactical and operational levels, and include topics, such as conceptual and 
behavioral complexity, strategic management, visionary/inspirational leadership 
practices, and meta-governance tactics. Up and coming leaders should increasingly 
demonstrate a preference for meta-governance, abandoning the traditional top-down, 
closed loop, governance structures prevalent in today’s public sector.  
This training, specifically targeting PIOs and their staff, could then 
be supplemented by additional, similarly focused training for senior staff and program 
managers, emphasizing parallel skill sets at the tactical and operational levels, also 
conducive to more innovative and creative leadership. OMB and the PIC could work 
together to outline minimum requirements for the training, along with standard tools and 
templates, that agencies could customize, tailoring the approaches to fulfill their 
individual requirements. Minimum requirements would focus on communicating the true 
face of leadership, which is no longer hierarchical, but vertical, no longer one-directional, 
but a reflection of “relational webs” of “network power” where complex problems are 
resolved through interdependent and interactive dialogue.  
The main purpose of the PIO/Deputy PIO leadership training 
would be to develop “next generation” leaders that recognize the importance and utility 
of transitioning from the current centralized top-down, command-and-control 
management model, primarily rational and directive, where power is mostly concentrated 
at the top and unhealthy for organizations, to one that prefers decentralized “leaders 
among peers,” trusted, inspirational, emotionally intelligent, and capable of adeptly 
applying collaborative skill sets to ambiguous, complex adaptive systems.  
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(3) COMPETE #3: Develop and Communicate Government 
Performance Information Tailored to the People—If true knowledge management means 
producing, analyzing and communicating information in ways that create true value to 
end users and consumers, then public-facing performance data should provide context 
and meaning to average citizens and/or their representatives. If government performance 
management practitioners are unable to package the public information mandated by the 
GPRA-MA in ways that satisfy the expectations and needs of the American people, then 
it has failed in its purpose to ensure transparency of government operations in the spirit of 
true fiscal and performance accountability.  
We have developed several recommendations, articulated around 
six (6) key attributes of performance reporting,198 to ensure that the federal government’s 
performance measure development and reporting processes are serving and satisfying the 
taxpayer, transparently communicating public policy and its effects as a means to gain 
and maintain public trust.  
• Attribute #1: Consistency and comparability in performance reporting 
structures 
The United States’ federalist system of checks and balances makes it particularly 
difficult to reconcile national decision making with the strategic direction of state and 
local administrations.  
We should focus on finding that hybrid “sweet spot” between federal government 
centralization and state and local decentralization, working to establish a clearer line of 
sight between investments in national goals and objectives and the assessment of the 
impact of those investments at more local levels. Effort should be made to reflect results 
in annual performance reports by displaying logical relationships between a federal 
agency’s inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes, at the higher level, and the actual 
benefit to local communities and municipalities, at the second and tertiary levels. Even 
though logic models are currently being used by public administrators to align agency 
resources, programs, and activities to achieve national strategic goals, there is very little 
effort to demonstrate how the achievement of such strategy is actually impacting 
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American lives at the state and local levels. We should concentrate on reconciling 
executive and legislative branch goals and decision making, with the needs and desires of 
the American public, which are most often expressed locally. 
Government officials should work to ensure greater linkages and collaboration 
between those who shape policy (i.e., legislative branch) and those who execute it (i.e., 
executive branch), while establishing the necessary mechanisms for a clearer articulation 
and understanding of federal intent at both the state and local levels. Tangible, 
measurable results from these national-level investments should also appear in the annual 
performance reports of state and local governments, demonstrating how federal programs 
are specifically enhancing individual communities throughout the nation. 
• Attribute #2: Inclusion of qualitative narrative to accompany quantitative 
performance indicators 
There is a preponderance of ways to improve decision making through detailed 
program explanations and supporting data in government financial and performance 
reports. Narratives should be much more granular, display the immediate benefit of 
government programs, and be written in language and terms easily understandable by the 
general populace. In other words, the information should be more educational in nature, 
as opposed to the simple information sharing formula predominant in the majority of the 
government’s current public-facing performance and accountability reports.  
Even more important is providing information on ways citizens can get more 
involved with their local representatives and/or public officials, reaching out to those who 
are actually responsible for the government program results contained in the performance 
plans and reports, in order to perhaps proactively influence better outcomes. Getting 
average citizens, and other impartial/independent stakeholders, more involved in 
government affairs and operations would create an environment conducive to greater 
political and administrative accountability, for both policy makers and executors.  
Officials can borrow some of the suggested mechanisms, provided in the current 
literature and captured in several of these recommendations, to continually and 
proactively strengthen and sustain a more open, transparent, and participative relationship 
between public administrators and average citizens, by involving the latter in 
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performance measure goal development and evaluation of success. Indeed, offering more 
information of an educational nature on government public websites, as well as working 
to elicit and communicate public expectations regarding specific government programs to 
legislative and executive branch officials would ensure greater accountability from 
nationally elected and appointed representatives. 
• Attribute #3: Existence of clearly identified outcome measures 
Provide public-facing outcome narratives and supporting performance indicators 
communicating the results and contributions of government programs at a more granular 
level, by disaggregating data according to demographic, geographic, or other relevant 
characteristics, highlighting significant variations to pinpoint problems and identify 
possible solutions. 
Greater effort should be made to ensure that Americans understand how success is 
being achieved and/or what specific challenges are preventing success, so that they can 
evaluate for themselves the efficacy of the strategic direction adopted by their leaders, as 
well as the strategies government officials are adopting to improve success. 
Agencies should be encouraged to articulate at least three (3) types of public-
oriented objectives and associated performance indicators in their annual performance 
plans and reports: 
• Outcome objectives, reflecting citizen expectations; 
• Service quality objectives, reflecting the expectations of the end users of 
public services; and 
• Management efficiency (i.e., cost saving) objectives, addressing taxpayer 
concerns. 
Including objectives and associated performance indicators, related to the 
(re)allocation of inputs or activities within programs, and linking them with the 
achievement of overarching priorities should be included in annual performance plans 
and reports.  
This detailed data at the national level should be reproduced by state and 
municipal governments in order to display connectivity with local-level strategic plans, 
priorities, budgets and performance results. 
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• Attribute #4: Availability of both target and baseline data to guide 
assessment(s) over time 
Everyone agrees that U.S. performance reports do rather well when it comes to 
presenting established targets and baseline data, displaying up to five years of previous 
performance, and stressing the importance of communicating trends and not simply target 
achievement. 
However, and perhaps due to the greater volatility of the American political 
landscape, the United States is less adept at displaying the potential and actual impact of 
new legislation on performance results. 
The United States should develop more sophisticated continuity of operations 
planning and implementation guidelines, based on established protocol and processes, 
capable of weathering the frequent changes in elected and bureaucratic leadership and the 
resulting shift in strategic direction, without impeding the logical continuity of public 
performance reporting. Without such continuity, continuous improvement becomes an 
impossible fallacy.  
• Attribute #5: Good formatting/presentation and effective use of 
technology platforms 
The most focus and progress made in the recent past pertains to use of technology 
to support the consumers of performance information. In particular, Performance.gov, the 
federal government’s centralized web portal, which provides results of government 
programs in a structured and consistent format, is helpful to sift through the mass of data 
currently available. Performance.gov is also increasingly providing hot links to other 
websites that contain additional information on the outcome area under scrutiny.  
Next steps could include providing easy access to relevant databases and systems-
generated analysis and reports, effectively presented and formatted, without having to 
rely on government information technology or other subject matter experts, thus further 
streamlining these types of one-way information flows to the American public.199  
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Likewise, developing more refined administrative processes that produce 
improved inter- and intra-agency collaboration, communication and coordination would 
contribute to reconciling the disparate performance monitoring and reporting systems. 
The goal is to provide the American public with a common operating picture of overall 
government performance, as opposed to the stove-piped performance reporting processes 
coming from individual agencies, currently in place.  
Most importantly, performance information should be placed in context and 
tailored to the needs of each particular audience, by constantly asking the “so what” 
question: What does the indicator, measure, number etc. really signify in terms of specific 
actions that can be taken within that particular sphere of influence? The principle is 
simple: if no action/decision is required, then performance information is not required. If 
performance information is not used to make decisions or take action, then it is neither 
important, nor necessary. Providing information for action/decision can be facilitated by 
formatting data in ways that allow it to be quickly and easily understood. In 1986, the 
NASA engineers of the space shuttle Challenger knew that the shuttle was not ready to be 
launched. Prior to countdown, they had produced several analyses containing copious and 
detailed performance data. Yet, this supporting documentation had not been presented in 
a clear, concise way that allowed decision-makers to fully and immediately understand 
the danger. Data needs to be presented in a way that draws attention to what is really 
important, what specifically requires action and/or decision, and this, within the attention 
span of the targeted audience, and in language that is meaningful to them.  
• Attribute #6: Inclusion of output and activity indicators 
The U.S. approach to performance reports in recent times has been to focus 
almost exclusively on outcomes, whereas the majority of actual indicators still appear to 
be output measures. This is because these reports are often being used as accountability 
mechanisms for individual program performance as opposed to providing perspective on 
overarching mission achievement. Nevertheless, good indicators of outputs and activities 
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are helpful in painting a richer description of success, because they allow for a better 
understanding of exactly what went into achieving the overall performance result.200  
Public managers are constantly looking for the appropriate balance between the 
end state and the granular data used to develop and/or inform specific outcome-based 
performance measures. Leadership often hedges outcome targets, due to a lack of a clear 
line of sight between inputs, outputs and outcomes. Because they do not understand what 
actually contributed to success, they are unable to influence the results. Because they feel 
they really cannot impact results, they become less interested in participating in strategic 
performance management exercises in general. With a better understanding of causal 
effect, officials would be more willing to allow higher-level cross-cutting strategic 
measures to collectively reflect their own individual contributions. Likewise, if they 
know exactly how their efforts contributed, they would be more willing to hold 
themselves accountable for achieving results.  
In order to minimize the fear of the loss of control, which prevents collaboration, 
there needs to be greater cross-organizational dialogue and buy-in, necessary for the 
production of true outcome-based measures, and this, from the beginning of the 
performance measure development process.  
To summarize, transparency with external partners/stakeholders is beneficial as 
there is a risk to not being transparent. More information is better. Otherwise, people will 
fill in the blanks with misinformation. Everyone along the performance management 
spectrum has an obligation to ensure the transparency of performance data. In a free 
democratic nation, the public has the right to see full-unclassified data sets pertaining to 
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3. Create 
Three (3) 
CVF Archetype Emphasis Organizational Focus Social Complexity 
CREATE Open Systems External/Flexible Organic/Descriptive 
 
This upper right quadrant suggests tools and techniques focused on innovation, 
creativity, articulating future vision, transformational change, or entrepreneurship (i.e., 
breakthrough, doing things first). 
 
Figure 6.  CVF Archetype: Create 
Social complexity theory would encourage individuals working within this 
archetype to embrace the true meaning of CREATIVITY as “making or bringing into 
existence something new,” rather than the bureaucratic definition of simply adjusting 
existing structures and/or tweaking standard operating procedures and calling them new. 
Creation, seen through the prism of Weberian administration which does not allow for 
uncertainty, is limited to what is already known, tethered to definitive conclusions and 
specific recommendations leading to clear outputs, rather than to what is still undefined 
and evolving, based on contingent conclusions and experimentation, and contributing to  
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greater outcome success.201 True creation first requires that one be flexible, resilient, and 
open to change. “Resilient [innovative, networked] governance, therefore, means not only 
responding to change, but also creating and shaping it.”202  
a. Create Recommendations  
(1) CREATE #1: Apply the Innovative (Democratic) 
Networked Governance Principle of Co-Creation at the State and Local/Tribal Levels to 
Advance the DHS Mission—Building on the information and momentum gained through 
the “DHS 101 Seminars” public outreach and crowd-sourcing campaigns, develop a co-
creative approach to further tap into the valuable perspective that a more limited and 
targeted number of average citizens, business and non-profit leaders, and state and local 
homeland security officials can bring to defining and refining the DHS mission, its 
continually evolving strategy and program solutions. This approach would involve an 
iterative, declassified, public-facing strategic performance management framework, 
mirroring the formal DHS PPBE structure. Based on the concept of value creation 
through open, mutual dialogue, voluntary collaboration, horizontal (versus vertical) 
communication, and sustained long-term working relationships, the framework is meant 
to elicit citizen and other public partner and stakeholder input to better inform and 
communicate the articulation of DHS goals and priorities; the alignment of DHS 
resources to accomplish those goals; and the assessment of progress and results. 
Borrowing from the collaborative rationality approach to negotiation, outlined in the 
book “Getting to Yes,”203 the process would apply the following principles to build 
consensus and reach agreement: separate the people from the problem; focus on interests 
not positions; invent options for mutual gain; insist on using objective criteria; and 
develop a BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement).204 This will entail 
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“[d]ialogue among professionals and other knowledgeable players, […] problem framing, 
selecting information, developing a robust and integrated picture of the issues from 
multiple perspectives, and choosing [a long-term] strategy [best tailored to meet the 
needs of each individual].205  
For such a framework to work in practice, involving stakeholders 
at all levels, current DHS goals and objectives should be developed/revised using an 
achieving end-state, rather than incremental, mind-set. Strategy should be developed, not 
through a single, one-time or even multiple-time discussion(s) with the public, but rather 
as setting the stage for a successful long-term exchange toward the attainment of long-
term success. The overriding goal here would be to establish real working relationships 
through ongoing and mutually sustained dialogue in environments of ease and trust where 
external stakeholders are afforded the opportunity to use their electoral and 
administrative voices to better understand and contribute to the resolution of homeland 
security-related problems.  
Revising strategic planning processes in such a way would ensure 
buy-in and support from multiple sources, and contribute to communicating a consistent 
message about the strategy’s expected and actual outcomes in a language that is 
meaningful to all stakeholders. In turn, such a dynamic would create a revised and 
acceptable/accepted public message that could actually influence the day-to-day 
negotiations and legislative/executive decision making of national leadership. In other 
words, it would completely change the tone and focus of today’s government 
performance and results dialogue. The American people and not only unaccountable 
public administrators could directly influence the framing of political considerations, 
perhaps mitigating accusations of partisanship and self-interest levied by, and against, 
strategic performance management practitioners within the federal system.  
Most DHS officials are mission focused, often oblivious to self-
seeking political considerations, desiring to do the right thing on a day-to-day basis, 
rather than waiting to be forced to do it eventually through some external compliance 
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process. Such congruence, when coupled with a higher public service calling based on a 
public/private partnership that involved the engagement and collaboration of all 
stakeholders, would make punitive bureaucratic oversight all but unnecessary. When you 
are working directly with people who are counting on you, you will strive to be 
successful, independent of any formal governance structure and/or administrative 
process. The law is for lawbreakers; formal audits and management controls for those 
who do not feel compelled to hold themselves accountable. For those who are intent on 
serving people they personally know and interact with on a daily basis, a more mature, 
interactive systems approach to instilling a culture of accountability would be the most 
appropriate.  
(2) CREATE #2: Create an Innovative (Web-Enabled) 
Networked Community of Practice to Inform DHS Strategy and Performance Measure 
Development—DHS organizational performance management can be reconciled with the 
various definitions of transparency and public accountability through interactive, web-
enabled CoPs, and their supporting ICTs.  
The DHS PIC, in collaboration with OMB, and component 
agencies, should develop interactive web-enabled CoPs that are capable of interfacing 
with all partners and stakeholders along the performance improvement continuum, 
particularly the general public. Building upon the success of the TSA’s IdeaFactory, and 
based on its social media concept expanding the traditional suggestion box, these 
innovative CoPs would create and maintain virtual communities/teams, performance-
based networks and learning forums that go beyond the simple, one-directional, 
information communication technology tool in place today, Performance.gov. This next 
generation ICT-enabled CoP would forge working relationship(s) with average citizens, 
creating an interactive dialogue with them through technology-based knowledge sharing 
environments, all with the express purpose of enhancing the development and 
measurement of DHS strategy. Working with departmental strategic planners and public 
affairs specialists, these collaborative communities would be comprised of a limited and  
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targeted number of state and local homeland security leaders, average citizens and 
business and non-profit leaders from across the nation, as a follow up to the “DHS 101 
Seminars” Crowd-Sourcing and Co-Creation efforts.  
These interactive web-enabled CoPs would foster innovative 
(democratic) networked governance by providing average citizens with a voice to: 
• Talk, educate, and inform each other about the homeland security 
environment and the DHS mission through online communities;  
• Contribute to relevant and important departmental programs and state and 
local homeland security-related priorities; and 
• Provide valuable and impactful public feedback regarding the 
effectiveness and efficiency of DHS strategic goals and measures directly 
to agency headquarters and staff. 
Such an approach would bring civic participation and learning 
back to the forefront, through the cultivation of more productive relationships with the 
general public based on trust and collaboration. Translating crowd-sourcing and co-
creation into networked solutions, creating forums for information and idea exchange, 
these departmental public-facing, web-enabled CoPs would contribute to closing the gap 
in the misconception(s) regarding the DHS mission and its contributions to the safety and 
security of the American people by establishing an on-going dialogue between average 
citizens and public officials. 
Leveraging cross-jurisdictional (i.e., federal, state and local) CoPs, 
and their supporting public-facing ICTs, would allow us to move beyond the current 
status quo of one-directional information sharing, to two-directional knowledge 
management and the communication of shared (i.e., collective) goals involving a 
multiplicity of both public and private stakeholders. It would represent an important first 
step in building public trust, collaboration and cooperation.  
(3) CREATE #3: Leverage Web 2.0 Technologies in Policy 
Development and Decision Making—In ongoing efforts to institutionalize processes that 
establish safe spaces for government officials to create and innovate, agencies should 
work with their internal public affairs and information technology shops, to identify any 
current ongoing efforts to leverage advanced internet technologies and applications 
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including blogs, wikis, RSS, and social bookmarking to better engage constituencies and 
improve the presentation and implementation of specific agency programs.  
The DHS PIO, in partnership with the Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) and appropriate public affairs specialists should identify ways that social media 
can help facilitate crowd-sourcing and co-creative dialogue between “citizens” and 
“public managers,” advancing this specific type of networked democratic governance 
within the department. The White House Office of New Media Technologies has already 
been working with various federal leaders government-wide, figuring out which social 
technologies work best in different circumstances to promote citizen engagement and to 
analyze the feedback they receive directly from the people relative to executive branch 
policy and priorities. Teams can be formed to pilot tailored social media projects capable 
of analyzing data gathered from hundreds of thousands of tweets and/or from other next 
generation communications tools in response to DHS public messaging. Analyses, 
identifying recurring themes, issues, and/or solutions within these communications, could 
then be developed into reports and provided to DHS components charged with 
developing or interpreting policy in specific arenas, for further follow up. Actions could 
include the possible revision of internal agency policy and/or the development of pilot 
initiatives and programs to implement the suggestions, in full compliance with current 
legislation and/or rules and regulations. An Executive Order to federal CIOs, advancing 
Web 2.0 technologies in agency policy development and execution, should be issued to 
ensure that agencies feel empowered to communicate directly with the American people 
in such a way. 
4. Control 
Four (4) 
CVF Archetype Emphasis Organizational 
Focus 
Social Complexity 
CONTROL Internal Processes Internal/Focused Control/Prescriptive 
 
Finally, tools or techniques, focused on assessing and measuring, controlling 
processes, structuring, efficiency improvement, or quality enhancement (i.e., incremental, 
doing things right), have been highlighted in the lower left quadrant. 
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Figure 7.  CVF Archetype: Control 
Social complexity theory is what allows visionaries to use the structured 
environment of the GPRA-MA of 2010 to safely shatter the strict parameters of 
CONTROL, and move away from official government subject matter experts and 
expertise as representing the only road to legitimacy, in order to embrace a more 
inclusive definition of knowledge management involving a multiplicity of stakeholders 
with a wide variety of experience and perspectives. Collaborative planning and decision-
making processes, wherein many kinds of knowledge, including input from lay people, 
should be considered as essential in understanding problems and developing policy 
solutions to them.206 Control, in the context of innovative networked governance, what 
we posit as being the “next new thing” in performance management and improvement, 
does not mean the preparation, monitoring and assessment of detailed policies and 
programs, but rather the establishment and shepherding of flexible governing frameworks 
that mobilize resources and unleash talent. Organizational effectiveness and efficiency 
are merely by-products, not goals in and of themselves, of this new genre of “control.” 
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a. Control Recommendations  
(1) CONTROL #1: Consider A Multiplicity of Program 
Theory Models to Develop Strategy and Measure Performance—Whether an agency opts 
to use the logic model, balanced scorecard, strategy mapping, or a different, uniquely 
tailored alignment methodology to create a clear line of sight between high-level strategic 
goals and individual program and personal contributions, the emphasis should not (only) 
be placed on the linear, step-by-step process of displaying the various simplistic input-
output relationships that exist among the diverse elements contributing to goal and 
measure achievement. Other, less rational, purely Newtonian-based planning concepts 
should come into play as well, allowing for more than the simple and rather limited 
compilation of detailed program action plans. Alternate options would include the 
development of counterintuitive governance frameworks that mobilize a diversity of 
players and remove all obstacles to greater collaboration. In order to determine whether 
we are doing the right things, and not simply doing things the right way, program 
decision-making models should allow for a multiplicity of perspectives that challenge the 
status quo, not simply regurgitate quantitative, “objective” data to sell strategy that has 
already been decided upon, or justify the allocation of resources that have already been 
applied. Ultimately, program theory models and empirically based problem-solving 
methodologies should be able to translate past knowledge into future action, not only past 
action into current knowledge. 
(2) CONTROL #2: Develop Innovative (Collaborative) 
Networked Performance Measurement and Evaluation Methodologies—In order to 
minimize distrust in executive branch analytical products, and ensure that they are 
making credible, unbiased representations about how well agencies and programs are 
performing, include a cross-representation of analysts in working groups (i.e., action 
learning forums) dedicated to developing acceptable methodologies and tools that 
improve the overall analytical capability and capacity of the department and 
appropriately define, measure, achieve and communicate what truly constitutes success. 
Genuine independent and objective oversight should be the guiding philosophy in the 
formation of these performance measurement and program evaluation teams, and 
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therefore should be comprised of external subject matter experts from both the public and 
private sectors, such as public/private think tanks, research centers of excellence, 
government management and oversight bodies, external consultants, and/or academia. 
Moreover, whether these measurement and evaluation tools and techniques support 
agency strategic planning processes, resource allocation processes, risk analyses, net 
assessments, modeling capabilities, statistical analyses, and/or data collection and 
verification, they should involve Congressional perspective and expectations up front, at 
the beginning of both the development and analytical processes, as opposed to the 
approach currently in place, which primarily involves simple information gathering 
and/or after-the-fact inquiry.  
(3) CONTROL #3: Reform the Congressional Authorization 
and Appropriations Processes and Budget-Performance Frameworks—The current DHS 
appropriations accounting structure still reflects a patchwork collection of legacy, pre-
9/11 appropriation accounts associated with individual components formerly organized as 
independent agencies or components of other departments. This means that resources still 
continue to flow to separate organizational elements, with their own unique cultures and 
stove-piped mission sets, as opposed to a single department, the chimerical “One-DHS,” 
possessing the “power of the purse” to develop plans, apply taxpayer dollars and 
understand performance results from longer term, strategic, cross-cutting perspectives. 
Without further consolidation in this arena to better communicate legislative performance 
expectations, DHS will continue to be hobbled in its ability to establish integrated 
strategic planning, resource allocation, execution oversight, and reporting processes, all 
of which are necessary to mature the homeland security enterprise in the most 
transparent, accountable, efficient and effective way possible.  
As the legislative and executive branches work to reconcile their 
competing and often contradictory agendas and priorities, Congress should consider 
consolidating the DHS appropriations structure in order to facilitate departmental 
comparisons of impact based on like costs across components and offices. This would  
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increase the department’s cross-organizational analytic capability and capacity and help 
DHS leadership better understand the implications of its strategic planning and resource 
allocation decisions.  
First, greater emphasis needs to be placed on cross-cutting strategy 
at both the Congressional and OMB levels to encourage more inter- and intra-
organizational alignment and collaborative performance planning. The GPRA-MA can be 
used to develop broad national goals and objectives along with associated accountability 
mechanisms to eliminate duplication, fragmentation, and/or redundancy of government 
programs. Congress would, therefore, be acting more like a board of directors, telling 
agencies what to do, but not necessarily how to do it. More efforts to ensure government-
wide strategic clarity and organizational alignment could then be made at the OMB level, 
where there is sufficient authority to canalize the “messiness” of such collaboration.  
Next, Congress, OMB Resource Management Offices (RMOs) and 
the PIC, and agencies could work together to develop pilot projects involving multi-year 
budget periods to allow programs to focus on long-term investments and adjust spending 
over time to improve short-term performance. This may require working with Congress 
to develop legislation and ensure continuity that allows for longer term budgeting.  
Currently, there is a disconnect between the GPRA-MA and DHS’ 
solution to implement it: PPBE. GPRA performance goals and measures tend to be 
shorter term (1-1/2 to 2 years) and politically driven to coincide with annual 
Congressional and administrative priorities. This has resulted in a bi-furcated 
performance planning and reporting structure within DHS and its Components, where 
GPRA-mandated measures are often considered to be no more than simplistic statements 
of what DHS is or wants to be in the eyes of the public, but not fully representative of the 
complexity of the DHS mission space nor sufficiently granular to measure and manage its 
discrete responsibilities. As a result, there are, in practice, two sets of measures within the 
department and its various components: 
• Public-facing GPRA measures, meant to “prove success,” that are short-
term, aligned with a Congressional budget framework and political 
appointees trying to make their mark within a limited 2–4 year timeframe; 
and 
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• Internal agency measures, meant to “improve performance,” that are 
longer-term, aligned with agency 4–6 year strategic, tactic and operational 
planning and program/front-line managers looking for data to inform 
specific policy and resource allocation decisions.  
Both Congress and OMB in acknowledging this less-than-ideal 
situation should work to better leverage the GPRA-MA to find the right balance between 
these macro- and micro-levels of strategic performance management. Purposeful effort 
will need to be made to link the development of higher, national level goals and their 
associated GPRA performance measures, with the more granular, prescriptive data, 
developed by the operators within each individual agency, based on the SMART 
objectives associated with their internal strategic planning and budgeting processes. This 
would also ensure that agency GPRA performance measures are not divorced from their 
longer-term strategic plans and simply aligned to individual short-term public-facing 
programs, solely based on Congressional/OMB interest. Improved collaboration between 
Congress and OMB would also allow for agencies to modify/adapt the goals and 
measures that they are actually using to manage and that accurately reflect real progress 
on the ground, to better inform the public in terms that are relevant to them. 
This would go a long way in eliminating the disjoint between the 
nation’s political leadership, being held directly accountable to the people, and its 
unelected administrative officials, interpreting legislation through their day-to-day 
operations and discrete, opaque decision making.  
It is time to make better progress in this arena. The 9/11 
Commission Report stated it succinctly: “Good people can overcome bad structures. 
They should not have to.”207  
C. CONCLUSION 
We have linked the theoretical conceptualization of public and organizational 
accountability with the GPRA-MA of 2010, in order to allow DHS leaders and 
performance management and improvement practitioners to experience a paradigm shift 
                                                 
207 Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Authorized Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2004), 399. 
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in the way they consider and apply strategic performance management within the DHS. 
Such a rapprochement, however, is still not sufficient to instill a culture of accountability 
at the department. 
Absence trust, or giving and getting the benefit of the doubt, government officials, 
both elected and unelected, will continue to default to the traditional governance styles 
they already know and depend upon.  
This thesis has provided a public accountability, or public trust, framework based 
on innovative (democratic) networked governance, or meta-governance. 
We have reviewed the reasons for, as well as the benefits of, such an approach. 
We have answered our over-overarching fundamental research question. Namely, how 
has the lack of true public and organizational accountability rendered the GPRA-MA of 
2010 ineffective and what can the DHS do to instill a culture of greater accountability, or 
increased trust, by better leveraging the Act toward such a goal? 
We have discussed the current condition of strategic performance management 
within the department and how the five (5) cultural conditions, primarily the lack of trust, 
have rendered the GPRA-MA ineffective.  
We have seen the cost of this situation, how it is preventing the improvement and 
communication of DHS performance and results, as well as the negative consequence 
these inadequate performance management practices are having on DHS mission 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
Finally, we’ve proposed remedies within the framework of the GPRA-MA of 
2010, applying strategic performance management best practices and social complexity 
theory to create, then cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e., a high-trust culture) both 
intra- and inter-agency, and vis-à-vis the public at large. 
Our “next-generation” solution proposed in these recommendations, spotlighting 
innovative-networked governance, will ameliorate all five (5) of the cultural conditions 
affecting performance management and improvement, alleviating deficiencies in all five 
(5) GPRA-MA focus areas, by: 
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• Focusing on collaboration as a means to diffuse and redistribute power 
and leverage the almost limitless capabilities of an almost equally limitless 
pool of talent; 
• Redefining competition to ensure that inclusive dialogue and teamwork 
are indeed force multipliers and that two (or three, or four, etc.) minds are 
truly better than one when it comes to finding solutions;  
• Unleashing true creativity by freeing it from the limits of Weberian and 
Newtonian paradigms; and 
• Shattering the myth that machine-like control automatically results in 
greater effectiveness and efficiency.  
We have seen how these social complexity theory epistemologies and principles 
can be practically applied to: 
• Overcome resistance to change and stagnation through greater leadership 
and management engagement, committed to transforming standard 
working groups into performance-focused action learning forums creating 
momentum toward continuous improvement;  
• Eliminate confusion and doubt concerning leadership motive and intent, 
by seeing complexity and unpredictability, not as overwhelming 
challenges, but as opportunities to discover more participative ways of 
achieving strategic clarity and organizational alignment, of reaching 
consensus, and gaining external stakeholder confidence in the homeland 
security enterprise; 
• Translate the inconsistency and indecision which currently characterizes 
agency performance measurement and evaluation functions into analytical 
products that enjoy greater credibility and legitimacy, leading to improved 
intra- and inter-agency collaboration; 
• Replace the current indifference and passivity toward performance reviews 
with motivation for and initiative toward more innovative management 
dialogue and cross-organizational interaction and collaboration; and 
finally, 
• Reconcile organizational performance accountability with public trust by 
applying transparent and democratic meta-governance structures, systems 
and processes, turning current public criticism and conflict into greater 
optimism and contribution to the homeland security mission overall.  
Moving toward trust, or giving and getting the benefit of the doubt, should be the 
one overriding factor determining success or failure. In a world increasingly 
characterized by uncertainty, diversity and interdependence, traditional institutional  
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sources of trust can no longer be taken for granted. They are being displaced by the 
requirement to earn respect and confidence through genuine dialogue and mutually 
responsive and beneficial relationships.  
Innovative-networked governance offers a way to confront the declining trust in 
government institutions and practices, by ensuring that public accountability is truly 
based on a social relationship between two parties that expect promises to be kept. In 
other words, innovative-networked governance can bring us back to our original 
definition of accountability as the single most important driving factor of any legitimate 
government performance and results framework, one that belongs to the people and is 
social in nature. 
The GPRA-MA performance accountability framework and federal government 
strategic performance management, will either be of the people, for the people, and by 
the people, or it will have failed in its premise to ensure true accountability within public 
administration. It will remain directionless, confusing, vague, unaffecting and 
disregarded.  
As career civil servants, currently being held accountable to other government 
elites, rather than directly to the American people, it is easy to ignore this evolving 
government-citizen interaction dynamic, the one defining philosophy of true public 
service, that of being held accountable to our fellow citizens and their increasing 
vociferous demand to be heard in the halls of national power.  
No taxation without representation…  
As unelected government officials, who do not like change, neither anticipating 
nor preparing for it, we appreciate being insulated from directly experiencing cultural 
shifts and changes in public mindset in the daily execution of our duties. 
Change, nevertheless, is coming. Indeed, it is already here.  
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VIII. IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP 
In their bestselling book entitled Switch: How to Change Things When Change is 
Hard, authors Chip and Dan Heath argue that the primary obstacle to making lasting 
change in our lives and communities issues from a conflict built into our brains, into our 
very nature. Pulling from research in psychology, sociology, biology, and other fields, 
they maintain that our minds are ruled by two different systems: the rational and the 
emotional. The rational mind (i.e., the “rider”) understands and accepts the utility, 
necessity and often times the inevitability of change, whereas the emotional will (i.e., the 
“elephant”) seeks comfort in the routine and the familiar. This dichotomy produces a 
natural tension in people’s hearts and minds. This tension can be overcome by applying 
pressure at various “stress” points. New “patterns” or “habits” can then be created, 
transforming the old emotional into the new rational (i.e., the elephant becomes the rider), 
with change following rather quickly.208 
The GPRA-MA of 2010 is currently being used to apply pressure at various stress 
points to affect change in government effectiveness and efficiency (i.e., performance).  
As the focus of a research topic, the GPRA-MA of 2010 can be studied to 
demonstrate how the federal government is working to ensure that today’s government 
programs are helping us to achieve long-term results in the greater public interest. The 
GPRA-MA of 2010, in fact, proposes a way to do this through the development and 
implementation of a five-prong approach or strategy. Our “SWITCH” authors call this 
“Pointing to the Destination.”  
The vision of the GPRA-MA of 2010 is not complicated. It is quite simple. The 
government should be able to clearly, consistently and correctly demonstrate its 
challenges and success to internal and external stakeholders, particularly the American 
public.  
                                                 
208 Chip Heath and Dan Heath, Switch: How to Change Things When Change is Hard (New York: 
Broadway Books, 2010).  
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In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the need to deliver the same quality 
of services with less money (i.e., work more efficiently) is widely acknowledged. There 
is no longer a need to establish these Values, describing why this matters to create a sense 
of urgency. We have found the ‘Feeling’ (i.e., SWITCH). GPRA-MA is, in fact, proof of 
that. Rather than yesterday’s “Why,” the question being asked today is “How.”  
“Why” can be defined in terms of results or “measurable deliverables” that can be 
achieved through the implementation of the GPRA-MA: Better informed policy, strategic 
planning, resource allocation, investment and human resource management decisions. 
Indeed, by improving our analytical capability to make better-informed decisions, we will 
improve operations, and ultimately, results.  
“How” can include specific actions, such as (1) socializing GPRA-MA of 2010, 
OMB and department requirements and frameworks, constantly communicating for buy-
in; (2) empowering action that enables good performance management practices at all 
levels (i.e., strategic-, tactical-, operational); (3) scheduling discussions/demonstrations of 
other agencies best practices; and (4) creating quick wins through effective change 
management teams.  
All of this has been done already, and even rather well. We have just drawn 
attention to existing literature, volume upon volume, discussing the GPRA-MA and the 
overarching subject of strategic performance management, both in terms of official 
government policy, as well as private industry best practices, and how to practically 
apply them to improve government organizational performance. 
Defining and achieving true public accountability, defined as public trust, on the 
other hand, is still largely unchartered territory.  
Making sure elected and appointed officials keep their word and deliver on their 
promises is a much better focus for a research topic. Here, there is no clearly defined 
vision. There are conflicting, often contradictory values. There is no real urgency. And 
with regards to results, few have told us what specific actions to perform to get there, or 
how to know it when we do. 
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A.  CURRENT STATE, GAP ANALYSIS AND END STATE 
Placing the GPRA-MA of 2010 with its agenda to improve mission and program 
outcomes, or performance results, within the greater context of public accountability, we 
have made practical suggestions on how to apply the various aspects of the GPRA-MA to 
instill a culture of accountability at the DHS in answer our original research questions. 
Our goal was to move beyond the status quo, to go beyond the current practice of 
adopting simple solutions to tackle the complex problems relating to strategic planning 
and decision making, and instead identify alternative approaches more meaningful to end 
users at all levels of the performance improvement continuum. 
Our approach/solution was to adopt an emerging philosophy/strategy based on 
innovative networked governance to creatively implement the GPRA-MA of 2010, by 
asking public servants to associate what they do in their daily professional lives with 
public accountability, and this, always with the implicit, unspoken desire of the American 
public to be heard, to be active participants in the decisions of their government. This 
thesis project was meant to proactively respond to the changing attitude relative to public 
accountability, determine how these changes to the existing cultural climate of 
government-citizen interaction is influencing the current field of federal government 
strategic performance management and make recommendations on how to best navigate 
in this quickly evolving landscape.  
We have attempted to explain and validate the premise that the GPRA-MA of 
2010, similar to most traditional strategic performance management frameworks, is 
failing to impact DHS performance and results. We demonstrated this current lack of 
success by highlighting deficiencies signaled by federal government performance 
practitioners in all five (5) of the legislation’s major focus areas. 
We have shown that without sufficient leadership engagement/commitment to 
instill a performance improvement culture through positive learning and interactive cross-
organizational collaboration, the various hierarchical, cultural and traditional forces  
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within the DHS organizations will continue to accept inadequate performance 
management frameworks limited by group think, preferring common practices over best 
practices.  
Even though language within the GPRA-MA mandate has attempted to alleviate 
challenges associated with the lack of connectivity among agency plans and performance 
results, DHS programs and initiatives continue to be plagued by competing, and often 
contradictory priorities, unintentional gaps and duplicative or redundant efforts. We have 
outlined a few measures that would ensure that the current top-down, prescriptive, and 
stove-piped approaches to strategic planning and reporting are being counter-balanced by 
efforts to embrace more descriptive, bottom-up solutions based on a better understanding 
of the complexities of the homeland security environment.  
Closing the gap in this area will require moving beyond the current practice of 
simply producing performance information, but not using it in any management and 
operational decision making. Effectively, decision making should be influenced by how 
emerging strategy is actually impacting program performance as opposed to basing 
decisions on purely political considerations and/or negotiated compromise. This can only 
be accomplished when sound program evaluation methodologies, undergirded by valid 
and verified performance measurement analytics, are applied and communicated through 
relevant, engaging, adaptive and inquisitive learning forums (i.e., successful data-driven 
performance review sessions).  
Finally, communicating and reporting transparent performance information will 
require replacing current compliance reporting frameworks hampered by unnecessary 
DHS bureaucratic complexity with true accountability structures supported by sound 
governance processes that ensure sufficient input, feedback and follow-up, involving a 
variety of stakeholders, including the general public.  
Addressing these various competency and capability gaps in the performance 
management discipline will entail gaining and sustaining leadership engagement and 
commitment, creating a results-oriented performance management culture, fostering  
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collaboration and alignment, gaining timely access to accurate qualitative and 
quantitative data, obtaining organizational buy-in, and most importantly, working to 
ensure a better public understanding of how DHS works. 
The GPRA-MA of 2010, as a typical government PMF, may satisfy the needs of 
public administrators responsible for implementing government programs through a 
rather mechanistic “operationalization” of performance management, but more 
innovative, less traditional approaches to strategic planning and implementation will need 
to be considered if a high-trust culture, necessary to achieve lasting results, is to be 
instilled.  
Today, because the GPRA-MA framework primarily associates accountability 
with improved organizational outcomes, or performance results, the overarching cultural 
climate or conditions contributing to true public and organizational accountability still 
remain largely unaffected. In addition to the main accountability factor, other conditions 
are undermining strategic performance management as well, such as the particular 
challenges/difficulties encountered when attempting to resolve performance 
management/improvement issues, the administrative/bureaucratic tendency to direct and 
control, undue political influence, and insufficient administrative and management 
governance and oversight.  
We have, therefore, made several recommendations on how to leverage the 
legislation in a way that affects change in both attitude and behavior, alleviating not only 
the identified deficiencies in its major focus areas, but also mitigating the negative effects 
of the current environmental conditions that contribute to the lack of the creation and 
sustainment of a high-trust culture.  
The crosswalk on the following page vertically displays where each of the twelve 
(12) recommendations would positively impact these five (5) focus areas and cultural 
conditions, horizontally demonstrating interdependencies between the various CVF 
categories and activities that can lead us from the current state to the desired end state. 
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 CVF Quadrants 
GPRA-MA Focus Areas/ 
Cultural Conditions 
Collaborate Compete Create Control 























































































































































































































































GPRA-MA #1: Leadership Engagement and Collaboration 
and Learning and Improvement  X   X X   X     
GPRA-MA #2: Strategic Clarity and Organizational 
Alignment   X X    X X  X  X 
GPRA-MA #3: Performance Measurement and Program 
Evaluation       X X  X X  
GPRA-MA #4: Performance Reviews  X    X    X   
GPRA-MA #5: Transparency and Accountability X  X   X X X X  X  
Cultural Condition #1: Accountability/High-Trust X  X   X X X X  X  
Cultural Condition #2: Complexity of Performance 
Management Challenges   X    X X X X   
Cultural Condition #3: Political Considerations  X     X X X   X 
Cultural Condition #4: Administrative Tendency to Direct 
and Control   X  X  X X    X 
Cultural Condition #5: Insufficient Management Oversight     X     X  X 
Table 10.   CVF Cross-Walk with the Five (5) GPRA-MA Focus Areas and Cultural Conditions 
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B.  FUTURE RESEARCH  
In order to develop and implement a deployment roadmap to implement the 
recommendations contained within this thesis, change managers should first conduct a 
gap analysis based on an accurate baseline of capabilities, determining how successful 
each individual agency/component has been in implementing the GPRA-MA to date, 
what the limitations of their current practices might be; and which cultural 
conditions/trends existing within their own agencies need to be affected in order to instill 
a culture of public and organizational accountability.  
Establishing such a capability baseline would assist individual agencies in better 
understanding deficiencies and/or gaps in their existing performance management 
frameworks and practices within the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas, as well as the 
general cultural climate contributing to such deficiencies, and how the ensemble of these 
challenges are practically affecting their current performance management and 
improvement efforts. 
The additional research methodology referenced Appendix C can be modified and 
applied to establish such a performance management/improvement capability baseline in 
view of determining which of the twelve (12) Recommendations might apply, and how 
they can best be tailored to assist agencies transition from current state to end state.  
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APPENDIX A. EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
Systematic measurement of performance has been evolving within the Federal 
Government since the early 1990s. Beginning with the Chief Financial Officers Act of 
1990, meant to improve overall financial and management processes, followed by the 
OMB Bulletin 91-15, Form and Content of Agency Financial Statements, each agency 
was required to produce an audited financial statement, including an overview of its 
mission linked with organizational measures displaying its most significant performance 
results.  
The 1993 GPRA, in line with the underlying Reinventing Government (RIGO) 
philosophy of President Clinton and Vice-President Gore, emphasized the importance of 
clearly defining an end state to promote greater efficiency, effectiveness and 
accountability in federal spending, by requiring for the first time that agencies prepare 
strategic plans, annual performance plans and annual performance reports with 
measurable performance indicators to address the policy, budgeting and (managerial) 
oversight needs of both Congress and agency program managers.  
Before the Act was updated in 2010, the Administration of President George W. 
Bush issued interim policy and guidance, which continued to associate strategy with 
results. Initiated in 2002 and articulated around the four broad themes of program 
purpose and design, strategic planning, program management and program results, the 
PART was a diagnostic tool with a standardized methodology to evaluate every federal 
program at least once every five years. President Bush built upon this analytical 
foundation in his Executive Order (EO) 13450, Improving Government Program 
Performance, dated November 13, 2007, requiring that each agency establish measurable 
goals for each program, identify individuals responsible for achieving these goals, and 
establish the means to measure progress against those goals. The EO also established the 
position of PIO supported by a PIC to oversee agency performance management 
activities. 
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In 1997, the GAO, assessing the effects of the GPRA, noted that “GPRA’s 
requirements have established a solid foundation of results-oriented performance 
planning, measurement, and reporting in the federal government,”209 with “significantly 
more federal managers […] having performance measures for the programs they 
manage.”210 However, even though federal managers surveyed by GAO reported having 
significantly more of the types of performance measures called for by GPRA, there were 
not significant gains in the use of performance information for decision-making.  
Hoping to close this gap, and falling in line with the Bush Administration’s focus 
on program effectiveness and public accountability, the Obama Administration outlined 
its own performance improvement philosophy; first in OMB Memorandum M-09-20, 
Planning for the President’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget and Performance Plan, dated June 
11, 2009, then in OMB Memorandum M-10-24, Performance Improvement Guidance: 
Management Responsibilities and Government Performance and Results Act Documents, 
dated June 25, 2010. 
Transitioning from a planning and compliance reporting approach, focused 
primarily on the production of performance information, to one that would apply such 
information to assess overall results, the President’s performance improvement strategies 





                                                 
209 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Results-Oriented Government GPRA Has Established a 
Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results (GAO 04–38), Washington, DC: GAO, March 2004. 
210 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Lessons Learned for the Next Administration on Using 
Performance Information to Improve Results. 
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• Using performance information to lead, learn and improve outcomes;211 
• Communicating performance coherently and concisely for better results 
and transparency;212 and 
• Strengthening problem-solving networks, inside and outside the 
government, to improve outcomes and performance management 
practices.213 
Emphasizing quality rather than quantity in government performance data, the 
memoranda required that each department and agency identify a limited number of high-
priority performance goals that were quantifiable and measurable. Progress toward these 
goals was to be monitored by senior agency leaders through constructive performance 
review processes. 
 
                                                 
211 In addition to pursuing High-Priority Goals (HPPGs) at the agency level, the Administration said it 
would ask agency leaders to carry out a similar goal-setting exercise at the bureau level in the coming year. 
Both agency leaders and OMB would put in place quarterly feedback and review sessions that are modeled 
after so-called “Stat” efforts in state and local governments. Office of Management and Budget, OMB, 
Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 2011, 73–75. 
212 Office of Management and Budget, OMB, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. 
Government, FY 2011. The Administration said it would “eliminate performance measurements and 
documents that are not useful” and convey information about agency-, cross-agency-, and program-level 
measures. In combined performance plans and reports, the Administration would explain, “why goals were 
chosen, the size and characteristics of problems Government is tackling, factors affecting outcomes that 
Government hopes to influence, lessons learned from experience, and future actions planned.” In an effort 
to make performance data useful to “all audiences—congressional, public, and agency leaders,” a new 
federal performance portal would provide “a clear, concise picture of Federal goals and measures by theme, 
by agency, by program, and by program type.” The portal also would link to “mission-support management 
dashboards.” The dashboards would include the IT Dashboard and “similar dashboards planned for other 
functions including procurement, improper payments, and hiring.” Information about all federal impact 
evaluations would be available through the portal as well.  
213 Office of Management and Budget, OMB, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. 
Government, FY 2011. The Administration planned to use “existing and new practitioner networks,” both 
inside and outside government. To address shared problems, the Administration would create cross-agency 
teams. The PIC, established by Executive Order 13450, would “function as the hub” of the overall network. 
OMB would work with the PIC to “advance a new set of federal performance management principles, 
refine a Government-wide performance management implementation plan, and identify and tackle specific 
problems as they arise.” The PIC, in turn, would establish communities of practice organized by program 
type, problem, and methods.  
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APPENDIX B. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS MODERNIZATION ACT OF 
2010 SCHEMATIC OVERVIEW 
# I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
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APPENDIX C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. RESEARCH METHOD 
The following suggested research method to establish a performance management 
baseline capability within individual DHS organizations and to assist in developing a 
tailored action plan to implement the twelve (12) recommendations contained in this 
thesis, follows the hypothesis-driven multiple, collective case study approach. It consists 
of face-to-face interviews with federal government leaders and subject matter experts 
who have examined accountability issues in the context of strategic performance 
management. The interview process, articulated around the GPRA-MA framework, 
involves various types214 of qualitative research methodologies215.  
B. SAMPLE PARTICIPANTS/SELECTION 
1. Sample Participants 
The researcher can begin by interviewing DHS high-level officials (i.e., GS-14, 
GS-15 and/or SES), subject matter experts in performance management/improvement, 
associated with and/or members of the OMB and/or DHS performance community (i.e., 
OMB/DHS Performance Improvement Council), tasked with implementing the GPRA-
MA of 2010 within and across the federal government, particularly the Department of 
Homeland Security, in order to gain a representative sampling of DHS performance 
relative to the GPRA-MA of 2010. 
2. Sample Selection 
The above non-random sampling procedure is based on purposive or judgment 
sampling.216 This type of non-probability sampling serves as the basis for selecting 
                                                 
214 Types of Research: exploratory, descriptive (i.e., inspectional, syntopical), analytical, explanatory, 
and predictive (i.e., basic, both deductive and inductive).  
215 Research methodologies: multiple, collective case studies, semi-structured interview, judgment 
sampling. 
216 Judgment sampling is a non-probability data collection technique in which the interviewees are 
selected based on their knowledge or experience. It is used to ensure researchers interview interviewees 
with the specific expertise or experience that is under study.  
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interviewees, due to the limited number of people that have expertise in the area being 
researched, and the need to acquire meaningful interview data. The following three (3) 
selection criteria can be used: 
• Initial interviewees can be selected from among the DHS performance 
community (see section 5 below). Because this community is comprised 
of the performance measurement experts representing the components and 
headquarters offices in DHS tasked with the implementation of the GPRA-
MA of 2010, it represents the best forum currently available within DHS 
to elicit diverse perspectives on performance management principles, best 
practices, policy, guidance, and initiatives.  
• The researcher may also seek to interview additional subject matter 
experts within individual DHS agencies and/or other organizations, either 
known to have contributed to the implementation of the GPRA-MA of 
2010 or who routinely develop, use, and rely on performance information 
to increase public and organizational accountability, trust, greater 
awareness, participation, cooperation and collaboration both inter- and 
intra-agency and vis-à-vis the general public; and 
• The researcher should attempt to select experts representing a wide range 
of responsibilities and organizational levels (i.e., staff professionals, first-
line supervisors, office directors, and agency senior management) 
including:  
• Parent organization (i.e., cabinet level departments): Deputy 
Secretary, Office of the Chief of Staff, Offices of Policy, Strategic 
Planning and Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Chief 
Financial Officer, and the Office of the Performance Improvement 
Officer; 
• Sub-Parent organization (i.e., bureaus, offices, components, sub-
agencies): Offices of Policy, Strategic Planning, Program 
Development, and Analysis and Evaluation, Chief of Operational 
Divisions, Office of the Performance Improvement Officer, and 
Director of National Programs; 
• Programmatic Level: Officials responsible for implementing 
programs, programmatic and policy experts, and budget and 
performance analysts. 
C. DATA SOURCES/DATA COLLECTION/PROCEDURES 
1. Data Sources 
Interviews of these federal officials, or government subject matter experts, will 
consist of:  
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• Completion of A Survey Questionnaire: Participants are asked to 
complete a two-part survey questionnaire, articulated around various 
Causes and/or Evidence (CE) (i.e., practices/factors/elements) contributing 
to SPM challenges within the DHS, and five (5) overarching conditions 
(C) also believed to impact GPRA-MA implementation. Duration of Task: 
Approximately 15–30 minutes. 
• Follow-Up Interview: The follow up face-to-face interview would ask 
respondents to clarify and/or elaborate on the responses given in the 
survey questionnaire. The purpose of the interview is two-fold: (a) 
determine the outcome or how successful the interviewees have been in 
implementing the GPRA-MA of 2010 within all five (5) focus areas of the 
legislation, and (b) calculate the corresponding accountability variable or 
how efforts are affecting or being affected by (the lack of) public and 
organizational accountability. Duration of Task: Not to exceed 60 minutes. 
2. Data Collection 
The subjects can opt to complete the survey questionnaire either by e-mail or 
face-to-face. If the subject opts to complete the survey face-to-face, both task one (1) and 
two (2) can be completed at the same time within the one-hour time frame allotted for the 
interview.  
3. Procedures 
Both the two-part survey questionnaire and subsequent semi-structured interview 
are meant to generate insightful information, by delving into the challenges and successes 
of the department’s strategic performance management practices, impacting the 
implementation of the GPRA-MA of 2010.  
The suggested interview questions, found below in section 6, have been 
articulated around the Act’s five (5) focus areas and conditions affecting implementation, 
and crafted based on an inspectional review of official government policy directly 
relating to the GPRA-MA of 2010, and a syntopical research of external strategic 
performance management best practices. The questions have been grouped into 6 broad 
categories: Category I: Questions Relating to GPRA-MA focus area #1: leadership 
engagement, collaboration, learning; Category II: Questions relating to GPRA-MA focus 
area #2: strategic planning, strategic clarity, organizational alignment; Category III: 
Questions relating to GPRA-MA focus area #3: program evaluation, performance 
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measurement; Category IV: Questions relating to GPRA-MA focus area #4: performance 
reviews, improvement; Category V: Questions relating to GPRA-MA focus area #5: 
transparency, decision making, accountability; and Category VI: Questions relating to 
overall conditions impacting GPRA-MA implementation. 
The survey questionnaire, also found below in section 7, asks the following two 
(2) questions meant to validate and/or refute this thesis’ original propositions/hypotheses: 
• Causes and/or Evidence of GPRA-MA Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency: How 
do the following variables in each of the five (5) GPRA-MA Focus Areas 
impede implementation of the Act within your organization? 
• Conditions Contributing to and/or Impacting SPM/GPRA-MA 
Ineffectiveness/ Inefficiency: How do each of the five Conditions impede 
successful SPM and GPRA-MA implementation within your 
organization? 
The ultimate goal of the survey questionnaire and follow-up interview is to better 
understand the DHS performance management culture, how successful DHS has been in 
its implementation of the GPRA-MA of 2010, and how its success and/or failure is 
affecting or being affected by the overall climate of accountability. By culling 
information pertaining to the various GPRA-MA themes and sub-themes (i.e., causes 
and/or evidence and conditions), and drawing valid conclusions from these findings, the 
researcher would be in a better position to begin to determine whether the lack of true 
public and organizational accountability has rendered the GPRA-MA of 2010 ineffective 
at improving and communicating performance and results and what the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) can do to remedy this situation. In other words, the researcher 
would be able to answer the overarching, fundamental research question from the 
perspective of his/her own DHS organization, unit or sub-unit; namely, how can the 
GPRA-MA of 2010 best be leveraged to instill a culture of accountability within the 
department and vis-à-vis the American public by adopting and/or tailoring the twelve 
(12) recommendations listed in Chapter VII.  
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D. TYPE AND MODE OF DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Type and Mode of Analysis 
Closing the gap between the two worlds of federal government SPM/GPRA-MA 
and organizational and public trust within individual organizations, will involve 
conducting in-depth research into the problem and/or issue, and making 
recommendations based on findings.  
• Inventorying current performance management and improvement practices 
within the DHS, highlighting some of the department’s more successful 
strategies and solutions to implement the GPRA-MA of 2010;  
• Further assessing these approaches against the underlying principles of the 
GPRA-MA of 2010 and relevant best practices contained in this thesis; 
and  
• Selecting/tailoring the specific improvement recommendations, contained 
in Chapter VII, based on actual performance management and/or cultural 
climate deficiencies, in order to best leverage the Act to increase 
accountability and improve public and organizational trust. 
To accomplish this, the researcher can adopt the process of a hypothesis-driven 
multiple, collective case study. 
a. Step 1: Identify the Number of Cases 
The researcher can inventory some of the current (more successful) DHS 
strategies and solutions to implement the GPRA-MA of 2010, including a review of 
existing practices at the headquarters level and/or within its seven (7) major components 
(i.e., CBP, CIS, USCG, FEMA, ICE, TSA, USSS), organizations, units, sub-units, etc.. 
b. Step 2: Discuss the Relevance and/or Importance of these Cases 
Each performance practitioner or subject matter expert interviewed can be 
asked to describe and assess their current efforts to implement the GPRA-MA of 2010 in 
the context of public and organizational accountability. In addition, they can be asked to 
qualitatively evaluate their approaches, strategies and solutions against the underlying 
principles of the GPRA-MA of 2010 and/or relevant best practices. 
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c. Step 3: Conduct Analysis 
The Researcher can then adopt thematic qualitative analysis to analyze the 
results of these face-to-face interviews, summarizing findings according to themes, 
patterns, variables, causes, and correlative factors. Particular emphasis should be placed 
on determining both (a) the outcome or how successful the interviewees have been in 
implementing the GPRA-MA of 2010 within all five (5) focus areas of the legislation, 
and (b) the corresponding accountability variable or how these efforts are affecting or 
being affected by (the lack of) public and organizational accountability. 
Open-ended, focused questions can be asked in order to glean information 
from subject matter experts based on their experience, perceptions, opinions, feelings, 
and knowledge of strategic performance management in the context of the GPRA-MA of 
2010 and public/organizational accountability. These data can then be recorded, 
transcribed into single-spaced pages, and then coded/interpreted according to initial 
themes and sub-themes based on the following criteria:  
• Five (5) GPRA-MA focus area(s); 
• Overarching research questions (i.e., condition, cost, consequence, 
application) specifically relating to public and organizational 
accountability; 
• Additional ad-hoc themes contained in the literature review; and  
• Five (5) conditions contributing to strategic performance 
management and/or GPRA-MA ineffectiveness/inefficiency. 
In coding/interpreting the interview results, the researcher can adopt the 
constant comparison method, a reiterative process of category refinement, consisting of 
breaking down the data into color-coded data bits, identifying preliminary category 
names and rules of inclusion, creating a tentative list of all categories and sub-categories, 
adding to, subtracting from and/or revising the original themes and sub-themes, in order 
to “group answers according to [the] common questions [and themes], analyz[ing] 
different perspectives on central issues,”217 draw conclusions and recommend ways to 
                                                 
217 Jane F. Dye, Irene M. Schatz, Brian A. Rosenberg, and Susanne T. Coleman, “Constant 
Comparison Method: A Kaleidoscope of Data,” The Qualitative Report 4, nos. 1/2 (January 2000), 
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR4–1/dye.html. 
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improve. In understanding the research results relative to both the GPRA-MA 
implementation and the conditions impacting its success, various processes such as 
categorization, comparison, inductive analysis, and refinement of data bits and categories 
can be utilized (see Step 4 below).  
The goal is to (1) cull information from the interviews based on the 
various themes and sub-themes, looking for internal homogeneity—coherence within a 
theme and external heterogeneity—distinct themes that represent the data set with clear 
relationships and a connection to any of the above-mentioned themes and sub-themes, (2) 
draw valid conclusions from these findings (see Step 4 below), and finally (3) make 
recommendations for improvement based on the developing trends, desirable system 
characteristics and successful case studies identified (see Step 5 below). 
Discussion of the results of the analysis from each of these individual case 
studies can be comprised of the following four (4) components, present in most research 
designs:  
• A rationale for studying each case; 
• A detailed description of the facts related to the specific 
individual(s), program(s), or event(s) studied; 
• A description of the data collected: 
• Responses as they relate to outcome (i.e., success or failure) 
in implementing the GPRA-MA of 2010 within all five (5) 
focus areas of the legislation; 
• Responses as they relate to (i.e., support or refute) the 
study’s propositions/hypotheses (i.e., conditions);  
• A discussion of the major themes and patterns indicating 
similarities and/or differences, articulated around the following 
criteria: 
• Responses as they relate to the study’s problem statement 
and interview questions (i.e., two-part survey 
questionnaire);  
• Responses as they relate to the accountability variable (i.e., 
the cause and/or consequence of the outcome) or how their 
efforts are affecting or being affected by public and 
organizational accountability or the lack thereof. 
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d. Step 4: Interpret Research Results 
The interpretation of the results of the research conducted using the 
interview questions and survey questionnaire should be two-fold: 
• Research Results/Findings (Current State):218 Exploratory and descriptive 
(qualitative) data discussing current DHS strategic performance 
management programs and processes using the multiple, collective case 
study approach, in answer to the question: What is DHS already doing?: 
(a) DHS Headquarters; (b) CBP; (c) CIS; (d) FEMA; (e) ICE; (f) TSA; (g) 
USCG; (h) USSS or other DHS organization, unit, sub-unit, etc. 
• Research Results/Interpretation (Gap Analysis):219 Analytical and 
explanatory convergence (i.e., triangulation) of the (qualitative) data, 
summarizing findings according to themes, patterns, variables, causes, and 
correlative factors. Current DHS strategic performance management 
programs and processes can be connected to the larger theme of public and 
organizational accountability, weighing current DHS practices against best 
practices in order to determine any gaps, in answer to the question: What 
is DHS not doing? 
In addition to the above analysis and commentary focusing on individual 
organizations, there should be a summary discussion of responses as they relate to the 
Accountability variable (i.e., the cause and/or consequence of the outcome) or how DHS 
efforts are affecting or being affected by (the lack of) public and organizational 
accountability, in answer to the thesis’ problem statement and research questions: 
2. Overarching/Fundamental Research Question(s) 
How has the lack of true public and organizational accountability rendered the 
GPRA-MA of 2010 ineffective at improving and communicating performance and results 
and what can the DHS do to remedy this situation? 
• Condition (Pure Research): The lack of accountability has rendered the 
GPRA-MA of 2010 ineffective, which in turn impedes organizational 
trust, participation, cooperation and collaboration, both intra- and inter-
agency, and vis-à-vis the public at large, perpetuating a vicious circle. 
Why? How?  
• Cost (Pure Research): This situation prevents the improvement and 
communication of performance and results. How?  
                                                 
218 See Step 3. 
219 Ibid. 
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• Consequence (Pure Research): How are these inadequate performance 
management practices negatively impacting DHS mission effectiveness 
and efficiency?  
• Application (Practical Research): How can DHS leverage the GPRA-
MA of 2010 to create, then cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e., a 
high-trust culture) within the Department, and vis-à-vis the general public? 
Finally, the Blue Ocean Strategy’s Four Actions Framework can be used to 
articulate discussion of the results of the findings/interpretation from each of these 
individual case studies in answer to the questions, “What is [DHS] already doing?” 
(Current State), “What is [DHS] not doing?” (Gap Analysis) and “What should [DHS] be 
doing?” (End State). 
E. THE BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY© 
The researcher can adopt the Blue Ocean Strategy© approach innovated by 
authors W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne to better organize and interpret the current 
state and gap analysis findings, relative to both the implementation of the GPRA-MA of 
2010 and the various climatic conditions and deficiencies (i.e., causes and/or evidence) 
impacting its success.  
Diverging from most traditional strategic planning methodologies, Blue Ocean 
Strategy© seeks to create true value by providing decision-makers with various 
frameworks and analytical tools that allow them to break free from existing 
environmental constraints, both internal and external. Value Innovation, the cornerstone 
to Kim and Mauborgne’s philosophy, is created when strategy favorably affects both 
effectiveness (i.e., value) and efficiency (i.e., cost). Cost savings are made by eliminating 
and reducing the factors that cause competition. Value is attained by raising and creating 
elements that are new and/or unique, setting organizations apart in uncontested market 
space.220  
Articulated around six (6) principles necessary to ensure such value innovation, 
such as reconstructing market boundaries, focusing on the big picture, reaching beyond 
                                                 
220 W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, The Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested 
Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 
2005), 16. 
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existing demand, getting the strategic sequence right, overcoming key organizational 
hurdles, and building execution into strategy, Blue Ocean Strategy© ensures 
differentiation from standard operating procedure and common results.  
This researcher has already applied the Blue Ocean Strategy’s Four Actions 
Framework221 to identify ways to eliminate and/or reduce causes of SPM/GPRA-MA 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency, while highlighting actions that would either 
raise/increase and/or create conditions conducive to improving public and organizational 
accountability. Using this analytical tool, the researcher asked four key questions to 
challenge the various DHS organizations’ strategic logic and performance-related 
business models: 
• Which practices within the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas, taken for 
granted, should be eliminated in order to increase public trust and 
organizational accountability? 
• Which factors should be reduced well below standard expectations? 
• Which elements should be raised well above standard practices? 
• Which practices should be created to revolutionize the way current DHS 
leaders and performance management and improvement practitioners, 
partners and stakeholders consider and apply strategic performance 
management? 
Impacting the causes of ineffectiveness and/or inefficiency in GPRA-MA focus 
areas 1, 4 and 5, or leadership engagement/collaboration/learning/improvement (1), 
performance reviews (4), and transparency/accountability (5) respectively, were 
identified as being crucial to impacting culture, and therefore deficiencies within these 
areas were slated to be completely eliminated, and replaced with the creation of new 
dynamics. Regarding focus areas 2 and 3, or performance measurement and program 
evaluation (2) and strategic clarity and organizational alignment (3), considered less 
important to cultural change, efforts would focus on reducing the causes contributing to 
the lack of current success, while raising standards that would lead to greater 
effectiveness.  
 
                                                 
221 Kim and Mauborgne, The Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and 
Make the Competition Irrelevant, 29. 
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The following scale of 1 to 5 was used to establish a best practices baseline, 
relating to GPRA-MA ineffectiveness/inefficiency, in answer to the question, “How do 
deficiencies in each of the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas impede implementation of the 
Act within your organization?” 
1 – Does not Impact Success 
2 – Slightly Hinders Success 
3 – Somewhat Hinders Success 
4 – Hinders Success 
5 – Greatly Hinders Success 
Through our initial analysis, detailed in Chapter V, section 2 (i.e., GPRA-MA 
deficiencies and strategic performance management culture within the DHS), we have 
already demonstrated that improving performance within the Department will “counter-
intuitively” require paying particular attention to certain GPRA-MA focus areas and 
conditions that have been minimized and/or neglected to date. That means identifying 
GPRA-MA focus areas 1, 4 and 5, and conditions 1, 2 and 4 as leverage points, which is 
contrary to and contradicts the legislation’s primary emphasis on performance 
measurement in support of strategic clarity and organizational alignment, and 
political/administrative governance and oversight, as being the key factors affecting 
change.  
Because our best practices baseline is counterintuitive, it has not been tried or 
proven yet. “Counterintuitive” is often the most appropriate word to use when describing 
complex systems, however, because as systems become complex, their behavior can 
become surprising, having leverage points that are frequently not intuitive, and when they 
are, often used “backward” to maintain status quo, as opposed to improving or 
innovating, systematically worsening whatever problems one is attempting to solve.222 
We have chosen to push through such knee-jerk resistance, by applying the four 
actions framework, which causes us to think more broadly about systems change, making 
every effort to mitigate deficiencies in focus areas 1, 4 and 5, to the point that they are no 
longer impacting success. Implementing best practices in these areas means achieving  
 
                                                 
222 Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer, 2734–2736. 
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number one (1) on the scale. For focus areas 2 and 3, success is expressed in terms of 
ensuring that any ineffectiveness and inefficiency is only slightly hindering success, or 
achieving number two (2) on the scale.  
So, even though we are stuck with working within the strict parameters of the Act 
to affect federal government performance, we can at least attempt to move its “levers” in 
a more radical fashion than has been attempted before. 
It is not that parameters are not important— they can be, especially in the short 
term and to the individual who’s standing directly in the flow. People care deeply about 
[…] variables […]. But changing these variables rarely changes the behavior of […] 
system[s]. If the system is chronically stagnant, parameter changes rarely kick-start it. If 
it is wildly variable, they usually do not stabilize it. If it is growing out of control, they do 
not slow it down.223 
See Blue Ocean Strategy Four Actions Framework #1, depicting these elements 
within the five (5) focus areas that would either need to be created/raised or 
eliminated/reduced to instill a culture of accountability. 
                                                 
223 Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer, 2774–2778. 
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Blue Ocean Strategy: 
Four (4) Actions Framework 
ELIMINATE RAISE 
5 – Lack of Transparency and Accountability  
5a – Eliminate Lack of Transparency in 
Communicating/Reporting Results 
5b – Eliminate Stove-Piped Strategic 
Performance Planning and Reporting 
5c – Eliminate Political Hubris 
5d – Eliminate Lack of Public Understanding of 
Government Operations 
5e – Eliminate Compliance-Only Reporting 
5f – Eliminate Ad-Hoc Congressional 
Engagement 
5g – Eliminate Unnecessary, Outdated, 
Duplicative Strategic Plans/Reports 
5h – Eliminate Multiplicity of Congressional 
Committees 
5i – Eliminate Inadequate Performance 
Monitoring and Reporting Systems (i.e., COPS) 
3- Performance Measurement and Program 
Evaluation 
3a – Raise Performance Management and 
Measurement Analytics 
3b – Raise Objectivity 
3c – Raise Data Quality, Accuracy and Timeliness 
3d – Raise Outcome-Oriented Performance Measures 
3e – Raise Stretch Targets 
REDUCE CREATE 
2 – Lack of Strategic Clarity and 
Organizational Alignment 
2a – Reduce Non-Connectivity Among Plans, 
Programs, Results 
2b – Reduce Competing and Contradictory 
Priorities 
2c – Reduce Unintentional Gaps and 
Duplicative/Redundant Efforts 
2d – Reduce Top-Down Goal Setting 
2e – Reduce Prescriptive, Centralized, Stove-
Piped SPM 
2f – Reduce Politics and/or Negotiated 
Compromise 
2g – Reduce Inconsistent and Non-Integrated 
SPM Systems and Tools 
2h – Reduce Stove-Piped Organizational and 
Strategic Planning 
1 - Leadership 
Engagement/Collaboration/Learning/Improvement 
1a – Create Leadership Engagement/Commitment 
1b – Create Cross-Organizational Collaboration 
1c – Create Independent Thought 
1d – Create Best Practices 
1e – Create Flexibility, Creativity, Innovation 
4 – Performance Reviews 
4a – Create Periodic Progress Reviews 
4b – Create Inquisitive Performance Reviews 
4c – Create Data-Informed Decision-Making 
4d – Create Feedback and/or Follow Through (i.e., 
Improvement Plans) 
4e – Create Streamlined Reviews 
Table 11.   Blue Ocean Strategy Four Actions Framework #1: Instilling a Culture of 
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A similar process was applied to establish a best practices baseline for the 
Conditions as well, in answer to the question, ““How are each of the five Conditions 
impeding successful SPM and GPRA-MA implementation within your organization?” 
Conditions 1 and 4 were to be completely eliminated, with best practices topping 
out at number one (1) on the scale. Efforts should be made to ensure that the second 
condition was only slightly hindering success, or number two (2) on the scale, while 
conditions 3 and 5 would be allowed to “somewhat hinder success” (i.e., number three), 
without having any great impact on public and organizational trust.  
See Blue Ocean Strategy Four Actions Framework #2, depicting which of these 
cultural conditions would either need to be created/raised or eliminated/reduced to instill 
a culture of accountability. 
Blue Ocean Strategy: 
Four (4) Action Framework 
ELIMINATE RAISE 
(C4) Administrative Top-Down Command-and-
Control 
(C2) Best Practices and/or Non-Traditional 
Performance Management Solutions 
REDUCE CREATE 
(C3) Influence of Politics 
(C5) Bureaucratic Governance/Oversight 
(C1) Public and Organizational Accountability/High-
Trust Culture 
Table 12.   Blue Ocean Strategy Four Actions Framework #2: Instilling a Culture of 
Accountability by Impacting Conditions (C) Contributing to Strategic 
Performance Management/GPRA-MA Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency 
1. The Blue Ocean Strategy Canvasses 
Strategy canvasses are both diagnostic and action tools, demonstrating an 
organization’s current constrained performance, based on various factors or criteria along 
the horizontal axes, when compared with unconstrained desired end state, or best 
practices benchmarking.  
The basic principle is that true change can only be accomplished through dramatic 
transformation that sets organizations apart from standards, by placing them in 
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uncontested “market space”, as opposed to simply through incremental progress, which 
leaves these same organizations stuck in the morass of competitive mediocrity.224 
The initial result findings using the above-mentioned research methodology can 
be presented using Blue Ocean Strategy Canvasses, visually/graphically depicting the 
current state of SPM/GPRA-MA within the major DHS components, organizations, units, 
sub-units, etc. in answer to the question: What is DHS already doing?  
As indicated, the four actions framework was used to establish best practices 
baselines.  
Weighing current DHS strategic performance management practices, programs 
and processes, against these best practices, expressed in terms of the current state of DHS 
GPRA-MA implementation and the conditions affecting its implementation, will allow 
the researcher to conduct a gap analysis in answer to the question: What is DHS not doing 
(but should be doing)?  
Strategy Canvass #1 can be used to depict DHS progress in implementing the 
GPRA-MA of 2010 across its five (5) focus areas, as well as its current status with 
regards to the five (5) cultural conditions contributing to successful strategic performance 
management and, ultimately, accountability (i.e., Strategy Canvass #2).  
Following these initial result findings and identification of any gaps, specific 
tailored actions to achieve any of the thesis’ recommendations, deemed relevant to one’s 
organization, can then be considered to raise and/or create conditions more conducive to 
improving public and organizational accountability, eliminating and/or reducing the 
causes of GPRA-MA ineffectiveness and inefficiency.  
                                                 
224 Kim and Mauborgne. The Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and 
Make the Competition Irrelevant, 25–28. 

























































How do deficiencies in each of the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas impede 
implementation of the Act within your organization?: 
 
0 – Not Applicable (i.e., Cause and/or Evidence of 
Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency Non-Existent) 
1 – Doesn’t Impact Success 
2 – Slightly Hinders Success 
3 – Somewhat Hinders Success 
4 – Hinders Success 
5 – Greatly Hinders Success 
Figure 8.  Blue Ocean Strategy Canvass #1: Instilling a Culture of Accountability 
through Successful GPRA-MA Implementation —Five (5) Focus Areas  





























































How do each of the five conditions impede successful SPM and GPRA-MA 
implementation within your organization?: 
 
0 – Not Applicable (i.e. Condition Non-Existent and/or Not 
Necessary) 
1 – Doesn’t Impact Success 
2 – Slightly Hinders Success 
3 – Somewhat Hinders Success 
4 – Hinders Success 
5 – Greatly Hinders Success 
Figure 9.  Blue Ocean Strategy Canvass #2: Instilling a Culture of Accountability by 
Impacting Conditions (C) Contributing to Strategic Performance 
Management/GPRA-MA Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency  
a.  Step 5: Outcome/Recommendations (End State)  
The major outcome of the supplementary research is to make specific 
improvement recommendations to increase accountability by improving performance 
management strategies and solutions within the context of the GPRA-MA framework.  
Providing these end state outcome recommendations will require 
predictive (qualitative) research and problem statement resolution, in answer to the 
question: What should DHS be doing (differently) to improve its performance 
management strategies and solutions with the intent of increasing accountability within 
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and across the Department and vis-à-vis the American public? This will first entail 
summarizing and interpreting the findings, then making recommendations on what DHS 
should be doing and how it should be doing it to close any identified gaps in 
performance.  
The recommendations contained in Chapter VII of this thesis, can then be 
selected and tailored, based on an actual capability baseline, in light of the results of the 
survey questionnaire and subsequent interviews, focusing on both the 
philosophical/theoretical as well as the practical applications of strategic performance 
management within the five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA-MA, and the five (5) 
conditions impacting the legislation’s effectiveness.  
In order to move beyond the status quo, and ensure that the Act is 
improving performance results within the DHS, focus has been placed on actions that 
create, then cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e. high-trust). This involves improving 
the noted deficiencies in the five (5) pillars of the GPRA-MA, by impacting conditions 
contributing to those inefficiencies, and selecting more flexible, creative and innovative 
solutions to increase public engagement, collaboration, and cooperation within the 
discipline of strategic performance management.  
It means focusing on how the DHS can better leverage the GPRA-MA, as 
well as public and private best practices, to bridge the gap between traditional definitions 
of public accountability (i.e., government effectiveness and efficiency) and its more non-
traditional interpretations of improved organizational and public trust. 
2. DHS Performance Community 
The DHS Performance Community, led by the COO and the PIO, is operationally 
supported by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) located under the 
CFO within the DHS Under-Secretary for Management (US/M). The DHS performance 
community, also known as the DHS performance team, has been an enduring structure 
since DHS was formed and is comprised of the performance measurement experts 
representing the components and headquarters offices in DHS. The performance team 
meets monthly, and serves as a forum to share best practices, review policy, guidance, 
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timelines, and discuss initiatives related to performance management. This community’s 
structure may vary depending on leadership direction. See the following figure for a 
diagram of this structure. 
 
 
Figure 10.  DHS Performance Community225 
3. Interview Questions 
a. Background Questions 
• What type of work do you do? Who do you work with? How 
would you characterize your level within your organization (i.e., 
front-line manager, SES and/or top-level officials (COO, PIO, 
political appointee, etc.)?  
• Are you directly/indirectly involved in the implementation of the 
GPRA-MA of 2010 within your organization? 
                                                 
225 Department of Homeland Security, CFO Policy Manual: Chapter 5.0 “DHS Performance 
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b. Overarching/Fundamental Research Question(s) 
• What is the prevailing attitude within your organization (among 
leadership, management and the performance community) toward 
the GPRA-MA of 2010?  
• How have you been implementing its requirements within all five 
(5) focus areas? In which areas have you excelled (i.e., been 
pioneers), made some progress (i.e., been migratory), and/or 
stagnated (i.e., settled)? Would you be willing to share a brief 
explanation about those programs and/or processes where you have 
been successful? 
• Of the five (5) conditions (i.e., (C1) public and organizational 
accountability/high-trust culture; (C2) best practices and/or non-
traditional performance management solutions; (C3) influence of 
politics; (C4) administrative top-down command-and-control; (C5) 
bureaucratic governance/ oversight) identified as potentially 
impacting GPRA-MA implementation, which one(s) have impeded 
success in your organization the most? Why? 
• How would you describe a low-trust organization? How would you 
describe a high-trust organization?  
• Do you believe that your organization has a culture of public and 
organizational accountability (i.e., high-trust culture, participation, 
cooperation and collaboration) both internally within your 
organization and DHS, and externally within OMB/GAO and the 
general public? Why? Why not? 
• Do you feel that the GPRA-MA implementation has been hindered 
by this lack of accountability? If so, in what ways? In terms of 
performance management? Mission effectiveness/efficiency? 
• Have your current performance management approaches, 
strategies, solutions improved outcomes and/or increased 
accountability? If not, what can your organization do to 
alleviate/remedy this situation? 
• How can DHS better leverage the GPRA-MA of 2010 to create, 
then cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e., a high-trust culture) 
within your organization, DHS, and vis-à-vis the general public? 
(1) Questions Relating to GPRA-MA Focus Area #1: 
Leadership Engagement, Collaboration, Learning. 
• What do you believe are the greatest contributors to leadership’s 
commitment to creating a positive learning and performance 
improvement culture? What are the greatest challenges? 
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• Do you believe that there has been a lack of agency leadership 
commitment and engagement to elevate the importance of the 
performance management and improvement discipline and create a 
performance culture inspiring continual learning and improvement 
within your organization? Why? Why not?  
• Has this lack of leadership commitment and engagement adversely 
affected organizational trust, participation, cooperation and 
collaboration both intra- and inter-agency, and vis-à-vis the public 
at large. In what ways?  
• Does your organization prefer top-down command-and-control 
hierarchies versus collaborative networks and interpersonal 
relationships to manage transformation and affect lasting cultural 
change? More specifically, does your organization tend to focus on 
short-term, stove-piped, day-to-day obligations and operational 
expediencies, rather than long-term, system-wide, vision and 
desired end-state decision-making? If so, what have been the costs 
of this preference? What are we missing out on, in terms of 
mission efficiency and effectiveness?  
• How can leadership, collaborative networks/partnerships/ 
organizational learning, that involves all stakeholders and 
emphasizes innovation, adaptability and the utilization of new (i.e., 
innovative) knowledge, be leveraged to create and cultivate a 
culture of accountability (i.e., a high-trust culture) within your 
organization, the Department of Homeland Security, and vis-à-vis 
the general public? 
(2) Questions Relating to GPRA-MA Focus Area #2: Strategic 
Planning, Strategic Clarity, Organizational Alignment. 
• What have been the greatest contributors and hindrances to 
ensuring organizational alignment and strategic clarity within your 
agency? 
• Have your strategic performance management frameworks 
struggled with creating a clear line of sight between high-level 
strategic goals and individual program and personnel contributions 
and associated outcome measures. If so, why?  
• Has this lack of strategic alignment adversely affected your 
mission efficiency and effectiveness? If so, how?  
• Have your strategic performance management frameworks 
preferred the rational or prescriptive versus descriptive side of 
strategy, development, implementation and assessment? How 
successful have your approaches to strategic planning, tactical 
planning, financial planning, management reporting, and human 
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resource allocation been in increasing public accountability and/or 
organizational trust?  
• How can your organization leverage the GPRA-MA of 2010 to 
develop strategy, translate it into operational actions, and monitor 
and improve the effectiveness of both? 
(3) Questions Relating to GPRA-MA Focus Area #3: Program 
Evaluation, Performance Measurement. 
• What have been the greatest contributors and hindrances to 
improving the quality of your organization’s performance 
measures and building analytic capacity to produce and analyze 
timely, actionable performance information for decision-making? 
• Have your strategic performance management frameworks 
integrated program analysis and evaluation, and/or business 
process transformation processes into its efforts to understand and 
improve results? If so, how effective have these processes been?  
• Has this lack of robust analytics adversely affected mission 
efficiency and effectiveness? If so, in what ways?  
• Have your strategic performance management frameworks 
preferred to relegate analysis and evaluation to the programmatic 
level versus the cross-cutting strategic level. What have been the 
costs of this preference? What are we missing out on, in terms of 
mission efficiency and effectiveness? How have such stove-piped 
approaches affected public accountability and/or organizational 
trust?  
• How can your organization leverage the GPRA-MA of 2010 to 
improve its program auditing, program evaluation and data 
analytics, performance measurements, and business process 
transformation policies, practices and processes in a way that 
enhances both public and organizational accountability? 
(4) Questions Relating to GPRA-MA Focus Area #4: 
Performance Reviews, Improvement. 
• What have been the greatest contributors and hindrances to 
conducting frequent, data-driven reviews to improve performance 
results (i.e., effectiveness and efficiency)?  
• Do your strategic performance management frameworks utilize 
public and/or internal scorecards/dashboards (i.e., web-enabled 
performance monitoring and evaluation (M&A) or reporting 
systems or databases) to monitor and report on results? If so, how 
effective have these systems been?  
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• Has a lack of transparency adversely affected mission efficiency 
and effectiveness within your organization? How?  
• Have your government strategic performance management 
frameworks preferred top-down command-and-control compliance 
reporting to prove success rather than regularly scheduled (i.e., 
routine) performance reviews to improve performance? If so, what 
have been the costs of this preference? What are we missing out 
on, in terms of mission efficiency and effectiveness? How have 
such traditional, reductionist, Newtonian approaches affected 
public accountability and/or organizational trust?  
• How can your organization leverage the GPRA-MA of 2010 to 
enhance its internal and external performance monitoring, 
reporting and review systems and processes in a way that enhances 
both public and organizational accountability? 
(5) Questions Relating to GPRA-MA Focus Area #5: 
Transparency, Decision-Making, Accountability. 
• Have your strategic performance management frameworks and 
governance structures increased the transparency and improved the 
decision-making of your operations both internally with leadership, 
DHS, and/or management and oversight bodies and externally with 
the general public. If so, how? If not, why not?  
• Has this increased transparency and improved decision-making 
resulted in accountability? If so, how? If not, why not? 
• Has placing the emphasis on public organizational performance, 
through improved transparency and decision-making, for example, 
hindered your organization’s ability to achieve greater public 
and/or organizational accountability (i.e., trust, participation, 
cooperation and collaboration)? If so, how? What have been the 
consequences?  
• How can your organization leverage the GPRA-MA of 2010 to 
bridge the gap between public organizational performance and 
public accountability, to translate improved government 
effectiveness and efficiency into improved public trust, 
participation, cooperation and collaboration? 
(6) Summary Question. 
• Is there anything else you think is important for the researcher to 
know? Do you have any additional comments/ideas for what works 
(i.e., what you have been using) or suggestions for what could 
work better in the arena of strategic performance management, the 
GPRA-MA, and public and organizational accountability?  
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4. Two-Part Survey Questionnaire 
Survey Questionnaire #1: 
Instilling a Culture of Accountability through Successful GPRA-MA 
Implementation 
Five (5) Focus Areas226 
Instructions: Please complete the following questionnaire in answer to 
the question “How do the following variables in each of the five (5) GPRA-MA focus 
areas impede implementation of the Act within your organization?” 
                                                 
226 GPRA-MA focus areas: (1) Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and 
Improvement: demonstrating leadership commitment to creating a positive learning and performance 
improvement culture; (2) Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment: aligning individual, program, 
and agency priorities through annual planning and goal–setting; (3) Performance Measurement and 
Program Evaluation: improving the quality of performance measures, by building analytic capacity to 
produce and analyze timely, actionable performance information for decision-making; (4) Performance 
Reviews: conducting frequent, data-driven reviews to improve performance outcomes and reduce costs; and 
(5) Transparency and Accountability: communicating and reporting transparent performance information 
frequently and effectively to increase accountability and results. 
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#1 - Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement 5 4 3 2 1 0 
(1a) Insufficient leadership engagement/commitment to drive performance improvement (i.e., limited, 
minimally compliant leadership engagement)       
(1b) Insufficient cross-organizational collaboration       
(1c) Organizational group think       
(1d) Common (vs. Best) Practices       
(1e) Lack of flexibility, creativity, innovation       
(1f) Hierarchical, cultural and traditional forces systematically resisting change       
#2 - Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment 5 4 3 2 1 0 
(2a) Lack of connectivity among agency plans, programs and performance results (i.e., disjointed goal 
setting and misaligned performance measures)      
 
(2b) Competing and often contradictory priorities       
(2c) Unintentional gaps and duplicative, or redundant efforts       
(2d) Top-down (vs. bottom-up) goal (and/or priority) setting       
(2e) Prescriptive vs. descriptive strategic performance management (i.e., centralized, formalized, 
stove-piped approaches to strategic planning and reporting)      
 
(2f) Politics or negotiated compromise, inadvertently resulting in mission slippage and drift       
(2g) Lack of consistent/integrated frameworks, processes, sub-processes and tools to develop 
strategy, translate it into operational actions, and monitor progress and improve performance      
 
                                                 
227 0 – Not Applicable (i.e. Cause and/or Evidence of Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency Non-Existent); 1 – Doesn’t Impact Success; 2 – Slightly Hinders 
Success; 3 – Somewhat Hinders Success; 4 – Hinders Success; 5 – Greatly Hinders Success. 
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#3 - Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation 5 4 3 2 1 0 
(3a) Inadequate application of performance management/measurement analytics       
(3b) Credibility issues, involving bias or lack of objectivity (i.e., subjective vs. objective judgments)       
(3c) Insufficient quality, accuracy, and timeliness of data       
(3d) Output- vs. outcome-oriented performance measures       
(3e) “Gaming the system” by establishing easily achievable measures and targets       
#4 - Performance Reviews 5 4 3 2 1 0 
(4a) Absence of periodic progress reviews       
(4b) Punitive (vs. inquisitive) performance reviews       
(4c) Information/data is produced, but not used (i.e., in management and operational decision-
making)      
 
(4d) Insufficient feedback and/or follow through (i.e., improvement plans)       
(4e) Bureaucratic complexity (i.e., multiple layers of review and lack of cohesive and consistent 
management processes and operational coordination)      
 
#5 - Transparency and Accountability 5 4 3 2 1 0 
(5a) Lack of transparency in communicating and/or reporting performance results       
(5b) Stove-piped strategic performance planning and reporting       
(5c) Political hubris (i.e., decisions influenced by power politics, rather than purely objective and 
neutral decision-making      
 
(5d) Lack of public understanding of how government works (i.e., lack of public access to agency 
planning and performance information)      
 
(5e) Proving success (i.e., compliance reporting) vs. improving performance and results (i.e., 
accountability)      
 
(5f) Ad-hoc Congressional engagement       
(5g) Unnecessary (i.e., outdated, duplicative) strategic and performance plans and reports       
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(5h) Multiplicity of congressional authorizing and appropriations committees       
(5i) Inadequate performance monitoring and reporting systems integrating large amounts of relevant 
quantitative and qualitative data from diverse sources to provide situational awareness (i.e., common 
operating picture) 
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Survey Questionnaire #2: 
Instilling a Culture of Accountability by Impacting Conditions (C) Contributing to 
Strategic Performance Management/GPRA-MA Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency 
 
Instructions: Please complete the following questionnaire in answer to the 
question “How do each of the five Conditions impede successful SPM and GPRA-MA 
implementation within your organization? 
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Conditions of Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency Scale 1–5228 































































































5 4 3 2 1 0 
(C1) There is a lack of the creation and sustainment of a “High-Trust Culture” (i.e., Public 
Accountability)       
(C2) Performance improvement is a “Wicked Problem,” particularly difficult to resolve, requiring 
non-traditional solutions, uncommon/unfamiliar to most government institutions       
(C3) Political considerations, wherein management decisions are sometimes being made based on 
political issues or hot topics instead of based on evidence that points to a particular alternative that 
would actually improve performance, rather than, simply prove success 
      
(C4) There is an administrative/bureaucratic tendency to direct and control, which produces 
stagnation       
(C5) There is inadequate administrative governance (i.e., bureaucratic oversight)       
 
                                                 
228 0 – Not Applicable (i.e. Condition Non-Existent and/or Not Necessary); 1 – Doesn’t Impact Success; 2 – Slightly Hinders Success; 3 – 
Somewhat Hinders Success; 4 – Hinders Success; 5 – Greatly Hinders Success. 
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